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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
The main aim of this research is two-fold; firstly, these chapters will seek to demonstrate the 
unreliability of theoretical or abstract approaches to legal reasoning in describing the law. 
Secondly, rather than merely providing a deconstruction of previous attempts to classify 
private law, the chapters attempt to construct an overlapping approach to classification. This 
represents a new way of classifying private law, which builds on the foundations of the 
lessons of legal realism and explains how classification can accommodate overlaps to assist 
in identifying the core elements of private law reasoning. Following the realist tradition, the 
thesis argues for narrower formulations of the concepts of property, contract and tort. It is 
then argued that within these narrower concepts, the law is made more predictable and 
clearer. Importantly, adopting the overlapping analysis, we can explain the areas that we have 
removed from property, contract and tort as overlaps with these core concepts. The purpose is 
to recognise that legal concepts can be best understood as links between facts and judicial 
decision making, and the best way to achieve this is to reject discrete categorisation and, 
instead, to recognise the overlapping of legal concepts. 
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 CHAPTER 1: CLASSIFYING PRIVATE LAW 
 
 
Regula est, quae rem quae est breviter enarrat. Non ut ex regula jus sumatur, sed ex jure 
quod est regula fiat. That is a rule which concisely states the actual doctrine of the case. 
The law is not taken from the rule, but the rule is made by the law.
1
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The main aim of this research is two-fold; firstly, these chapters will seek to 
demonstrate the unreliability of theoretical or abstract approaches to legal reasoning 
in describing the law. Secondly, rather than merely providing a deconstruction of 
previous attempts to classify private law, the chapters attempt to construct an 
overlapping approach to classification. In doing so, it incorporates and explains the 
overlapping of legal concepts. This represents a new way of classifying private law, 
which builds on the foundations of the lessons of legal realism and explains how 
classification can accommodate overlaps to assist in identifying the core elements of 
private law reasoning. To begin with, it is important to state why this thesis, and the 
overlapping analysis that it introduces, is desperately needed. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
1
 Paulus D 50. 17. 1, as reproduced and translated in JG Phillimore, Principles and Maxims of 
Jurisprudence (John W Parker 1856) at 92.  
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2. The Role of Classification 
 
There have been many previous attempts to comprehensively codify or arrange 
English private law, all of which have been met with limited success.
2
 In recent times, 
the quest to classify English private law has taken on a renewed focus.
3
 One of the 
significant factors in this resurgence of interest in classifying the law has undoubtedly 
been the recognition of the law of unjust enrichment in England. Those writing on the 
subject have sought to find a place on the map for this developing area of private 
law.
4
 However, the debate has gone much further than this. Attempts to classify 
private law have also raised important questions about the way in which English 
lawyers apply logic and deductive reasoning, and the systematic arrangement of 
private law actions.
5
 In particular, many of those seeking to classify English Law have 
sought to use an approach to classification which would represent a fundamental shift 
in the way that we approach legal reasoning.  
 
                                                 
 
 
2
 S Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal 
Reasoning (CUP 2003) at ch 1; H Hollond, ‗English Legal Authors before 1700‘ (1947) 9 CLJ 292 at 
296; R Brown, ‗The Law of England During the Period of the Commonwealth‘ (1931) 6 Indiana LJ 
359 at 367-370. 
3
 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (rev edn, Clarendon Press 1989); P Birks, 
‗Misnomer‘ in WR Cornish et al (eds), Restitution Past, Present and Future:. Essays in Honour of 
Gareth Jones (1998); G Samuel, Can the Common Law be Mapped? (2005) 55 Univ of Toronto LJ 
271; G Virgo, What is the Law of Restitution About? in WR Cornish et al (eds), Restitution Past, 
Present and Future:. Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Hart 1998); A Beever and C Rickett, 
‗Interpretative Legal Theory and the Academic Lawyer‘ (2005) 68 MLR 320; A Burrows, ‗Contract, 
Tort and Restitution – A Satisfactory Division or Not?‘ (1983) 99 LQR 217; P Birks (ed), The 
Classification of Obligations (OUP 1997); C Rickett and R Grantham (eds), Structure and Justification 
in Private Law: Essays for Peter Birks (Hart 2008); P Jaffey, Private Law and Property Claims (Hart 
2007). 
4
 See in general P Birks, 'Misnomer' in WR Cornish et al (eds) Restitution, Past, Present and Future 
(Hart 1998), M McInnes, ‗Restitution, Unjust Enrichment and the Perfect Quadration Thesis‘ [1999] 
RLR 118; A Burrows, ‗Quadrating Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: A Matter of Principle‘ [2000] 
RLR 257. 
5
 P Birks, ‗Definition and Division‘ in P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (OUP 1997). 
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The arguments made by the unjust enrichment lawyers, whatever our opinion on the 
substantive proposals, cannot be ignored. In the past, it may have been the case that 
judges could dismiss the work of academics for being too theoretical,
6
 or maybe to 
maintain their role as the exclusive voice of the law.
7
 That is no longer the case. 
Indeed, as Hedley has explained, the organisation and arrangement of private law has 
largely been left to the field of academia.
8
 In the courtroom, judges focus on solving 
the case before them, and attempts to restructure the law are always on shaky ground.
9
 
So the restructuring is left to the academics. It would, therefore, be wrong to assume 
that the classification debate has simply been the preserve of the academic; a number 
of authoritative judgments over recent years have been heavily influenced by these 
issues.
10
 Judges are now writing in academic journals themselves, and show an 
awareness of academic writings which indicates the influence that academics have. 
Similarly, many of our top academics are at the same time practising barristers. We 
cannot think that the law is immune to any of the arguments made by the 
theoreticians.  
 
What this means is that, for those practising or teaching in private law areas, the need 
to understand the issues that have been raised by the classification debate is, therefore, 
very important. One way in which this can be important is in drawing our attention to 
                                                 
 
 
6
 J Mclaren, ‗Codification of the Laws of the United Kingdom‘ (1897) 9 Juridical Rev 1 at 1. 
7
 S Hedley, ‗How Has the Common Law Survived the 20th Century‘ (1999) 50 NILQ 285 at 287-288. 
8
 S Hedley, ‗How Has the Common Law Survived the 20th Century‘ (1999) 50 NILQ 285 at 287-288. 
9
 See, for example, the recent attempt by Lord Hoffmann in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 
1 AC 1 where his Lordship restructured the economic torts and defined the term ‗unlawful means‘. 
This was soon followed by Total Network SL v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2008] UKHL 
19, [2008] 1 AC 1174, where a differently constituted court took a very different view of the phrase 
‗unlawful means‘. H Carty ‗The Economic Torts in the 21st Century‘ (2008) 124 LQR 64. 
10
 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL); Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL); 
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL). 
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cases which in the past have been sidelined or misinterpreted. This process allows us 
to replace the language of old, making the law more accessible to those who are new 
to certain areas of the law. Probably the most important way in which these writings 
can be important is in predicting the future. Academics can draw up patterns which 
the courts may not have seen, and they can explore cases which have not, as of yet, 
even reached the courts. To have these guides is invaluable to anybody seeking to 
understand the legal system. Writing more recently, Hedley has acknowledged that 
most writers accept that there is need for some structure.
11
 There is simply 
disagreement about how to achieve that structure and its role.  
 
Another factor which we must take into account is that more complex and novel 
disputes have emerged over the last decade, and the boundaries between different 
areas of private law have been tested and often blurred.
12
 The blurring of these divides 
has led many to question whether the tools which we use to identify and distinguish 
private law claims are of any use anymore. Some have told us that property is 
disintegrating,
13
 that contract has risen and fallen
14
 and that tort law lacks coherence.
15
 
The need to find some clarity in the law is important for everyone. The above 
criticisms have, to an extent, been valid. We have stretched most of our core concepts 
to the point where we can no longer recognise them. This is, however, the product of 
                                                 
 
 
11
 S Hedley, ‗Looking Outward or Inward: Obligations Scholarship in the Early 21st Century‘ in 
Robertson A and HW Tang (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Hart 2009). 
12
 As for example the P Cane, ‗Contract, Tort and The Lloyd‘s Debacle‘ in F Rose (ed), Consensus ad 
idem: Essays for Guenter Treitel (Sweet and Maxwell 1996) at 96. 
13
 TC Grey, ‗The Disintegration of Property‘ in JR Pennock and JW Chapman (eds), Property: Nomos 
XII (New York UP 1980). 
14
 P Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press 1979); G Gilmore, The Death 
of Contract, (Ohio State Uni Press 1974); FH Buckley, The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract, 
(Duke University Press 1999). 
15
 P Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart 1997) at 202. 
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classification as much as it is a problem in need of classification. In other words, the 
answer to this problem is to avoid the mistakes which got us to this position in the 
first place. We must learn the lessons of the past. 
 
3. The Nature of the Project: To Reject the Exclusivity of Categories 
 
This may all sound like hyperbole; even academics who subscribe to discrete 
categories seem to acknowledge the importance of facts in decision making.
16
 But 
some go much further, and the effort has become one for elegance, simplicity and 
symmetry in private law.
17
 The following comment explains why the overlapping 
approach is an original approach; 
 
‗In order to ensure that the categories of causative events do not overlap with each other, 
we have to insist on the basic principle of classification, namely the principle of 
exclusivity.‘18 
 
For this writer, the dangers of classification can be demonstrated by the decision in 
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour.
19
 Birks praised the 
decision for ridding us of the fiction that claims of restitution for money under failed 
                                                 
 
 
16
 E McKendrick, ‗Taxonomy: Does It Matter?‘ in D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified 
Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (CUP 2002) at 631. 
17
 This principle of symmetry is identifiable in the following works; A Burrows, E McKendrick and J 
Edelman, Cases and Materials on the Law of Restitution (OUP 2007) at 250 and 394 P Birks, 
Restitution: The Future (Federation Press 1992) at 86-87, J Edelman, ‗The Meaning of Loss and 
Enrichment‘ in Chambers et al (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2009), R 
Nolan, ‗Change of Position‘ in P Birks, Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon 1995) at 174. 
18
 P Birks, ‗The Law of Unjust Enrichment: A Millennial Resolution‘ (1999) Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies 318 at 328. 
19
 Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour [1943] AC 32 (HL) at 
61; A Burrows, ‘Contract, Tort and Restitution – A Satisfactory Division or Not?‘ (1983) 99 LQR 217 
at 217. 
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contracts arose because of some ‗implied contract‘.20  This had the benefit of allowing 
recovery in cases where the contract was initially valid. In other words, it recognised 
that the claim was distinct from contract, and avoided the need to justify restitution on 
the basis of an ‗implied contract.‘ But this cannot be given as an example for 
classification.  
 
Fictions such as the category of implied contract were not produced because of an 
absence of legal classification. They were developed simply because the claim had to 
be pigeon-holed into contract or tort.
21
 We simply repeat this error when we think that 
we can solve this issue by adopting a third category or a fourth of a fifth category. 
Neither is the problem solved by having a separate catch-all miscellaneous category. 
The problem highlighted by the implied contract is the very fact that we are using 
categories in the first place. Such an approach is inevitable if we place the law within 
categories, as the courts can never develop new concepts outside of the strictures of 
the code.
22
  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it demonstrates the problem with classification through 
exhaustive and exclusive categories. To quote Stevens and Neyers; ‗[t]he common 
law has a weak and deficient theory of sources of obligation since no court has ever 
been, nor ever will be, seized of the question.‘23 The tendency for lawyers is to argue 
                                                 
 
 
20
 P Birks, ‗The Law of Restitution at the End of an Epoch‘ (1999) 28 UWAL Rev 13 at 36-37. 
21
 S Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal 
Reasoning (CUP 2003) at 9-11. 
22
 Even one of the supporters of discrete categories has recognised the dangers; A Burrows ‗Legislative 
Reform of Remedies for Breach of Contract: The English Perspective‘ (1997) Edinburgh L Rev 155 at 
156, he warns that ‗[b]inding codes are dangerous‘ as they can ‗freeze‘ the development of the law 
which he argues should be shaped by the courts and academics. 
23
 D Stevens and J Neyers in ‗What's Wrong with Restitution‘ (1999) 37 Alberta L Rev 221. 
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for the extension of one or other of those concepts.  For example, in Chapter 3, we 
look at the classification of claims for ‗pure economic losses‘ in the English tort of 
negligence or the law of contract. For many modern lawyers, the basis of liability 
must be described as either contractual or tortious. As a result, what happens is that a 
wide definition of tort or contract is adopted to accommodate these claims. This is the 
solution in civilian legal systems. French law, for example, places such cases within 
the law of tort; 1382 Code civil covers harms which are physical and purely 
economic.
24
 In contrast, German law would permit claimants to bring an action for 
negligent misstatements as a contractual claim.
25
  
 
The same approach even happens in England. We can see this in the House of Lords 
decision in White v Jones, which involved a claim by the intended beneficiaries of a 
will against the defendant solicitors.
26
 Lord Goff noted the problems created by the 
narrow definition of contract in England, going on to state; ‗I have already referred to 
problems created in the English law of contract by the doctrines of consideration and 
of privity of contract. These, of course, encourage us to seek a solution to problems of 
this kind within our law of tortious negligence.‘27 This reluctance to recognise the 
unique nature and scope of the overlapping area undermines the search for an accurate 
description of the existing legal system.  
 
                                                 
 
 
24
 M Bussani & V Palmer, ‗The Liability Regimes of Europe- Their Facades and Interiors‘, in M 
Bussani & V Palmer, Pure Economic Loss in Europe (Cambridge UP 2003) at 127. 
25
 M Bussani & V Palmer, ‗The Liability Regimes of Europe- Their Facades and Interiors‘, in M 
Bussani & V Palmer, Pure Economic Loss in Europe (Cambridge UP 2003) at 148-149.   
26
 [1995] 2 AC 207 [HL]. 
27
 [1995] 2 AC 207 [HL] at 263. 
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Not only are we failing to properly describe the operation of the claim for pure 
economic loss, but we are also adding confusion to the tort of negligence. This 
concern is noted by Waddams; ‗material that is inherently complex is not better 
understood by concealing its complexity.‘28 Grouping areas of private law together 
under broad and abstract categories does little to help us traverse the terrain covered 
by private law and it is easy to get lost on the map.  
 
Stifling Flexibility 
 
The other significant problem that classification must deal with is growth and 
flexibility. In Europe, the development of Civil Codes has arguably inhibited the 
flexibility of the law and its ability to adapt to new situations.
29
 In a recent article, 
Omar notes that, ‗one of the criticisms levelled against the French Civil Code in the 
late 1990s was that it was ―greatly out of date‖.‘30 With a rigid system of 
classification there are two ways to incorporate new developments.
31
 The first is to 
extend the boundaries of the existing categories which, as we have seen above, can 
lead to the categories losing their integrity and becoming heterogeneous. The second 
option is to create new categories, which has the danger of creating a new type of 
claim which may be uncertain in its application and scope. In France, the difficulties 
of creating new laws have sometimes been a hindrance. It was only recently that 
                                                 
 
 
28
 S Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal 
Reasoning (CUP 2003) at 2. 
29
 E Metzger, ‗Roman Judges, Case Law and Principles of Procedure‘ (2004) 22 Law and History Rev 
243 at 243-244. 
30
 P Omar, ‗Lessons from the French Experience: The Possibility of Codification of Commercial Law 
in the United Kingdom‘ (2007) 7 ICCLR 235. 
31
 H Collins, ‗Classifications from Knowledge Systems‘, in P Birks (ed), The Classification of 
Obligations (Clarendon Press 1997) at 63-64. 
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France managed to introduce the mechanism of ‗la fiducie’ in Article 2011 of the 
Civil Code.
32
  
 
Legal Tradition 
 
Atiyah explains that most unjust enrichment scholars have been heavily influenced by 
Roman law.
33
 This system of classification has already provided the impetus for the 
development of contract and tort in English Law.
34
 However, this has been achieved 
by integrating the labels of the Roman categories with the current system, rather than 
replacing it outright.
35
 Attempts to carry forward this integration of Roman and 
English private law have come at the expense of Equity. This criticism is nothing 
new; as Atiyah noted, ‗[n]obody ever paid much attention to the place of the law of 
trusts in this scheme of things.‘36 Yet, it is easier to find a Roman law of equity and 
trusts than it is to find a Roman law of unjust enrichment.
37
 Furthermore, if Roman 
law achieved greatness and simplicity, it was seemingly achieved through an 
evolution of law and not a revolution of law. This was described by Llewellyn as the 
Grand Style; the application of precedent and ‗unceasing judicial review of prior 
                                                 
 
 
32
 PJ Douvier and C Potter, ‗Trusts Face Testing Time in France‘ (1997) 8 Intl Tax Rev 43; MJ de 
Waal, ‗In Search of a Model for the Introduction of the Trust into a Civilian Context‘ (2001) 12 
Stellenbosch L Rev 63at 74-75. 
33
 P Atiyah, ‗Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obligations‘ in P Atiyah, Essays on Contract (OUP 
1990) at 10. 
34
 B Simpson, ‗Innovation in 19th Century Contract Law‘ (1975) 19 LQR 247. 
35
 Birks for example did not see the need for the separation of the law of property and the law of 
obligations that is present in the Civilian model; P Birks, 'Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical 
Truths' [1997] New Zealand L Rev 623. 
36
 P Atiyah, ‗Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obligations‘ in P Atiyah, Essays on Contract (OUP 
1990) at 10. 
37
 D Johnston, The Roman Law of Trusts (OUP 1989), P. Stein, Roman Law in European History 
(Cambridge UP 1999), at 20. 
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judicial decisions on the side of rule, tool and technique‘38 Llewellyn favoured what 
he referred to as the ‗grand style‘ of legal reasoning. As noted in The Common Law 
Tradition, Llewellyn only witnessed this grand style in two other legal systems: ‗in 
Cheyenne Indian law and in the classical Roman period.‘39  
 
For this writer, we would lose a valuable part of our legal heritage if we were to 
ignore this style of law. This is not just a case of clinging on to a tradition without any 
consideration of its virtues. Indeed, we must recognise that those outside the common 
law systems have expressed admiration for our legal system. The comparison between 
Roman law and English law was also made by Pringsheim, a German scholar. He 
argued that English law was more open, accessible and fair than its civilian 
counterparts. He similarly praised the English law for demonstrating ‗a sense of 
reality and the significant.‘40 English private law also found a supporter in the 
renowned economist, Hayek. For Hayek, the great benefit of English law was its lack 
of any rigid or predisposed structure.
41
 He praised English law for its spontaneity, for 
having the flexibility to adapt to each particular case.
42
 General rules and principles, 
he argued, were a source of inefficiency. The important point that Hayek made was 
that the complexity of the private law limits the extent to which we can fully 
understand the particulars of the legal order. Indeed one relatively recent article gives 
full support to Hayek‘s thesis. Mahoney has argued that all of the evidence we have 
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suggests that the market benefits from the development of specialist rules.
43
 This is 
not an argument that economic growth is necessarily a measure of the merits of a 
legal system. But those seeking to place private law into discrete categories have 
certainly made this argument in support of their methods. We are often told that the 
commercial world requires certainty and it is the job of the courts to provide it.
44
 
Mahoney‘s article suggests that economically the answer is that there are no benefits 
to be provided by discrete categories.  
 
The other argument for discrete categorisation is that it achieves consistency. This 
seems mistaken for two reasons. Firstly, every case is distinct and despite our best 
wishes we cannot treat every claim in the same way. We might find it unfair, for 
example, that a mistaken provision of services is treated differently from a mistaken 
transfer of money, but it would arguably be just as unfair to treat them in the same 
way.
45
 Secondly, by setting out broad and ambiguous categories, we get no closer to 
consistency. Because the categories are so broad, the facts of the cases can be 
classified so as to achieve a desired result.
46
 The arguments seem ill-founded. 
 
4. The Foundations 
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If the law is broadly defined, it loses its descriptive value and it will be necessary to 
look at case-law in more detail. Our objective is to classify, without providing a 
straitjacket for the law. The balance is achieved through the acceptance of overlaps. 
Instances of concurrent liability can be avoided by the adoption of narrower and more 
specific concepts. An overlap leaves the core areas of law untouched; the borders of 
contract, tort or property are left intact under an overlapping approach. The overlap 
represents a unique concept, within which new rules and defences can be tailored.  
 
The inspiration for the thesis comes from three main sources; Llewellyn, Waddams 
and Dietrich. Firstly, it is inspired by Llewellyn and the tradition of the rule-sceptic 
form of legal realism. In the early stages of the project, it was recognised that the 
approach taken here would require the boundaries of private law concepts to be 
redrawn. Otherwise, there would be no overlaps at all; the large areas of property, 
contract, tort and unjust enrichment have taken up most of the terrain. A sound 
methodology was required. Llewellyn indeed fitted perfectly with this aim. He argued 
against fictions in the law; he argued for narrower concepts; and, importantly, he 
argued against abstract theories of the law.
47
 At the same time, it was quite clear that 
many realists were opposed to any attempts to classify the law.
48
 Separating the rule-
sceptics from the fact-sceptics became a necessary part of the groundwork for this 
project. The rule-sceptics were those who favoured concepts and classification, if they 
were used sensibly, for the purposes of predicting the law. Obviously, most realists 
also called for further changes in the substance of the law; but nearly all recognised 
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that the classification itself cannot be the basis for any such restructuring. It is merely 
a road to a better understanding of the law. 
 
The thesis also draws on the work of Waddams, who explored the interrelation of 
legal concepts in Dimensions of Private Law.
49
 In Dimensions, Waddams refutes the 
exclusivity of private law categories. Developments in private law seem to respond to 
facts more than anything else, and the categories can be combined and used to justify 
and explain these decisions.
50
 Waddams‘ primary focus is on the historical 
foundations of developments in private law, but Waddams also shows that many legal 
developments are attributable to conceptual overlaps.
51
 He rejected the arguments of 
unjust enrichment scholars that the law is incoherent or chaotic and argued that any 
alternative would prejudice the more important values of our legal system.
52
 
Additionally, this thesis develops a concept taken from Dietrich‘s discussion of the 
classification of estoppel and its ‗hybrid‘ nature as an overlap of contract and tort.53 
Dietrich also supports the abandonment of discrete categories of private law.
54
  
 
What this thesis intends to do is to fully explain how and why legal concepts overlap 
in the first place. In doing so it responds to one particular criticism made by Beever 
and Rickett against Waddams‘ work; ‗if it is true that a list of these concerns can, in 
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any case, be added together to generate liability, then one must show how the 
aggregation generates the conclusion reached.‘55 This is the very crux of the thesis; 
explaining how the overlap works and how the overlapping analysis assists in 
predicting private law. The overlapping concept analysis which we develop in this 
thesis provides a detailed explanation of how overlaps occur and also why in fact this 
assists in predicting the law.  
 
5. Scope of the work 
 
The relevance of unjust enrichment, and the methods used by the unjust enrichment 
lawyers, is of central importance to the thesis. It will become apparent that much of 
the overlapping territory which is explored within this thesis has at one time or 
another been claimed by unjust enrichment theorists. Those who have argued for 
unjust enrichment have attempted to stake claim to large portions of private law, but 
in doing so they have sought to make substantial changes to our legal culture. This 
thesis is an attempt to reclaim much of that territory, but it goes much further than 
that; it is also a defence of the reasoning we apply in approaching legal issues.  
 
The first explanation that needs to be made is the focus of the study; private law. No 
apologies are made for this focus; it is in this area where unjust enrichment lawyers 
have made their arguments. It is not presumed that private law itself is a category 
which can be separated from public or criminal law. In fact, in Chapter 5 an argument 
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is presented that there is a clear overlap between private law and criminal law in 
regards to the type of remedy available for money transfers.
56
  
 
Secondly, the thesis avoids arguing for substantive changes in the law. That statement 
must be taken in light of our definition of law. For this thesis, the law is the decisions 
reached by the courts
57
. What this means is that judicial reasoning does not 
necessarily count for what we would regard as ‗law.‘ This means that our proposals 
are restricted to looking at how we analyse the decisions of the courts. Decisions are 
not criticised for being wrongly decided on the basis of justice, fairness, consistency 
or outcome. This has been necessary so that the thesis can stay true to its 
methodology. The arrangement of the law is not an opportunity to change the 
substance of the law. If at times the analysis is descriptive, for the most part that is a 
deliberate aim. In achieving narrower categories the purpose is to find a clearer and 
easier way of understanding private law claims. The thesis looks for patterns; but the 
conceptual tools are not tools for any grander task. Ultimately they are used to 
establish these patterns. For cases that do not fit into the patterns, attempts have been 
made to find alternative explanations. The narrowing and redefining of legal concepts 
does not mean that we sideline and ignore those areas of law which do not fit into our 
schema. This should be always kept in mind. In Chapter 6, for example, it is argued 
that ‗proprietary estoppel‘ cases which are based on acquiescence have very little 
modern support as the higher courts are finding more and more reasons for not 
recognising claims in these cases. It is not argued that the acquiescence cases are 
wrong, but that they are finding a smaller role in border disputes between landowners. 
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This is not a normative argument, it is one based on the facts and the patterns. The 
only normative element which is present in this thesis is the aim of presenting a 
clearer picture of judicial decision making. It is hoped that, throughout, the thesis has 
stayed true to this proposition. 
 
6. The Structure 
 
Since the focus of the thesis is in the area which has been claimed by unjust 
enrichment, the following chapter looks at the work of the leading figure in unjust 
enrichment. Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the methodology and the philosophy 
behind Birks‘ classification, but the specific details of his classification will be 
explored throughout the thesis. In short, his theory was that private law could be 
classified as four ‗causes of action‘; consent, wrongs, unjust enrichment and 
miscellaneous others. There were three assumptions which lay at the heart of this 
classification. First, that private law claims arise because of ‗causative events‘, which 
meant each area could be encapsulated by a single principle such as ‗consent‘. 
Secondly, these areas were categories in the strict sense of the word, i.e. they were 
discrete areas of law, and importantly they did not overlap. Finally, case law was used 
to support the presence of the categories in English private law. Chapter 2 concludes 
by arguing that the methods applied by Birks illustrate the necessity of separating 
description from prescription. 
 
The next chapter sets out the methodology that will be adopted in the thesis. The aim 
is to provide the appropriate balance of description and prescription. This is a realist 
classification, one that adopts a conceptual approach inspired by Llewellyn. The 
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chapter also introduces the idea of overlapping concepts, the idea that law can be 
arranged into expositive concepts. The chapter introduces the process of ‗pruning‘ 
legal concepts to establish narrow concepts to form the basis of this framework. The 
chapter applies the realist method of testing the utility of concepts by reference to the 
extent to which they can identify facts and outcomes.  
 
Chapter 4 sets up the framework for the overlapping approach. It provides what can 
reasonably be regarded as the three core concepts of private law; property, contract 
and tort. Using the methodology which was set out in Chapter 3, these three concepts 
are given the realist treatment. Narrower versions of these concepts are set out in this 
chapter. Within these concepts, we identify the legally significant facts which make 
up the factual elements of each concept. For the most part, they are distinct insofar as 
property can exist without contract, contract can exist without tort and so on. 
Nonetheless, they are in no way exclusive. The next few chapters set out how they 
overlap with other legally significant facts. 
 
Chapter 5 considers the concept of money transfers, an area which at present forms 
the bedrock of the modern theory of unjust enrichment. The argument is that money is 
a weaker variant of property, requiring a specialised approach. The rules governing 
money transfers are not, therefore, of wider application. We also delve into the 
question of ‗specific restitution‘ (a phrase developed here to avoid confusion with the 
trust, although it would more commonly be referred to as a ‗constructive trust‘.) Our 
conclusion is that this mechanism shares an overlap with tort, looking into the 
standards of conduct of the defendant. Finally we argue that claims for money 
transfers under an initial agreement provide a clear overlap with contract, with the 
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content of the agreement providing the main guidelines for restitution in these 
circumstances. 
 
Chapter 6 looks at reliance-based claims. The reliance-based claim does not operate in 
isolation, it requires additional facts. Three main overlaps are looked at, the first with 
property (proprietary estoppel), the second with contract (non-contractual services) 
and the third with tort (claims for pure economic losses.) Finally, Chapter 7 considers 
the trust mechanism, arguing that the express trusts, resulting trusts and bargain-based 
trusts represent different combinations of facts from contract and property. All three, 
therefore, are overlaps between these two main concepts of contract and property. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of co-habiting couples, usually referred to as the 
‗common intention constructive trust‘. It is argued that there is very little overlap with 
the concepts of private law which we have looked at in this thesis. Therefore, the 
argument is that we should be more open about the special nature of these situations. 
The concepts we look at here are in no way exclusive, and they repeatedly overlap. 
The analysis reveals the patterns of these concepts, and in turn the legally significant 
facts of our private law. 
 
7. Conclusion 
  
The classification of the common law is an important task. It is possible to identify a 
number of core legal concepts in English private law, but only by adopting a 
conceptual approach which accommodates overlaps instead of excluding them. The 
methods applied by civilian lawyers to categorise the private law are specific to those 
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legal cultures, and English private law has developed in a much more ad hoc and 
disorganised manner. Moreover, concepts that would be treated as distinct within 
civilian legal systems can overlap within the English legal system. For example, in 
equity we have concepts such as estoppel and the trust, which do not seem to fit into 
any of the basic categories of contract, tort or property.  This poses two important 
questions which will be addressed in the following chapter; (i) can English private 
law be described in a systematic and logical manner, and (ii) if not, should we be 
changing the substantive content of the law to achieve a more coherent and 
straightforward system of private law? It will be argued that classification must reflect 
the substantive content of the legal system, and only when the classification provides 
an accurate picture of what the law is, can there be any sensible discussion of what the 
law should be doing. Although the concepts we use in our private law are not 
arranged in a logical and coherent manner, they can provide accurate descriptions of 
the substantive content of the private law. The purpose of classification is simply to 
identify the relevant factors which reveal the various functions of private law actions. 
As Waddams declares; ‗[c]onvenience and elegance of concepts are not the primary 
ends to be attained by the legal system.‘58  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW CLASSIFCATIONS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter approaches the classification of private law by looking at two interrelated 
issues; first, the methodological approaches which have been used to classify private 
law and, second, the overall aims of those seeking to reclassify the law. One of the 
most important themes that will be explored in this chapter is whether the attempt to 
reclassify the law is an effort to describe the legal system or an effort to prescribe 
changes in the law. This dichotomy has been explored by Waddams in Dimensions of 
Private Law.
1
 As the first chapter of Dimensions demonstrates, it is almost inevitable 
that efforts to classify the law will involve elements of both; by incorporating existing 
rules and principles the author can allay fears of revolution or being merely 
aspirational, while at the same time the project is also used for arguing for substantive 
changes in the law. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the dangers of 
failing properly to distinguish the roles of descriptive and prescriptive commentaries. 
This sets the scene for the next chapter, where an alternative ‗legal realist‘ approach 
to classification is developed. 
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2. Legal Interpretivism in General 
 
Writing recently, Webb has set out two functions of classification.
2
 The first is that 
classification is a tool for arranging and discovering patterns within private law.
3
 This 
is the position which is adopted in this thesis. As Pound once explained, this method 
treats classification as ‗simply a means of organizing knowledge and thus of making it 
more effective for some purpose.‘4 According to this method it is argued that 
classification can have a useful function in understanding the law, but it is not an 
attempt to argue that the law should be changed. Classification, therefore, serves the 
higher purpose of improving predictability in private law and identifying the relevant 
factors in judicial decision making. The second function of classification which is 
identified by Webb goes much further than this. This second function is the use of 
classification to determine the content and development of private law claims. By this, 
it is meant that the writer is trying to identify a single norm that underpins private law 
claims. In this context, classification is a method of supporting a general proposition 
about what private law is, while also determining the way in which decisions should 
be made. Although this method is not our main focus, we return to this type of 
approach later on in this chapter by looking at the approach taken by Weinrib. 
 
The main focus of this chapter, however, is to explore a possible third function. Under 
this third approach, the author attempts to construct a classification of private law 
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which is both descriptive and the prescriptive. Beever and Rickett have labelled this 
method as ‗interpretive legal theory‘5 (hereafter referred to as ‗interpretivism‘).6 
‗Interpretivism‘ is the process of ‗reflective equilibrium‘7 whereby the lawyer is led 
by moral intuitions and constructs a normative moral theory.
8
 Essentially, this is a 
form of theorising about areas of private law, with the aim of achieving coherence and 
justification. This chapter is a focused critique of Birks, who was the leading figure in 
this interpretivist school.
9
 Beever and Rickett deny that interpretive theories are 
primarily prescriptive in nature.
10
 This position is also adopted by Smith, who 
explains that ‗[i]nterpretive theories aim to enhance understanding of law by 
highlighting its significance or meaning.‘11 As Beever and Rickett conclude ‗[a] 
similar analysis is undertaken by those who taxonomise the law in terms of categories 
such as consents, wrongs, unjust enrichments, and other events, and by those who 
argue that the private law is a system of corrective justice or of economic 
efficiency.‘12 It is argued that interpretivist methods do not separate the prescriptive 
from the descriptive, and that one can only classify the law by adopting a descriptive 
methodology. This is a necessary step before one can develop a prescriptive analysis.  
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3. Birks and the classification of the private law 
 
Birks’ Critique of the private law 
 
The most recent resurgence of interest in legal classification has been instigated by 
the writings of Birks. Dietrich has noted that those who have followed Birks have not 
always completely agreed with the way in which he sought to classify the law,
13
 but 
most have more or less agreed with the methodology and aims of his classification.
14
 
Our focus is on the latter; the methodology of the Birksian approach. For present 
purposes we are not concerned with some of the finer details concerning the structure 
of these classifications, although these are addressed where it is relevant. Instead, we 
are concerned with the techniques and reasoning that characterises Birks‘ 
classification.  
 
Birks argued that the common law lacked cohesion and consistency due to the failure 
to develop a logical and reasoned approach to the classification of English private 
law.
15
 He proposed the adoption of Justinian‘s Institutes of private law, which 
contained the basic framework for the Roman legal system.
16
 This map has also 
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provided the basis for the civilian legal systems.
17
 Justinian‘s Institutes divided the 
private law into the law of property and the law of obligations, with the latter further 
being divided into contract, quasi-contract, delict and quasi-delict. The notable feature 
of Birks‘ adoption of the Roman map is that he did not propose to perfectly replicate 
the Roman classification. For example, Birks rejected elements of the Roman system 
for containing flaws such as the ‗hopeless‘ categories of quasi-contract and quasi-
delict.
18
  
 
Therefore, a perfect replication of the Roman scheme was never the actual purpose of 
Birks‘ taxonomy. Rather, it was the approach to legal reasoning and the development 
of an institutional scheme that Birks borrowed from the Roman system.
19
 The form of 
legal reasoning and logic used in Roman law also differs quite significantly from that 
used in English private law. Samuel presents a useful comparison of these forms of 
legal reasoning by contrasting ‗inductive‘ and ‗deductive‘ forms of reasoning.20 
Inductive reasoning refers to a bottom-up approach that develops legal rules and 
principles from the litigation facts. It is generally accepted that the English system of 
precedent and fact-based law is one such example of ‗inductive‘ reasoning.21 This is 
distinct from the process of deductive reasoning, where a codified set of legal rules 
                                                 
 
 
17
 P Birks, ‗Definition and Division: A Mediation on Institutes 3.13‘ in P Birks (ed), The Classification 
of Obligations (Clarendon Press 1997) at 1-2; J Apple and R Deyling, A Primer on the Civil Law 
System (Federal Judicial Center 1994-1995) at 39. Available online at 
<www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf> accessed 18 January 2011. 
18
 P Birks, ‗Definition and Division: A Mediation on Institutes 3.13‘ in P Birks (ed), The Classification 
of Obligations (Clarendon Press 1997) at 18-19. 
19
 This is demonstrated by Birks‘ statement that ‗Nobody should think that the structural scheme of 
these volumes is, or is thought, to be, perfect. It is merely the best that can for the moment be found‘ 
from P Birks, ‗Introduction‘ in P Birks (ed), English Private Law (2 vols, OUP 2000) at l. 
20
 G Samuel, ‗Can the Common Law be Mapped?‘ (2005) 55 Univ of Toronto LJ 271 at 271. 
21
 C Valcke, ‗Comparative History and the Internal View of French, German, and English Private Law‘ 
(2006) 19 Can JL & Juris 133. 
  
39 
 
 
and principles are developed and then applied to litigation facts.
22
 According to 
Legrand, this provides one of the distinguishing factors between English private law 
and the civilian legal systems.
23
 This process of deductive reasoning characterised 
Birks‘ legal classification, as he tried to identify generic principles which can in turn 
be applied to factual situations.
24
  
 
Fourfold Classification 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
 
Birks believed that English private law could be classified under four discrete 
categories of right-creating (or causative) events. These consist of ‗events‘ which 
create private law rights. There were, accordingly, four general events which created 
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rights; consent, wrongs, unjust enrichment and others.
25
 Although the content of these 
categories changed over time, the overall structure of this division was present 
throughout his writings.
26
 In his classificatory model, both the law of contract and the 
creation of express trusts were subsumed into a category which Birks referred to as 
‗consent‘ based obligations.27 The law of tort(s) and breaches of fiduciary duties 
become the category of 'wrongs', while the law of unjust enrichment incorporated 
what is now regarded as unjust enrichment at common law and also some resulting 
and constructive trusts.
28
 Birks also rejected the threefold common law classification 
of contract, tort and restitution that had been recognised by Lord Wright in Fibrosa 
Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour.
29
 This was on the basis that 
restitution only refers to a response and not to a right-creating event. Unjust 
enrichment was, therefore, to be preferred.
30
  
 
Discrete Categorisation 
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According to Dietrich, these categories were, ‗for the most part‘, presented as discrete 
branches of civil law.
31
 Birks did at least acknowledge the possibility of overlaps, but 
only so far as it may be possible for there to be concurrent claims in unjust enrichment 
and wrongs.
32
 As will be discussed below, the eventual recognition that restitution 
overlapped with unjust enrichment and wrongs led Birks to re-assess his classification 
altogether.
33
 In Birks‘ view, the overlap showed an error in his structure, one which 
he was keen to avoid.
34
 Whereas he had previously maintained that unjust enrichment 
and restitution quadrated (meaning that unjust enrichment only ever resulted in 
restitution, and restitution only responded to unjust enrichments) he would later 
modify this so that restitution would also be available for wrongs. This meant that 
restitution had to be cut down into smaller categories of restitution for wrongs and 
restitution for unjust enrichment. It was also clear that unjust enrichment and consents 
were separate causes of action, and if there was a contract to pay money back, this 
would be justified under the contract alone.
35
 In Birks‘ words, ‗there can be no 
overlaps in the nature of dependent description.‘36 In a later piece, Birks was even 
more adamant in his rejection of overlaps; ‗[a] good classification must observe the 
principle of exclusivity. That principle requires that each category in a series be 
perfectly distinct from all the others. If one of the relevant entities can fall into more 
than one category, the classification is flawed, indeed falsified, and has to be 
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revised.‘37 Each category was, therefore, analytically distinct; although as pointed out 
above, this did not preclude concurrent claims.
38
 
 
The last category was a miscellaneous ‗Others‘, which (in Birks‘ own words) was 
somewhat of ‗a cheat.‘39 This category represented actions that could not be placed 
within the other three categories of consent, wrongs and unjust enrichment. Unlike 
Justinian‘s quasi-categories, this miscellaneous category was analytically distinct 
from the three main causative events of contract, tort and unjust enrichment.
40
 
According to Birks, such events included ‗salvage, judgments, taxable events, and 
becoming a parent but it would require very remarkable learning to compile an 
exhaustive list.‘41 As Dietrich does,42 one could argue that it was simply those claims 
that undermined the discrete nature of the taxonomic project that were sidelined. 
Whether or not that was the case with Birks‘ scheme, one of the dangers of having a 
catch-all ‗cheat‘ category is that areas of the law that undermine the classificatory 
system are sidelined. As Waddams states this is problematic; while a certain decision 
may appear insignificant in the taxonomic scheme, these ‗insignificant cases‘ 
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certainly are not insignificant for the parties involved, and importantly the courts that 
have to deal with these disputes.
43
  
 
No Room for Property 
 
Birks rejected the institutional separation of the law of obligations and the law of 
property that is found in the Roman and civil codes.
44
 It was Birks‘ conclusion that 
property rights could never be conceived of as a causative event. Therefore, the 
separation of property and obligations at the institutional level became unnecessary.
45
 
In fact, in some of his later writings, Birks quite doggedly rejected the independence 
of property from the law of obligations.
46
 However, several academics who agreed 
with the nature of Birks‘ project refuted the rejection of ‗property‘ as a right-creating 
event.
47
 That is not to say that Birks was arguing against the distinction between 
personal and property rights, as he made it quite clear that there is an analytical 
distinction between these rights.
48
 However, both types of rights were said to be 
created by one of the four right creating events. This aspect of Birks‘ scheme was 
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inspired by the approach within English private law, where the distinction between 
property and obligations is blurred.
49
  
 
 
The theory behind Birks’ taxonomy 
 
An Exercise in Description 
 
It is important to identify why Birks was seeking to reclassify private law and the 
general approach that he used in his writings. The general view is that Birks was 
essentially a legal positivist, which is why he presented even the most controversial 
aspects of his thesis as descriptive in nature.
50
 The term ‗positivism‘ has several 
connotations, but in its simplest form legal positivism is the study of the stated law, as 
opposed to aspirational or reason-based views of the law.
51
 In other words, stating 
what the law is and not what the law ought to be. According to positivism, there is no 
necessary connection between law and morality.
52
 This theme can certainly be 
witnessed in Birks‘ writings: as, for example, when he rejected the normative 
foundations of ‗unjust enrichment‘ and any general duty to obey the law.53 This has 
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been noted by Hedley, who points out that Birks actually went out of his way to deny 
that restitution or unjust enrichment had any relevance as a moral principle.
54
  
 
The importance of the posited law in Birks‘ thesis is demonstrated by those occasions 
when he felt that his theories were no longer compatible with developments in the 
case law. One such example is the House of Lords‘ decision in Attorney General v. 
Blake.
55
 Birks had maintained that unjust enrichment was the only causative event 
that could lead to a claim for restitution, which he referred to as the quadration of 
unjust enrichment and restitution.
56
 After the Court of Appeal indicated that gain-
based damages would be available for breach of contract,
57
 Birks incorporated this 
into his thesis.
58
 In ‗Misnomer‘ Birks rejected his own quadration theory, and adopted 
a multicausal approach to restitution, which recognised that restitution could be 
available for wrongs as well as unjust enrichment. Although it would be inaccurate to 
state that the decision of the Court of Appeal was the only factor that was relevant in 
the revision of his theory (the seeds of this view were already present in 1986‘s An 
Introduction to the Law of Restitution
59
) it does demonstrate that he was willing to 
incorporate the decisions made by the courts.  
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Another example is Birks‘ adoption of a single principle of unjustified enrichment in 
his final publications. Birks abandoned the ‗generic conception‘ of unjust enrichment 
that had been central to his earlier writings, after a number of English decisions had 
indicated that, in his view at least,
60
 the law was developing in this manner.
61
 Birks 
believed that the law had developed to the point where unjust enrichment claims 
could be explained under the unifying principle of ‗absence of basis‘, with the 
existing ‗unjust factors‘ providing reasons for why there was no basis for the 
enrichment.
62
 This represented a fundamental shift in his approach to unjust 
enrichment as he had earlier rejected any unifying doctrine of unjust enrichment.
63
 It 
cannot be doubted that Birks was more than prepared to amend his theories to 
accommodate developments in the courts. Therefore, Birks‘ approach to legal 
classification placed a large degree of importance on the posited law.  
 
The prescriptive element of Birks’ approach to taxonomy 
 
Although there is a descriptive element to his thesis, Birks would often advocate 
changes in the substantive law by arguing that the law ought to have been decided in a 
certain way.
64
 This is where it may seem that the comparison with legal positivism 
collapses, as it is not simply an effort to describe the legal rules, but it is also an 
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attempt to prescribe changes in the legal system.
65
 In fact, Birks utilised normative 
arguments in his methodology a number of times. For example, in discussing the 
separation of common law and equity Birks stated that, ‗unnecessary and accidental 
differences merely create confusion. Confusion in the law is a close cousin to 
injustice, since it means that parties lose litigation they should win.‘66 It has already 
been noted above that Birks was strongly opposed to broad notions of fairness and 
justice, particularly in the categorisation of rules and principles deriving from the 
courts of equity.
67
 Birks‘ opposition to equitable doctrines was not an actual rejection 
of ‗justice‘ per se, but represented his own distinct definition of what ‗justice‘ is.68 
This form of justice is characterised by consistency, clarity and more generally the 
rule of law, rather than justice in the substantive sense of the term.
69
 Therefore, those 
principles or concepts which did not fit into Birks‘ conception of clarity or 
consistency were rejected, no matter how well-established they might be. On closer 
inspection, Birks was not merely describing what the law is, and he was not a 
positivist in the mould of Austin.
70
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The form of positivism that encapsulates Birks‘ thesis is generally referred to as ‗soft‘ 
positivism.
71
 This form of positivism is concerned with the development of a clear, 
precise and rational legal system.
72
 To explain how positivism can be ‗ethical‘ we 
need to go back to the basic premise of positivism, which is the effort to describe the 
law. In turn this leads to the more fundamental question of what constitutes the ‗law‘. 
Whereas Austin took the view that ‗laws‘ are commands backed by sanctions, modern 
positivists such as MacCormick
73
 and Coleman
74
 tend to agree with Hart that the legal 
system itself defines whether or not a law is valid under the rule of recognition.
75
 This 
rule lays down the requirements of valid laws and, under soft positivism, these 
requirements are seen to be consistency, clarity and the rule of law. Therefore, just as 
in Birks‘ methodology, soft positivism places rationality as the first virtue of the legal 
system.
76
 If a rule is not predictable, or if it contravenes the general rule of law, then it 
should be changed as it does not pass the rule of recognition. This methodology can 
be seen in Birks‘ work, as he made it quite apparent in a number of his writings that 
he valued consistency and clarity over the actual substantive content of the law; 
‗judgment(s) must be rational, intelligible, and consistent with others.‘77 This 
‗positivist‘ trait can also be traced in Birks‘ suspicion of judge-made law and his 
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rejection of social, political or moral explanations for judicial reasoning.
78
 For 
example, Birks strongly opposed the use of nebulous legal concepts such as 
‗unconscionability‘ or ‗fairness‘ that could give a wide discretion to judges to decide 
each case on its merits.
79
 It is apparent that Birks did have a normative basis for his 
methodology, one which placed consistency and logic as the rules for recognition. 
 
Criticisms of Birks’ Methodology 
 
Rewriting history 
 
Unless there are to be widespread changes in the structure of the private law, any 
realistic attempt to re-classify the law as it currently stands needs to show that it can 
be adopted with minimum fuss.
80
 Indeed it would be almost unworkable to replace the 
private law system without creating untold uncertainty and confusion. Therefore, any 
realistic taxonomy must demonstrate that not only can the map cover the current legal 
system, but that the map can effortlessly be incorporated into the legal system. Birks 
himself stated that it would be too late to start the common law anew and that 
categories are ‗abolished only in the last stages of Alzheimer's disease.‘81 This is why 
it was necessary for Birks to show that he was not really prescribing major changes in 
the English legal system, but rather that he was identifying a hidden structure.  
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The problem with this approach is that it means selectively picking out existing parts 
of the law to support the categories, and marginalising parts of the law that do not fit 
into the taxonomic model.
82
 For example, the case of Chase Manhattan Bank NA v 
Israeli-British Bank (London) Ltd
83
 (where Goulding J recognised that a mistaken 
payment was held under a ‗constructive trust‘) is a central part of Birks' thesis that 
there are some ‗trusts‘ which can be viewed as responses to unjust enrichment.84 At 
the same time, Virgo claims that the case is nothing more than an anomaly and 
therefore cannot provide authoritative support.
85
 Virgo himself presents a similar 
classification to Birks‘ with an additional category which is named ‗vindication of 
property rights‘. Using the Birksian approach, Virgo has argued that ‗trusts‘ and 
unjust enrichment are analytically distinct. This is why Chase Manhattan is regarded 
by Virgo as anomalous.
86
 Ultimately, one‘s interpretation of the case law will almost 
inevitably be guided by the taxonomic model proposed. If the effort is to describe the 
law, this method of selection does not ensure the objectivity of the description.   
 
Simplicity and Logic 
 
Hedley argues that another major problem with Birks‘ taxonomy is that 
Restitution/Unjust Enrichment is given a central importance in the taxonomic scheme 
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but in practice it is a very small area of the law.
87
 In fact, Hedley went on to conclude 
that the only plausible purpose of Birks‘ taxonomy was to establish restitution as a 
foundational subject.
88
 Indeed, the consequence of Birks‘ taxonomy is that a large 
portion of the law of trusts is placed in this smaller and relatively undeveloped area of 
the law. To illustrate this, Birks argued strongly that the establishment of some 
instances of resulting or constructive ‗trusts‘ could not be based upon legal principle 
unless it was accepted that they were explained by reference to unjust enrichment.
89
 
This would mean that a ‗trust‘ could be imposed in claims for mistaken payments. 
However, the complexities inherent within the private law system means that even 
small changes can have significant consequences on how the law operates in practice. 
The House of Lords realised this in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v 
Islington LBC,
90
 when their Lordships rejected Birks‘ argument that ‗trusts‘ can be 
imposed for the receipt of mistaken payments on the basis that it could lead to 
‗practical consequences and injustice‘91 for third parties. Sometimes cases may seem 
quite similar, but they are treated separately for important economic, social or moral 
reasons.
92
 Attempts to classify the law cannot capture all of the complexities and 
nuances of the legal system, but unforeseen consequences arise when the 
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classification is presented as having normative force.
93
 The search for simplicity and 
logic, therefore, comes at a price. 
 
Within his own scheme, Birks proceeded to provide even more general dichotomies 
for his taxonomy; after categorising the law into consents, wrongs, unjust enrichment 
and ‗others‘, he would later go on to generalise a dichotomy between wrongs and not-
wrongs.
94
 The problem of oversimplification is one that was identified by Pound some 
60 years ago;  
 
‗From the standpoint of a systematist, seeking to apply the method of formal logic, four or even 
three categories seem too many. He asks at once why he cannot conform to the requirements of 
dichotomous division by reducing them to two. The answer is that the system exists for the sake 
of the ends of law, not the law for the ends of system -something that analytical systematists 
have not always kept in mind.‘95  
 
The lesson that we should learn from Pound is that sometimes the classifier will try to 
simplify material, whether or not that achieves a greater understanding of the rules 
and principles of the legal system. The Birksian approach to classification seems to 
suffer from exactly this problem, as the coherence of the classificatory system seems 
to take precedence over the substance of the law. As Pound tells us, this approach tells 
us little about the substantive content of the law, as it is less descriptive and more 
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prescriptive in arranging the law.
96
 Instead of seeing simplicity and logic as a tool in 
our understanding of the law it becomes the underlying purpose of the law.  
 
Classification as a Scientific Exercise 
 
Birks sought to classify the law along the same lines as classification in biological 
taxonomy. He often compared classification in English law with the ‗flawed‘ 
classifications in zoology that preceded Darwin.
97
 However, despite Birks‘ 
comparisons between Gaius and Darwin, it is argued that the comparisons are flawed. 
In a 1924 article, Pound pointed out that even biological classification had long ago 
abandoned formal logic.
98
 In fact, taxonomies developed before Darwin relied on 
similarities among organisms without explicit reference to the origin or the basis of 
these similarities.
99
 Birks‘ classification of consent, wrongs and unjust enrichment is 
one such taxonomy as he rejects the evolutionary basis of equitable and common law 
doctrines.
100
 One of the central themes of his categorisation is that the categories are 
discrete and exclusive, and no regard is paid to the way in which these legal groups 
have evolved.
101
 But even in the natural sciences, discrete categorisation has long 
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been abandoned as the result of unclassifiable organisms such as the platypus.
102
 The 
comparison with biological taxonomy is attractive, but ultimately unconvincing. 
 
This does not mean that private law should necessarily follow the lead of the natural 
sciences. This is for the simple reason that the two are very different disciplines. 
Writing in 1910, Andrews pointed out that the differences between law and science 
provided ‗the great impediment‘ to classifying the law.103 More recently, the 
argument has also been made by both Samuel and Low.
104
 Samuel effectively 
demonstrates that legal classification cannot be compared to scientific classification as 
it is not a naturally occurring phenomenon.
105
 Legal classification is an inherently 
human construct, not one that already exists and is waiting to be discovered. Thus, the 
taxonomic approach suffers from a lack of observability, as ‗law is the object of its 
own science.‘106 In other words, since the classifier can set the definition of what the 
law ‗is‘, he can reject or adapt any rule which does not fit into his overall theory. As 
Leff pointed out, efforts to classify the law face a constant tension between 
‗simplification and falsification‘.107 The more material that someone tries to analyse, 
the more difficult it will be to predict the outcome of judicial decision making. 
Conversely, the less one tries to analyse, the less accurate the analysis will be. This is 
the balance which classification must achieve, but arguably Birks set the level of 
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analysis at too high a level by looking for single events which gave rise to private law 
rights. This provides an important distinction with the overlapping analysis which is 
developed in this thesis; although we recognise that some form of generality is 
required, we also seek to establish that concepts are multi-factual and cannot be 
reduced to a single event. 
 
The point about seeking a balance between generality and specificity was conceded 
by Birks himself, when he stated that ‗[d]efinitions are dangerous. They can easily 
mislead. The artificiality must be kept to a minimum.‘108 The accusation of 
artificiality can be directed towards the category of wrongs, as Birks claimed that 
wrongs can only be defined as a breach of duty,
109
 while at the same time he rejected 
the use of moral propositions in categorising the law.
110
 This leaves the term ‗duty‘ 
without any concrete meaning, as it only refers to what the classifier recognises as a 
duty.
111
 For example, Birks distinguished unjust enrichment and wrongs on the basis 
that, where one receives a mistaken payment, the primary obligation is to return the 
payment, which is directly enforced by the order for restitution.
112
 It was then argued 
that ‗[t]here is no conception of wrong which will reach the receipt of a mistaken 
payment.‘113 But Birks undermined the strength of this argument when he pointed out 
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that there are several duties which can be characterised as strict liabilities, such as the 
unauthorised profit of a fiduciary or liability in conversion.
114
 Additionally, Birks 
conceded that there can be a ‗blind‘ primary right, ‗that does not flower‘ such as the 
duty not to defame.
115
 One could quite easily formulate a general ‗blind‘ primary right 
not to be unjustly deprived by the enrichment of another, which is breached when the 
defendant receives the mistaken payment.
116
 This would make the response of 
restitution a secondary right and therefore capable of being a ‗wrong‘. Birks never 
went this far, one presumes because such liability does not have the ‗whiff of 
blameworthiness‘,117 despite his declaration that questions of morality are irrelevant 
to the classification of ‗wrongs‘. On closer inspection Birks' separation of unjust 
enrichment from ‗wrongs‘ seems like a moral proposition and not one based solely on 
legal principle. The logic does not hold under close scrutiny. The legal taxonomist is 
not an objective observer, as he or she is the very person who is constructing the thing 
that is being studied.  
 
A Question of Semantics  
 
This is not just an epistemological concern; it seriously undermines the force of Birks‘ 
criticisms of English legal reasoning. Take Birks‘ earlier position that restitution is 
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only a response for unjust enrichment claims. In his later writings, Birks reconsidered 
this position and argued that restitution could be a response to wrongs as well as 
unjust enrichments.
118
 Other academics have resisted this move and argued that 
restitution is only a response to unjust enrichment, providing an alternative name of 
‗disgorgement‘ to describe gain-based response to wrongs.119 The debate becomes 
little more than a discussion about semantics, for example, one of Birks‘ arguments 
against the use of the term ‗disgorgement damages‘ is that it is an ‗ugly phrase.‘120 In 
fact, Birks himself accepted that the debate was little more than a question of 
semantics.
121
 There is no ‗right‘ answer to such a debate because the test for validity 
is determined by subjective rather than objective criteria. Unjust enrichment, as a 
concept, can be as wide or narrow as we want to define it. So too is the claim for 
restitution.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
As Waddams effectively demonstrated in his book Dimensions of Private Law, the 
use of legal reason and logic has often been much less important than the 
circumstances of the cases and the policy considerations that have influenced judicial 
decision making.
122
 Past decisions have been rationalised as examples of concepts or 
categories even where they did not exist and this, in turn, can purportedly justify the 
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writer‘s system of classification.123 The point is conceded by Smith, who argues that it 
does not necessarily follow that taxonomy itself is a futile exercise.
124
 Admittedly, the 
methodology used in the following chapters of this thesis also seeks to re-analyse 
cases. The important distinction is that this is not an attempt to use this analysis as 
criteria for determining which decisions are substantively correctly or wrongly 
decided. Re-interpretation must be used carefully; one cannot use this as a mechanism 
for re-shaping the substantive rules of private law. To quote Pound; ‗I doubt whether 
a classification is possible that will do anything more than classify.‘125 Once this is 
accepted, we can start to bring our attention to the real issue in the classification 
debate. This is identifying the purposes and aims of the private law, and how (if at all) 
does the classification can assist in achieving our objectives. 
 
The taxonomy presented by Birks raises the question of how classification can 
balance both description and prescription. Is it possible to describe something while 
also attempting to re-align it? Legal scholarship would be a very limited enterprise if 
it were not possible to try to do both at the same time. There would be little purpose in 
the publication of case notes if the writer was not describing judgments, while also 
providing some worthwhile comment about the outcome of the decision. The issue 
with Birks‘ approach is that it is not sufficiently clear when the author is merely 
describing the law and when the author is prescribing a substantial change in the law. 
If classification is to provide a useful purpose then the methodology must expressly 
                                                 
 
 
123
 S Hedley, ‗Unjust Enrichment: The Same Old Mistake‘ in A Robertson, The Law of Obligations: 
Connections and Boundaries (UCL 2004) at 75 and S Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: 
Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning (CUP 2003) at 21-22. 
124
 S Smith, ‗A Map of the Common Law‘ (2004) 40 Can Bus LJ 364. 
125
 R Pound, ‗Classification of Law‘ (1924) 37 Harvard L Rev 933 at 938. 
  
59 
 
 
allow room for both description and prescription, but in a way that separates these 
stages of inquiry.  
 
4. Weinrib, Formalism and Corrective Justice 
 
Weinrib’s Approach 
 
As Campbell has noted, Weinrib‘s legal classification is an attempt to eliminate from 
private law ‗considerations of social context which cannot be dealt with by abstract 
doctrinal scholarship.‘126 Weinrib presents a ‗juridical‘ classification of the private 
law which, in essence, seeks to present an internal account of the law.
127
 In doing so, 
Weinrib separates public from private law, and focuses his attention on the latter. 
Weinrib concludes that the ‗unifying structure that renders private law intelligible‘ is 
corrective justice.
128
 The concept of corrective justice ‗treats the plaintiff as the 
sufferer and the defendant as the doer of the same injustice.‘129 According to Weinrib, 
private law categories must reflect the correlativity between the defendant and 
plaintiff, otherwise they cannot be included in the classification of the private law. 
 
One immediate objection to Weinrib‘s formalism is that it is far from conclusive that 
the immanent rationality of the law is corrective justice. In this writer‘s opinion, the 
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salient characteristic of private law is not correlativity between the plaintiff and 
defendant but, to use Weinrib‘s own words, ―…the massive complex of cases, 
doctrines, principles, concepts, procedures, policies, and standards…‖130 It is the 
inability of many skilled legal scholars to find unifying principles in contract,
131
 
tort,
132
 property,
133
 fiduciary duties,
134
 estoppel
135
 and even arguably unjust 
enrichment
136
 that characterises and encapsulates the common law. If ‗complex 
phenomenon‘137 can be identified as the immanent rationality of the private law then 
Weinrib‘s corrective justice-based classification is, by his own standards, 
fundamentally flawed. Ultimately, it is impossible to prove or disprove that corrective 
justice is the unifying characteristic of the private law, as the identification of this 
inner rationale has been produced under a philosophical ideology, rather than through 
an exercise in description.
138
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Consequently, it is doubtful that Weinrib‘s approach can provide the starting point for 
a logical and coherent body of law.
139
 As the starting point is so basic, there is no 
convincing rationale for the subsequent alignment of the categories that he presents. 
For example, Weinrib‘s distinction between corrective justice and distributive justice 
is comparable to Atiyah‘s reductionist interpretation of tort law.140 Atiyah identified 
that negligence failed effectively to compensate victims or to punish wrongdoers who 
were often indemnified by insurance. Tort law was therefore intelligibly incoherent as 
it did not satisfy the requirement of either distributive justice or corrective justice.
141
 
In turn, Atiyah argued for the introduction of a state-sponsored no-fault compensation 
scheme.
142
 Under Weinrib‘s classification, this scheme satisfies the requirement of 
distributive justice and so tort law could now be classified as part of public law rather 
than private law. That is not to say that Atiyah was a formalist in the same manner as 
Weinrib, but it does demonstrate that tort law is not an inevitable or even logical 
consequence of the inner rationality of the private law. The rationale of corrective 
justice may just as well lead to the conclusion that the law of tort should be removed 
from the ambit of private law altogether. Corrective justice is too simple to be used 
effectively to provide a useful guide for the development of legal rules and principles. 
A similar point was made by Lord McClaren when discussing Bentham‘s 
philosophical approach to the codification of private law: ‗[t]his type of code need not 
be further considered. No state which has grown up under a reasonably good legal 
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system would agree to abandon its native institutions and accept a system of laws 
devised by philosophers.‘143 
 
To conclude that rules and principles which are not compatible with corrective justice 
are not in fact part of the private law, therefore, rests on some very circular reasoning. 
It is no different than drawing a primitive map of England, and then denying that 
certain parts of the country are English on the basis that they are not represented by 
the primitive map. What this discussion of Weinrib‘s approach has shown is that a 
purely theoretical approach to legal classification is neither strictly possible nor 
desirable. It is only once we have effectively described the legal system that we can 
begin to propose changes to the structure and substance of the law. 
 
 
5. Classification as a Descriptive Exercise 
 
The methods used by those seeking to reclassify private law have varied considerably. 
Some attempts have sought to reconstruct the private law with the aim of defending 
the existing legal system, whereas others have been purely theoretical attempts to 
construct a more logical and rational legal system. One of the criticisms of the effort 
to reclassify the law is that it is possible that the author is selectively describing the 
law so as to achieve social, political or economic goals.
144
 For example, in other legal 
systems, classification has been used as a means for achieving equality between the 
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ruling elite and the common people.
145
 It has also been used as a way of achieving 
political unity and a common sense of nationality in newly formed countries.
146
 This 
is why methodology is fundamentally important; if we are using classification for 
some wider objective, we must be open and frank about this. Even then, it is 
questionable whether there is any desire or need for such an exercise; the common 
law has developed perfectly well without the need for such drastic intervention.  
 
Even Smith, who supports the methods applied by Birks, would concede that ‗[n]one 
of these maps of the common law has been successful in the sense of being widely 
adopted by judges or even by scholars.‘147 This does not necessarily undermine the effort 
to classify the law, but it does suggest that an over-reliance on logic and theory will take 
us too far away from the very legal system we are trying to study. If we were to view a 
consistent and clear classification as the sole aim of our law (as Birks at many times 
appears to do) then the solution would be to abolish those claims that are not based on 
a single principle such as the law of negligence.
148
 Or just to keep things clear and 
simple, we could simply say that the only obligations that are enforceable are those 
that are expressly agreed to by both parties in the form of a deed. This is in fact how 
the medieval equivalent of ‗covenant‘ operated, but it soon became redundant because 
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this was too rigid and formal, and almost inevitably the courts began to recognise 
other methods of enforcing agreements.
149
 Simplicity itself has never been the priority 
of the private law. It would be an inadequate system if this were the case. 
Unfortunately, for those seeking to identify core principles or moral justifications for 
private law claims, external justifications which provide better explanations are often 
ignored.
150
 Within a rigid system of classification, even rules which appear to be 
inherently legal are rejected for failing to fit within an institutional scheme. The 
approach taken in the following chapters does not take the same view; if there are 
areas of law which are flexible and unpredictable, it is argued that we must first try to 
identify why this is the case, before trying to impose rigid and inflexible rules.
151
  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Once it is accepted that law is not just concerned with theory and principles, then it 
can in turn be accepted that an over-reliance on legal reasoning only serves to increase 
uncertainty, as the true functions of the law can become distorted. As Holmes taught 
us, paper rules do not produce certainty.
152
 This is not to say that classifying the law 
into areas such as contract and tort becomes irrelevant in our understanding of the 
law, but it does tell us that we cannot achieve a full understanding of the legal order 
just by relying on legal concepts. To take these concepts down to even more abstract 
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and wider legal concepts like ‗consent‘, ‗wrongs‘ or ‗unjust enrichment‘ may take us 
in the wrong direction. The law may be more complex than this for good and proper 
reasons.  
 
We began by addressing the interpretivist account of legal theory. Whereas Beever 
and Rickett and Smith see interpretative theories as neither descriptive nor 
prescriptive, this chapter has sought to show that there is no halfway point. All 
classifications include elements of both. One of the problems with Birks‘ approach is 
that it sidelines rules which cannot be perfectly placed within the institutional scheme; 
simplicity is favoured over reality. In rejecting abstract approaches to classifying 
private law, we are led into the territory of legal realism. Instead of treating legal 
concepts and principles as metaphysical, legal realism seeks to expose the myth that 
the law can be treated independently from external factors. A realist classification is 
an attempt to understand the complexity of the legal system without sidelining the 
substantive content of the legal order. What follows is therefore not a taxonomy of the 
law at all, but rather an exercise in what Hayek would have labelled kosmos; a legal 
cosmology.
153
 It is an effort to describe in simpler terms the structure of a complex 
and spontaneous legal order. Yet, the adoption of legal realism comes with a warning. 
What needs to be avoided is the criticism made by Twining of American legal 
realism; ‗it had been more successful in its iconoclastic and negative aspects than in 
providing a basis for constructing coherent alternatives.‘154 This leads us into a more 
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in depth discussion of legal realism in the next chapter; in particular we need to adopt 
a realist methodology that explains and justifies the classification exercise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 3: LEGAL REALISM, CONCEPTUALISM AND 
CLASSIFICATION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In contrast to interpretivist methods of private law classification, this project adopts a 
legal realist approach. Legal realism is a perspective which acknowledges the 
complexity of private law. At least for the purposes of classification, it is important to 
reject any normative proposition about the aims or goals of private law. It may very 
well be that private law can eventually be reduced to a single principle; however, this 
conclusion cannot be the starting point of the classification exercise. Since there has 
never been a unified school of legal realism, and there has been much debate about 
the true nature of legal realism,
1
 the start of this chapter sets out to define the 
approach and methodology that is adopted within this thesis. It is also important to 
dispel some common misconceptions about legal realism, such as the often held belief 
that realists were fundamentally opposed to legal reasoning and conceptualism.
2
 That 
is not the position adopted by Llewellyn, who spearheaded the realist movement,
3
 and 
neither is it the position which is adopted here. We go on to construct a conceptual 
methodology that fits with this realist approach. 
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2. Descriptive and Prescriptive Elements in Legal Classification 
 
As we saw in the last chapter, Waddams pointed out that attempts to classify the law 
usually contain elements of description and prescription; the author is making an 
attempt to describe what the law is but also trying to prescribe changes in the way the 
law should be.
4
 Yet, one cannot criticise the law for being inconsistent or even wrong 
without knowing what it is that the law is doing in the first place. It is only by 
separating description and prescription that we can identify why the courts treat 
certain scenarios differently. It is suggested that this problem can be avoided by 
adopting a realist approach to legal classification.  
 
It is important to note that Llewellyn himself did not see realism as a theory of law; 
rather it was a methodology.
5
  The basic definition of ‗law‘ in a realist approach is 
‗the decisions reached by the courts‘, which is not always in line with the rules and 
principles laid down in the speeches of the judgments.
6
 The realists were influenced 
by Holmes, and in particular his view that ‗(t)he prophecies of what the courts will do 
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in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.‘7 Similarly, 
Llewellyn emphasised the distinction between ‗paper‘ rules and ‗real‘ rules.8 
According to Llewellyn, a legal system may consist of paper rules, however these 
paper rules are abstract and provide little guidance for predicting decision making.
9
 
We saw examples of this in the previous chapter; the idea that there is an area of law 
which can be deemed ‗wrongs‘ is an example of a paper rule. Real rules, on the other 
hand, are those that do predict how the courts behave.
10
 Accordingly, ‗rules‘ are not 
always determinative of the decisions of the courts; it depends on whether the rule is a 
realistic one.  
 
It was the search for real rules which underlined the realist movement. At the same 
time, Llewellyn also noted that some form of ordering and arrangement was a 
necessary tool for understanding how the law operates; 
 
‗Behaviour is too heterogeneous to be dealt with except after some artificial ordering. 
The sense impressions which make up what we call observation are useless unless 
gathered into some arrangement. Nor can thought go on without categories.‘11 
 
A similar point is made by another of the legal realists
12
, Radin;  
                                                 
 
 
7
 OW Holmes, ‗The Path of the Law‘ (1897) 10 Harvard L Rev 457 at 461. This is reiterated by M 
Green in ‗Legal Realism as Theory of Law‘ (2005) 46 William & Mary L Rev 1915 at 1928: ‗we must 
predict how a judge will decide to determine what the law is.‘ 
8
 K Llewellyn, ‗A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in 
Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 21-25. 
9
 K Llewellyn, ‗A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in 
Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 22. 
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 K Llewellyn, ‗A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in 
Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 25-26. 
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Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 27. 
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‗We must speak of ―contracts‖, of ―tenure‖, of ―insolvency‖, of ―divorce‖, of ―property‖, 
of ―rights‖, because we cannot possibly arrange in our memories or indicate in our 
speech a whole series of special facts that may have a bearing on the situation in which 
we need guidance.‘13 
 
The search for ‗real‘ rules does not mean that we completely abandon the use of 
abstract or conceptual tools. These realists recognised that it would be impossible to 
get by without some form of arrangement of the decisions of the courts. Otherwise we 
would need to learn the full set of facts of every decision of the courts; this would be 
an impossible task for even the greatest minds. Nonetheless, the emphasis was that 
conceptualism must be rooted in reality. As with everything, the key is in finding the 
balance between, on the one hand, trying to process too many facts and, on the other, 
giving up the task of processing facts altogether.  
 
The methodology for this thesis follows the guidance provided by Llewellyn and 
Radin. This realist approach is an attempt to redefine the basic legal concepts of our 
common law, but through description and not prescription. Certainly this rests upon a 
normative proposition, namely that we should be more descriptive when classifying 
the law.
14
 However, the most important distinction between this classification and 
those discussed in the previous chapter is that there is no attempt to argue that judges 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
12
 For Radin‘s credentials as a legal realist, see M Radin, ‗Legal Realism‘ (1931) 31 Columbia L Rev 
824. 
13
 M Radin, ‗A Restatement of Hohfeld‘ (1938) 51 Harvard L Rev 1141 at 1145. 
14
 This aim is one that is shared by most commentators; A Burrows, Understanding the Law of 
Obligations: Essays on Contract, Tort and Restitution (Hart 1998) at 102; A Beever and C Rickett, 
‗Interpretative Legal Theory and Academic Lawyer‘ (2005) 68 MLR 320 at 325; S Hedley, ‗The 
Taxonomic Approach to Restitution‘ in A Hudson (ed), New Perspectives on Property Law, 
Obligations and Restitution (Cavendish 2004) at 154; P Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution 
(rev edn, Clarendon Press 1989) at 7. 
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should stay within the guidance of this classification. A realist classification cannot 
fall into this trap; the law as it is must not be confused with arguments about the way 
that the law should be.
15
  
 
This does not mean that the legal realist must reject any constructive argument about 
what the courts should be doing. Indeed, realism itself is in many circles a by-word 
for arguing for the reform of the legal system.
16
 However, realism is opposed to any 
methodology that uses a normative framework to dictate the description of the law. As 
Llewellyn noted ‗(t)he argument is simply that no judgment of what ought to be done 
in the future with respect to any part of law can be intelligently made without 
knowing objectively, as far as possible, what that part of law is now doing.‘17 Cohen 
went even further, stating that ‗[u]nless a legal ―problem‖ can be subsumed under one 
of these forms [of what the law is doing, or what it should be doing], it is not a 
meaningful question and any answer to it must be nonsense.‘18 Going back to the 
interpretivism method seen in Chapter 2, we can see that the methodology of Birks 
was guilty of this error. As far as the realist is concerned, that is an error which needs 
to be avoided to ensure that we can achieve the most accurate description of private 
law.
19
 As lawyers we can, and should, argue for changes in the law where they are 
needed, but the first step in this process is to understand the law in the first place. This 
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 WE Rumble, American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process (Cornell UP 
1968) 
17
 K Llewellyn, ‗Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound‘ (1931) 44 Harvard L Rev 
1222 at 1236-1237. A point also made by K Barker in ‗Theorising Unjust Enrichment Law: Being 
Realist(ic)?‘ (2006) 26 OJLS 609: ‗[n]ormative theory of whatever type cannot be allowed to 
‗reconstruct‘ that which the law is‘ (at 625).  
18
 F Cohen, ‗Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach‘ (1935) 35 Columbia L Rev 809 at 
824. 
19
 As K Llewellyn stated in ‗Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound‘ (1931) 44 
Harvard L Rev 1222; ‗Freed of the check of the concrete, the most learned err‘ (at 1225). 
  
72 
 
 
is why the separation of description and prescription can be achieved through a realist 
approach. 
 
3. Realism Re-Assessed 
 
While there is no unified school of legal realism, the main characteristic of legal 
realists is their opposition to the elevated status of legal rules in traditional legal 
science.
20
 As Leiter has pointed out, to a degree, the realist approach can be 
considered as a form of positivism, as it is concerned with what courts in fact do, 
rather than being concerned with ethics, ideals or rules.
21
 Leiter compares legal 
realism with ‗hard‘ positivism, which rejects morality as criterion for legal validity.22 
Writing recently, Priel concludes that ‗[i]n a loose sense Leiter is surely right.‘23 
However, Priel goes on to point out that there are still some fundamental differences 
between the two approaches. Notably, realism is concerned with what the courts do, 
whereas positivism entails norms which determine the validity of legal rules.
24
 
Arguably, this is simply a question of how one approaches the test of validity, since 
the norm which determines the validity of legal rules under the realist approach is that 
they should accurately predict the decisions of the courts.
25
 A full discussion of this 
debate is one that is outside the scope of this chapter; however, the similarities 
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 R Dias, Jurisprudence (5
th
 edn, Butterworths 1985) at 447. 
21
 B Leiter, ‗Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered‘ (2001) 111 Ethics 278 at 279; R Dias, 
Jurisprudence (5
th
 edn, Butterworths 1985) at 447. 
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 B Leiter, ‗Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis‘ (1998) 4 Legal Theory 533; B Leiter, 
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24
 D Priel, ‗Were the Legal Realists Legal Positivists‘ (2008) 27 Law and Philosophy 309 at 348-349. 
25
 D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, ‗Normative Positivism: The Mirage of the Middle Way‘ (1989) 9 
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between realism and positivism are acknowledged even by Priel.
26
 Part of the 
confusion, it is contended, is created by the failure to distinguish between two very 
different schools of realism; fact-sceptics and rule-sceptics.
27
 
 
Fact-Scepticism 
 
Rumble separated the realists into two broad groups; the fact-sceptic realist, as 
exemplified by Frank, and the rule-sceptic realist, as exemplified by Llewellyn.
28
 
Frank‘s fact-scepticism centred on the unpredictability of factual analysis by judges 
and juries.
29
 It did not matter how certain a legal rule was, there was always 
subjectivity in the way in which courts or juries interpreted facts. Accordingly, law 
‗always has been, is now, and will ever continue to be, largely vague and variable.‘30 
Frank is correct that we can no more effectively predict how the courts will weigh up 
the inherent tensions that are seen in the private law than a biologist can predict 
protean behaviour.
31
 This does not undermine the attempt to understand this complex 
phenomenon, but simply illustrates that even naturally occurring events are not 
always predictable. Frank went so far as to claim that if one were to take into account 
the judges‘ background, the social facts and aims, then the outcome of disputes would 
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be predictable.
32
 But, as Samuel has pointed out, if this were so it would be possible 
to predict legal rulings using artificial intelligence, which has never been 
accomplished.
33
  
 
Goode has also stated that in other disciplines such as mathematics it has been 
accepted that some events are incapable of prediction.
34
 If natural science can concede 
that human knowledge is imperfect and incomplete, then the realist should also 
concede that we are in no position to identify every factor which will influence 
judicial decision making. Instead, we can only identify the main factors which are 
likely to have an impact upon judicial decision making. A fact-sceptic would reject 
any attempt to classify private law as a futile exercise, but not all realists would. It is 
this second type of realism which this thesis adopts for the purposes of classification. 
 
Rule-Scepticism 
 
The more rewarding methodology for the process of classification can be drawn from 
the rule-sceptics, and in particular the writings of Llewellyn. As Rumble noted, the 
rule-sceptic approach seeks to achieve ‗‗real‘ rules that describe the actual 
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uniformities in judicial decisions.‘35 The focus under the rule-sceptic approach is on 
the reported cases; at this level it does not represent a complete rejection of legal 
rules, but instead ‗strives for greater legal certainty.‘36 It should also not be forgotten 
that it was, after all, Llewellyn who became the chief reporter for the Uniform 
Commercial Code.
37
 Llewellyn was a firm supporter of the project.
38
 There is no 
reason why the classification of private law should be incompatible with the realist 
approach. 
 
Llewellyn stated that the aim of legal realism, under the rule-sceptic approach, is to 
describe and predict the behaviour of the courts.
39
 A ‗realist classification‘ may 
appear to be a contradictory phrase but this could not be further from the truth. 
Certainly, some rule-sceptic realists were strongly critical of the use of legal concepts 
such as ‗property‘ and ‗contract‘ as they believed the real social issues were hidden by 
these terms.
40
 Although some legal realists did argue against the overuse of terms 
such as property, contract and tort, a realist does not necessarily have to reject the 
continued application of these terms. Many legal realists acknowledged that legal 
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concepts can play an important role in predicting the behaviour of the courts.
41
 
Accordingly, a realist must acknowledge any analysis which will develop our 
understanding of what the courts are actually doing and how to predict future 
decisions.
42
 For example, Llewellyn criticised Langdell‘s approach to consideration 
and unilateral contracts, on the basis that it did not ‗work according to that pattern‘.43 
At the same time, he saw the usefulness in the ‗c.i.f.‘ (cost, insurance, freight) as it 
had ‗proved in test after test as surely, as cleanly, as smoothly gauged to the work it 
had to do as any legal engine man has yet designed.‘44 What we are looking for are 
rules or concepts that describe and predict how the courts decide cases. One of the 
most effective methods for predicting the behaviour of the courts is to look at past 
judicial reasoning and to identify patterns of judicial outcomes to particular facts. Any 
reference to legal realism from this point onwards will be a reference to rule-sceptic 
realism as opposed to fact-scepticism. 
 
Dagan’s Realism 
 
 
Another attempt to provide a realist approach to the classification debate has been 
produced by Dagan. As with this project, Dagan has taken his lead from the rule-
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sceptic realists. Thus, he cites Lllewellyn and Cohen as the forefathers of his realist 
methodology.
45
 Many of the conclusions reached by Dagan are insightful and 
certainly avoid the narrowness of formalistic or positivist classifications of law. 
However, there is an evident flaw with his methodology, which is his failure to 
separate the ‗is‘ from ‗ought‘. Dagan‘s entire project rests on normative principles of 
autonomy, utility and community.
46
 In fact Wyman contends that Dagan‘s realism is 
as much formalistic as it is realist.
47
 As Sherwin notes, Dagan ‗defends existing rules, 
sometimes proposes refinements to rules, and sometimes argues for significant 
reforms‘.48 Lllewellyn himself noted that an attempt to classify the law would 
inevitably ‗obscure some of the data under observation and give fictitious value to 
others- a process which can be excused only insofar as it is necessary to the 
accomplishing of a purpose‘.49 However, Dagan goes too far in this regard, and as 
noted throughout this chapter and the preceding Chapter 2, the separation of the 
descriptive and prescriptive is essential for any realist analysis. It is for these reasons 
that Dagan is not regarded as a realist in the tradition of Llewellyn and Cohen, despite 
his claims. Our efforts will, therefore, move forward by developing a very different 
realist methodology. 
 
4. Realism and Determinacy of Legal Rules 
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Indeterminacy of Legal Rules 
 
The aim of legal realism is to identify the social factors which influence the outcome 
of judicial decision making and to predict the future behaviour of the courts. The 
realist movement has been treated (unfairly) by some opponents as a complete 
rejection of legal rules
50
 and also as a ‗jurisprudential joke.51 The most damning 
criticism levelled against legal realism was Hart‘s exposition in The Concept of Law 
where he attacked the realist‘s argument that rules do not guide judicial behaviour but 
are merely predictions of judicial behaviour.
52
 Hart pointed out that some legal rules 
may be indeterminate at the margins, but at their core they are not indeterminate. 
Even modern legal realists concede to some degree that the outright rejection of any 
legal theory is a philosophical mess.
53
 It is difficult to argue that Hart is not correct 
when he asserts that legal rules are important in any effort to understand the law, no 
matter how strongly one may disagree with interpretivist approaches. However, as we 
have already seen, Hart‘s critique can be applied to fact-sceptic realists, but not 
necessarily to the rule-sceptic realists.
54
 It is therefore necessary to explain the core 
determinacy of the law under a realist approach. 
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Determinacy of Legal Rules under a Functional Approach 
 
There are several reasons why, from a realist perspective, we can accept the influence 
of previous decisions when judges settle disputes. The first is that English judges have 
traditionally been careful (or at least make it appear so) to stay within their role as 
enforcers of the law and not to usurp the powers of the legislature.
55
 Even where we 
see judicial creativity, in many cases, this limits the behaviour of the courts by 
requiring the judges to make links with the decisions of past courts. For example, 
even Lord Denning, who is generally regarded as an activist judge,
56
 went to great 
lengths in many of his judgments to try to show that his rulings were at least 
compatible with the existing legal framework.
57
 Yet where Lord Denning could not 
convincingly show that his decisions were in line with previous rulings of the courts, 
it was likely that the decision would be reversed by the House of Lords upon appeal. 
An example is when their Lordships rejected the deserted wife‘s equity that Denning 
had introduced in the Court of Appeal.
58
 There is also a more cynical reason for 
explaining the importance of adhering to past decisions. Higgins and Rubin argued 
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that there were economic motivations for consistency in judicial decision-making.
59
 
Any judge who simply came to his decision without reference to existing legal 
materials would not get very far in his profession.
60
 According to Posner, judges 
would either find themselves out of a job very quickly, or at the very least they would 
never have the chance to advance to a higher position in their profession.
61
 
 
If we leave to one side these more cynical arguments, probably the most significant 
reason for the importance of precedent within the legal system is the wealth of 
experience that is embodied by the culmination of hundreds of years of judicial 
decision making.
62
 To use the map analogy that is often referred to by those seeking 
to classify the law,
63
 someone who believes they have a good sense of direction will 
usually want to make use of maps made by those who have made similar journeys in 
the past. As Hayek pointed out, one of the benefits provided by precedent based 
systems of law is that the rules developed by the courts are context specific rather 
than the result of some grand design.
64
 This means that when the English courts seek 
to address social, economic and moral issues they will often find that their 
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predecessors have left a well trodden path to follow.
65
 Therefore, when judges are 
deciding cases they have the benefit of the experience and insight of their 
predecessors. Unless the judge identifies a particular reason to depart from the 
decisions of the preceding courts, it can often be assumed that the existing rules and 
concepts are the most appropriate approach for these situations.
66
 Llewellyn noted 
that, ultimately, the judge in any given case may decide that there are good reasons 
for distinguishing the case before him from previous decisions of the courts or that a 
new approach is to be taken.
67
 However, the fact that the existing rules have been 
developed and tweaked over a long period of time means that for the most part what 
has been decided in the past is a valuable indicator for how things will be decided in 
the future. The search then turns to finding the tools for identifying the past behaviour 
of the courts.  
 
Before moving on, it should be noted that realism also accounts for a stronger level of 
determinacy when it comes to legislation.
68
 For example, Llewellyn explained that 
judges ‗must accept them, to start with: you are no independent agents.‘69 What this 
means is that, just as with precedent, the courts will not simply ignore the rules laid 
                                                 
 
 
65
 Lord Denning in The Discipline of Law (Butterworths 1979) at 314; ‗I would treat it as you would a 
path through the woods. You must follow it certainly, so as to reach your end, but you must not let the 
path become too overgrown. You must cut out the dead wood and trim off the side branches, else you 
will find yourself lost in the thickets and the brambles.‘  
66
 K Llewellyn, ‗Frank‘s Law and the Modern Mind‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in 
Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 110: ‗Rules guide, although they do not control, 
decision. The rule of the case or the code does lay its hand upon the future, though one finger or several 
may slip or shift position‘.  
67
 K Llewellyn, ‗Impressions of the Conference on Precedent‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism 
in Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 122-123. 
68
 K Llewellyn took the view that judges based their decisions ‗in the main from authoritative sources 
(which in the case of law are largely statutes and the decisions of the courts)‘ in The Bramble Bush, 
(New York 1930) at 13.  
69
 K Llewellyn, ‗The Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition‘ in K Llewellyn,  Jurisprudence: 
Realism in Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 227. 
  
82 
 
 
down by others. This is regularly seen in those cases where Parliament has laid down 
a structured and comprehensive legislative regime.
70
 There are justifiable concerns 
that the courts are sometimes not the appropriate forum for addressing some of the 
social and economic issues raised in certain cases, because of the limited resources 
and the time restraints placed upon the courts.
71
 This does not mean that all statutes 
are enforced without question, as Llewellyn and Radin both emphasised the flexibility 
which the courts often employ when interpreting statutes.
72
 Moreover, there are some 
statutory provisions which are simply ignored by the courts because there are more 
compelling reasons for not applying them.
73
 The simple point is that it will be more 
difficult for a judge to depart from statutory provisions than it will be to depart from 
judge-made rules. It is for these reasons that this project is primarily concerned with 
judge-made law, as statutory law is generally more static and gives less room for the 
courts to address social, economic and moral issues. 
 
                                                 
 
 
70
 This has been very important in nuisance cases where claimants seek to show that private remedies 
are available where these statutory regimes are breached; Ali v City of Bradford MDC [2010] EWCA 
Civ 1282 at [39] (Toulson J): ‗In these circumstances, for the courts to impose such a liability through 
the law of nuisance would be to use a blunt instrument to interfere with a carefully regulated statutory 
scheme and would usurp the proper role of Parliament.‘ See also Birmingham City Council v Shafi 
[2008] EWCA Civ 1186, [2009] 1 WLR 1961. This was also one of the reasons for Lord Hoffmann‘s 
reticence in recognising a tort of causing intentional distress at [46] in Wainright v Home Office [2003] 
UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 . 
71
 K Holland, ‗Review: Judicial Activism vs Restraint: McDowell, Miller, and Perry Reconsider the 
Debate‘ (1983) 8 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 705 at 706 onwards. A recent example 
can be seen in Lord Hoffmann‘s judgment in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at 54, 
where his Lordship argued that the courts are not well qualified to address competition law. 
72
 K Llewellyn, ‗The Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: 
Realism in Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 227-229. M Radin, ‗Statutory 
Interpretation‘ (1930) 43 Harvard L Rev 863; M Radin, ‗Realism in Statutory Interpretation and 
Elsewhere‘ (1935) 23 California L Rev 156. The judge‘s role in interpreting statute is more generally 
discussed in J Willis, ‗Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell: Preliminary Observations‘ (1938) 16 Can 
Bar Rev 1 (as reprinted in (1938) 55 South African LJ 322). 
73
 For example in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 (HL). Another example is the way in which the courts 
have applied section 53 of the Law of Property Act 1925, which has been criticised as being 
inconsistent with the terms of the statute in B Green, ‗Grey, Oughtred and Vandervell: A Contextual 
Reappraisal‘ (1984) 47 MLR 385. 
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5. A Realist Approach to Conceptualism 
 
It is one thing to argue that contract, tort and property are not metaphysical 
institutions waiting to be discovered,
74
 but we have seen that this does not necessarily 
mean that legal concepts cannot play a useful guide in predicting the behaviour of the 
courts.
75
 According to Llewellyn, concepts can be a ‗helpful device‘76 that will in 
most cases help us to identify the most likely outcome in a predetermined set of 
circumstances. Radin, one of Llewellyn‘s fellow legal realists, also made this 
argument using the phrase ‗expository function‘ to describe the role of legal 
concepts.
77
 A similar view is adopted by Cane who argues that we can regard 
‗categories‘ such as contract, tort, trusts and restitution as ‗expository devices‘.78 
According to Llewellyn, such concepts provide the necessary balance between 
consistency and flexibility that we are seeking to achieve in this realist 
classification.
79
 Llewellyn identified three functions for concepts; they guide the 
courts, they help to predict judicial decisions, and provide flexibility which is 
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 G Samuel, ‗Can Gaius really be compared to Darwin‘ (2000) 49 ICLQ 297 at 312. 
75
 J Dickinson, ‗Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision‘ (1931) 79 Univ of 
Pennsylvania L Rev and American Law Register 833 at 835. 
76
 K Llewellyn, ‗Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound‘ (1931) 44 Harvard L Rev 
1222 at at 1249.  
77
 M Radin also states that conceptualism provides a valuable expository function in ‗Legal Realism‘ 
(1931) 5 Columbia L Rev 824 at 827. 
78
 P Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart 1997) uses the phrase expository devices in a similar fashion  
(at 198-201). Cane went on to argue that concurrent claims, where claims can be brought under 
different conceptual devices on the same set of facts, but where the concept applied led to different 
results, should be abolished (The Anatomy of Tort Law at 200). There is nothing wrong with this 
proposal, as it is a normative one. Since the purpose of this thesis is to describe the law, the merit of 
concurrent claims is, therefore, outside the scope of this work. 
79
 K Llewellyn, ‗On Reading the Newer Jurisprudence‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in 
Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 139. 
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essential in facilitating the dynamism of the law.80 We will now go on to consider how 
concepts can be constructed to ensure that they perform these three functions. 
 
The Importance of Social Reality 
 
One of the central features of legal realism is the search for more accurate 
descriptions of the behaviour of the courts.
81
 In that regard, the aim of this chapter is 
one that is shared by legal taxonomists and their critics alike.
82
 However, there are a 
number of distinct ways to describe naturally occurring events and this creates the 
possibility that the observer may subjectively describe the material.
83
 As Llewellyn 
pointed out, this is something that needs to be avoided, if possible, under a realist 
approach.
84
 This is why it is important that legal concepts can be defined by reference 
to social reality. If the concept can only be defined by further references to legal rules 
and principles then it will be of little use in identifying the relevant issues and facts 
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 K Llewellyn, ‗On Reading the Newer Jurisprudence‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in 
Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 133; ‗(1) They help control and guide the judge 
or other official in ways and places in which the rules of law, as such, fail to control and guide. (2) 
They are factors which are given and present in the legal system as we have it, so that they can be 
known, felt, even seen by a lawyer, and they therefore can guide him both in predicting and in working 
out an argument to a court. (3) They are factors which afford, however, some very real degree of 
flexibility of adjustment both of the outcome of a particular case and of the rule laid down in a case to 
changing times and needs and case situations.‘ 
81
 K Llewellyn, ‗Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound‘ (1931) 44 Harvard L Rev 
1222 at at 1255. 
82
 Although Birks was strongly opposed to the realist tradition, he undoubtedly favoured the use of 
more clear and insightful language, P Birks, ‗Equity in The Modern World: An Exercise in Taxonomy‘ 
(1996) 26 University of West Austl L Rev 1 at 4. A similar point is made by one of his harshest critics, 
S Hedley, ‗The Taxonomic Approach to Restitution‘ in A Hudson (ed) New Perspectives on Property 
Law, Obligations and Restitution (Cavendish 2004) at 155. 
83
 G Samuel, ‗Can Gaius really be compared to Darwin‘ (2000) 49 ICLQ 297 at 311. 
84
 K Llewellyn, ‗A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in 
Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 27. 
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that influence the decisions of the courts.
85
 As Samuel has pointed out, the success of 
the Roman model lay in the fact that its categories were not just legal concepts, but 
were also reflective of social reality.
86
 Persons and things ‗existed both as legal and as 
empirical realities and thus the scheme functioned like a scientific model.‘87 The 
Roman classification undoubtedly provides great benefits in this regard. However, it 
must always be used with caution.
88
 It should not be assumed that legal concepts can 
become the primary object of study as their function is to serve as a bridge between 
factual events and the decisions of the courts.
89
 This is why the basic concepts of the 
Roman system are adapted rather than adopted in this thesis. The approach which we 
adopt looks at concepts as multi-factual; by looking for multiple facts we ensure that 
our concepts are closely rooted in reality. 
 
6. Concepts as Links between Facts and Outcomes 
 
It was Holmes who stated that to identify the law we have to, first, ‗determine what 
are the facts to which the special consequences are attached; second, to ascertain the 
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 For example in Daraydan Holdings v Solland [2004] EWHC 622 (Ch), [2005] Ch 119 at 132, 
Lawrence Collins J stated that some formulations of the fiduciary duties were very often ‗circular‘. 
There is no better example of this than the following excerpt taken from Millett J‘s (as he then was) 
speech in Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (CA); ‗The expression ―fiduciary 
duty‖ is properly confined to those duties which are peculiar to fiduciaries and the breach of which 
attracts legal consequences differing from those consequent upon the breach of other duties‘ (at 16). 
86
 G Samuel, ‗English Private Law: Old and New Thinking in the Taxonomy Debate‘ (2004) 24 OJLS 
335 at 344; G Samuel ‗Classification of Obligations and the Impact of Constructivist Epistemologies‘ 
(1997) 17 Legal Studies 448 at 457. Although Samuel is at times a rule-sceptic, it would appear that he 
would not agree to being called a legal realist; G Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law (Ashgate 
2003) at 32. 
87
 G Samuel, ‗English Private Law: Old and New Thinking in the Taxonomy Debate‘ (2004) 24 OJLS 
335 at 344. 
88
 G Samuel, ‗Classification of Obligations and the Impact of Constructivist Epistemologies‘ (1997) 17 
Legal Studies 448 at 456-458.  
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 P Cane, Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart 1997) at 198. 
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consequences.‘90 Simply put, there is little point in conceptualising facts or issues if 
they have no bearing on the decisions made by the courts. To take an extreme 
example, a classification that separated cases by reference to the defendant‘s eye 
colour will be grounded in social reality, but the colour of the defendant‘s eyes will 
most probably not be a useful guide for predicting when the courts will or will not 
find liability. What we need are facts which lead to predictable outcomes. So, for 
example, an agreement between parties to make an exchange will lead to the court 
finding a contract, which will normally attract expectation damages if one party fails 
to perform their side of the agreement. Contract is undoubtedly a wide concept which 
is relevant in several areas of private law, and it would be naive to think that the 
outcome in every contract case is the same. Nevertheless, the identification of a 
contract provides a bridge between the facts and the likely decision of the courts. It 
can, therefore, be regarded as a realist concept; as this bridging role assists in both 
predicting the law and in identifying the primary factors that are influencing the 
decisions of the courts. As we have explained earlier, this approach would not be 
compatible with fact-sceptic realism. It is however, compatible with rule-sceptic 
realism. The boundaries of realist concepts are facts; they cannot be boundaries that 
are based on technical or abstract principles. Without factual elements, we cannot 
predict how the legal system will work, and this would defeat the very purpose for 
classifying private law. The effort throughout this thesis will be to define realist 
concepts; this will entail redefining and cutting down a number of core private law 
concepts such as property and tort. This is done in the next chapter, where it is argued 
that these concepts can have use, but only by adopting narrower versions of them. 
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7. Dynamism of the Legal System 
 
A narrow approach to concepts may appear to inhibit the development of the law. 
This concern can easily be rebutted. Firstly, it should be emphasised again that under 
a realist methodology, we are not laying down rules which have normative force. If 
concepts become stretched to the point where they no longer retain their link between 
reality and predictable outcomes, then a new concept (or set of concepts) must be 
found instead.
91
 The same concern should be applied throughout the law of 
obligations. As we will see, the thesis presents an overlapping approach to 
conceptualism which explains the progression and development of law, while at the 
same time trying to avoid undermining the cohesion of core legal concepts. Secondly, 
the thesis presents an overlapping approach, which allows us to recognise new types 
of claims which can share factual similarities with existing concepts whilst avoiding 
the problem of pigeon-holing new claims. 
 
8. Overlaps 
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 This echoes Lord Rodger‘s comments in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank Plc 
[2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 at 204, about the concept of a voluntary assumption of 
responsibility analysis of pure economic losses in negligence. His Lordship stated that the concept 
should be narrowly defined, otherwise this concept could end up ‗being stretched beyond its natural 
limits-which would in the long run undermine the very real value of the concept as a criterion of 
liability in the many cases where it is an appropriate guide.‘ Note that the analysis of ‗assumption of 
responsibility‘ is rejected in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The reasoning of his Lordship is insightful 
nonetheless. 
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‗I do not mean in this classification to make mutually exclusive groups. The heads are 
convenient for description, not the framework of a logical system. Things overlap.‘92 
 
Llewellyn recognised that concepts were not mutually exclusive, and indeed that they 
often overlapped. This happened in two ways; firstly, it was seen in cases where there 
might be a combination of concepts, such as a contract for the sale of land. This 
situation is an overlap of ‗contract‘ and ‗property.‘ Indeed this is the way in which 
Birks viewed the term overlap.
93
 Yet there was also a second form which Llewellyn 
identified, and this is the very type of overlap to which this thesis is concerned with. 
This second type of overlap occurs when cases cannot be ‗brought under one or 
another of these main heads.‘ This overlapping analysis finds its roots not only in the 
work of the realists, but also the more recent writings of Waddams and Dietrich. As 
explained in Chapter 1, both have argued that overlaps can and do occur.
94
 This thesis 
seeks to further develop that argument and explain how it assists in predicting the law.  
 
The next chapter sets up the framework within which these overlaps occur. In doing 
so, we redefine the core concepts of property, contract and tort. However, it is not 
enough simply to develop narrower concepts, we must also explain what happens 
with the content which has been removed. An overlapping approach allows us to do 
this whilst also not requiring us to completely break the links with other legal 
concepts. For this reason, it is important for the purposes of this thesis that we are 
talking about concepts and not categories. Concepts are expositive devices for 
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 K Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York 1930) at 9-10. In this piece, Llewellyn had a four-fold 
division in mind; property, contract, something which resembled a law for associations and laws which 
govern things outside of agreements, primarily the law of tort. 
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 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (rev edn, Clarendon Press 1989) 44-48. 
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 See text at n 49 in Chapter 1. 
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describing facts, and there are no convincing reasons for supporting a discrete 
categorisation of private law. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate that a realist methodology can 
provide the groundwork for a classification of private law that incorporates a 
conceptual analysis. Any useful concept should perform the functions set out in this 
chapter; it is predictable, it is identifiable and there should also be room for 
development and flexibility. Thus, in the next chapter we assess whether the concepts 
of property, contract and tort lead to predictable outcomes in the courts, and whether 
they are socially observable (which performs the function of identifiability.)  
 
 
CHAPTER 4: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE LAW 
 
 
‗The quest for narrower, more significant categories is always a sound first approach to 
wide categories which are not giving satisfaction in use. But of course, once satisfactory 
narrow categories have been found and tested, the eternal quest recurs for wider 
synthesis- but one which will really stand up in issue.‘1  
 
1. A Three-Fold Classification of Private Law 
 
Llewellyn cited contract, tort and property as providing the three important functions 
of predictability, identifiability and flexibility.
2
 The concepts of property,
3
 contract
4
 
and tort,
5
 are terms that we have taken from Roman law,
6
 although the English 
                                                 
 
 
1
 K Llewellyn, ‗Some Realism about Realism‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and 
Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at [c] on 56. See also D Phillips, ‗The Commercial Culpability 
Scale‘ (1982) 92 YLJ 228 at 290. 
2
 As mentioned at n92, in the last chapter, Llewellyn also had a fourth category of a law relating to 
associations which he set out in another piece, K Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York 1930) at 9-
10. We do not explore this fourth category in much detail, although it is discussed in our analysis of 
negligence further on in this chapter. Note that the main influence is on methodology; it does not 
require the exact replica of Llewellyn‘s basic approach. There is not enough room in this thesis to 
discuss the fourth category, and there is less overlap between this possible fourth area and the private 
law concepts which are being explored in this thesis. 
3
 The House of Lords recognised in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655 that the various torts 
aimed at protecting land could be identified as forming part of an English law of property; at 687, 708 
and 723. 
4
 D Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (OUP 1999) at 141-151.  
5
 D Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (OUP 1999) at at 153-168. 
6
 More recently in Fibrosa Spolka Akcynja v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour [1943] AC 32, Lord 
Wright recognised contract and tort, but added another category of restitution. Although the concept is 
referenced in some early texts, Roman law never developed a general concept of unjust enrichment; P 
Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (rev edn, Clarendon Press 1989) at 22-23. Roman law 
instead placed a number of miscellaneous rules and principles within categories of quasi-contract and 
quasi-delict, R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 
(Juta & Co 1995) at 16. The term quasi-contract was also used by the English courts primarily to refer 
to money transfers, such as in Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 (HL), but has been replaced in 
favour of the terms restitution or ‗unjust enrichment‘. In any case the status of restitution in English 
private law is a much more complex issue, and it will be argued that the concept of unjust enrichment 
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versions of these concepts are not used in the same way as their Roman counterparts. 
It is argued that, at their core, these concepts can and do have an important role as 
expositive devices. Nonetheless, it is also argued that we must also look for narrower 
accounts of these concepts. We need not abandon our existing tools; for example, one 
of Llewellyn‘s fellow realists, Cohen, whilst acknowledging the descriptive utility of 
legal concepts also called for the ‗redefinition of concepts‘.7 It must, therefore, be 
stressed, once more, that rule-sceptic realists were not calling for the absolute 
rejection of conceptualism. Those such as Llewellyn and Cohen were, instead, 
arguing that many terms and concepts had become so far removed from reality that 
they failed to perform any useful guidance.
8
 Some sort of arrangement of private law 
is not only compatible with legal realism, it also plays an integral role in assisting our 
understanding of the legal system. 
 
Llewellyn also provided invaluable guidance for setting out how such a classification 
could be constructed: ‗[i]n view of the tendency toward overgeneralization in the past 
this is likely to mean the making of smaller categories- which may either be sub-
groupings inside the received categories, or may cut across them‘.9 Similarly, Gilmore 
noted that ‗when our categories become over-defined we lose touch with reality.‘10 
Thus the search is to identify narrower concepts of the law. In particular, for the 
purposes of this thesis, we see that Llewellyn recognised that a ‗realist‘ classification 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
fails to describe the relevant circumstances that lead the courts to award restitution. This is to be 
discussed further on in this Chapter. 
7
 F Cohen, ‗Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach‘ (1935) 35 Columbia L Rev 809 at 
824. 
8
 K Llewellyn, ‗A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in 
Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 27. 
9
 K Llewellyn, ‗A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step‘ in K Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in 
Theory and Practice (Univ of Chicago Press 1962) at 27-28. 
10
 G Gilmore, ‗Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure‘ (1961) 70 Yale LJ 1037 at 1039. 
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would not be tidy or discrete. This chapter lays down the basic framework for the 
classification adopted in this thesis, through the redefinition of property, contract and 
tort.  
 
At this stage, we must keep in mind the distinction between paper and real rules. This 
rests on the differentiation between the language used by the courts and the actual 
decisions they reach.
11
 In relation to the concepts of property, contract and tort, we are 
not following the language used by the courts, as the courts undoubtedly use these 
terms in a much wider sense. This, it is argued, is the only way to achieve narrower 
concepts. However, it is not an attempt to sideline those rules that do not fit into these 
concepts. Instead the exploration of overlapping concepts in the following chapters 
will demonstrate how this arrangement can assist in our understanding of private law. 
It is only possible to do this by accepting narrower constructions of property, contract 
and tort and then to explore the territory which is left unclassified. This chapter 
provides the first step in the process; in the following chapters the overlapping 
territory is looked at in more depth. 
 
 
2. The Law of Property 
 
This section will provide an alternative analysis of ‗property‘ which seeks to redefine 
the concept of property as control of a tangible thing to which the claimant has title. 
                                                 
 
 
11
 M Green in ‗Legal Realism as Theory of Law‘ (2005) 46 William & Mary L Rev 1915 at 1928: ‗we 
must predict how a judge will decide to determine what the law is.‘ 
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There are three constituent facts which we look for; title, control and tangible things. 
Even at this early stage, the nature of the overlap with other legal concepts will 
hopefully be emerging. Our definition requires us to separate other legal concepts 
which are sometimes referred to as ‗property‘. For example, a trust is often stated to 
be a property right; however, the consequence of our narrower account of property is 
that we must distinguish the trust scenario. Leaving aside for the time being the issue 
of tangibility, it is the lack of the third element, control, which indicates that the trust 
is to be treated differently. This analysis does not require us to completely distinguish 
the two concepts; there is always an overlap in the example of a trust as the 
beneficiary has title, but the trustee has control. We shall explore these distinctions 
further on.
12
 For now, we need to set out the arguments against a wider concept of 
property which identifies all of these situations as being examples of ‗property.‘ 
 
The most controversial distinction between our approach and the current approach in 
English law is that we require something tangible. Admittedly, this is controversial; 
Samuel has pointed out that, generally, English lawyers have no reservations about 
confining the term ‗property‘ to corporeal things.13 As a result the view that property 
is concerned with tangible things is usually treated as crude and outdated.
14
 There are, 
however, some academics that have adopted a narrow concept of property, the most 
recent being McFarlane, who has argued that, a ‗right can only qualify as a property 
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 See generally Chapter 7. 
13
 G Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law (Ashgate 2003) at 155; K Gray points out that English 
law does not confine the use of the term property to tangible things in ‗Property in Thin Air‘ (1991) 50 
CLJ 252. 
14
 ‗Someone who believes that property is a right to a thing is assumed to suffer from a childlike lack of 
sophistication- or worse.‘ T Merrill and H Smith, ‗What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?‘ (2001) 111 Yale LJ 357 at 358.  
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right if it relates to the use of a thing: an object that can be physically located.‘15  
Even so, this view is controversial, as seen by Rahmatian‘s response to McFarlane‘s 
approach; ‗[i]t is hard to understand how anyone in the 21st century can question that 
there are property rights in intangibles.‘16 Birks also stated that ‗[n]o modern system 
gives very much weight to the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal things.‘17 
We will argue that English law does indeed continue to recognise the distinction 
between corporeal and incorporeal things. There is no need to employ property 
concepts to identify other types of situations, as this will only lead to the 
disintegration of property as a useful concept.
18
 The argument is that tangibility is a 
key fact which identifies the way in which we treat property; there may be overlaps as 
in the law of trusts, or money interests, but this should not obscure the differences. 
 
Property as a Nebulous Concept 
 
Out of all the terms and concepts which we use in our private law system, ‗property‘ 
is probably one of the most nebulous and overused.
19
 As Grey has noted, the term 
‗property‘ is used to describe such a wide variety of circumstances that it has lost all 
meaning and utility.
20
 Notably, in a recent comparative study by von Bar and 
Drobnig, English property was referred to as a ‗broad concept‘, at least in comparison 
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 B McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (Hart 2008) at 132. 
16
 A Rahmatian, ‗The Structure of Property Law by Ben McFarlane‘ (2009) 72 MLR 877 (Publication 
Review) at 877. 
17
 P Birks, ‗Definition and Division: A Mediation on Institutes 3.13‘ in P Birks (ed), The Classification 
of Obligations (Clarendon Press 1997) at 9. 
18
 A Hudson, ‗The Unbearable Lightness of Property‘ in A Hudson (ed), New Perspectives on Property 
Law, Obligations and Restitution (Cavendish 2004) at 9. 
19
 S Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal 
Reasoning (CUP 2003) at ch 9. 
20
 T Grey, ‗The Disintegration of Property‘ in JR Pennock and J Chapman (eds), NOMOS XXII: 
Property (New York Univ Press 1980) 69-70. 
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with the versions of property in Germany and Greece.
21
 This is shown by the 
numerous situations where the English courts have used the term ‗property.‘ Those 
situations include money held in a bank account,
22
 interests in cheques,
23
 rights to sue 
in private nuisance,
24
 trademarks,
25
 copyrights,
26
 goodwill between a business and its 
customers
27
 and any assets that form the subject matter of trusts.
28
 Therefore, it should 
be quite apparent that ‗property‘, as it is commonly used by English lawyers, is a very 
wide concept that constitutes a substantial part of private law. In short, property, when 
used this way, cannot be a realist concept. The overuse of property did not escape the 
criticism of the realists; Cohen famously referred to property as one of the ‗magic 
solving words of traditional jurisprudence.‘29 From a realist perspective, property can 
only be useful if we establish a narrower version of the concept. First, we must 
consider whether it is possible to discover a concrete meaning behind the wider 
concept of ‗property‘. 
 
Exclusion, Transferability and Excludability 
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 C von Bar and U Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe: A 
Comparative Study (Sellier 2004) at 317-319. 
22
 Trustee of the Property of FC Jones and Sons (a Firm) v Jones [1997] Ch 159 (CA). 
23
 United Australia Bank Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1 (HL). 
24
 Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655 (HL). 
25
 Jacob LJ in Boehringer Ingelheim Ltd and others v VetPlus Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 583, [2007] Bus 
L Rev 1456 at [36]. 
26
 HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, [2008] Ch 57:  
‗Copyright is a property right‘ at 102. 
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 Star Industrial Co Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor (Trading as New Star Industrial Co) [1976] FSR 256 (PC) at 
259. 
28
 Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL) at 127. 
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 F Cohen, ‗Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach‘ (1935) 35 Columbia L Rev 809 at 
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Rights against the Rest of the World 
 
The idea of property as consisting of rights which are good against the rest of the 
world can be traced back to Roman law. Adopting the Roman model, Birks stated that 
‗the really bright line has to be drawn between rights in rem and in personam.‘30 The 
in rem right is itself a personal link between individual and ‗thing‘ which provides a 
right to exclude the rest of the world. Birks noted that this requires a ‗thing‘, however 
for Birks this is any item which is specifically identifiable.
31
 Although we disagree 
with Birks as to what a ‗thing‘ is (in this thesis a thing is something tangible) the idea 
of specific assets is at least a ‗fact‘; if it is money, we can identify notes, coins and 
even bank balances. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, it would be inaccurate 
to classify the trust as a property right. The same point has been made by Stone; ‗the 
broad statement that the right of the cestui que trust is a right in rem, even if true 
because of the breadth of the definition adopted, serves no useful purpose because it 
ignores the fundamental differences between the rights of the cestui que trust and 
other classes of rights which are more or less perfectly described by the phrase ―rights 
in rem‖.‘32 Thus, the realist questions why the definition is made so wide when the 
patterns of judicial behaviour are so different. For the purposes of categorising legal 
concepts, it is, therefore, of fundamental importance that we distinguish between 
property and the trust.
33
 As we saw in the previous chapter, Birks would reduce 
property to a response; in essence this is a rejection of property as a legal concept. 
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The classification of property as a response is surely attributable to the failure to 
recognise how overlaps work in private law. For example, an overlap of contract and 
property will entail a different set of rules than a contract which does not involve 
tangible things.  
 
A narrower version of this in rem approach is adopted by McFarlane. For McFarlane, 
property rights consist of one right; ownership, which means that ‗B has a right to 
immediate exclusive control of a thing forever‘.34 Notably, McFarlane, defines ‗thing‘ 
in the same way as we do here, so that it means a tangible thing. The distinction 
between our approach and McFarlane‘s is his focus on rights to a thing. This is 
unnecessary and methodologically questionable. As Hudson has pointed out the 
‗rights-based‘ approach is not a reference to natural rights, simply a reference to the 
situations where the courts recognise interests.
35
 The first issue is how to balance this 
with the inevitable ‗rights‘ of other parties, and it is very difficult to identify the limits 
of these rights without knowing about every other competing right which might exist. 
For example, even if one has an absolute right to a thing, someone else may come 
along and cause damage to this thing; so long as they have not done so carelessly or 
with intent they will not have infringed any right of the owner.
36
 Explaining that 
property interests are rights becomes little more than a concept within a concept; the 
same argument was made by Ross who concluded that ‗rights‘ of ownership are not 
facts at all.
37
 The danger, as any realist will know is that by justifying an interest on 
the basis of ‗rights‘ it allows the author to argue that other decisions should conform 
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to the pattern of these rights. Academia is the appropriate place for discussing why the 
law should be different, but this cannot be done purely by the analysis of abstract 
‗rights‘.38 Although the substance of McFarlane‘s arrangement is similar to the one 
made here, the important distinction is that McFarlane can only explain the 
relationship between property and other concepts, such as the trust, by further 
reference to ‗rights.‘ It is at this point that his approach starts to lose cohesion as it 
becomes very expansive. McFarlane‘s attempt to classify ‗trusts‘ is discussed in 
Chapter 7 in more detail. 
 
There is also a current trend among commentators to take the view that property is 
simply any asset that can be exchanged and is enforceable against the rest of the 
world.
39
 Gray refers to this more generally as excludability, which provides the 
‗constitutive criterion of property‘.40 More recently, Worthington states that the ‗twin 
attributes of ‗transferability‘ and ‗excludability‘ characterise property rights‘.41 Even 
though the term excludable is more attractive than ‗exclusive‘, there is still a problem 
insofar as this is ultimately a legal response. To modify slightly an example made by 
Holmes, if a child has a pocketbook and a ruffian tries to take this, we know that in 
reality the child will not have the physical power to exclude the adult.
42
 It is the law 
which gives the child the power which protects the interest in the book, not reality. 
We must avoid this problem of conflating facts and judicial responses in our 
definition of the core concept of property.   
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Bundle of Rights 
 
An alternative approach, which accommodates both corporeal and incorporeal 
‗property‘, is Hohfeld‘s definition of property as a ‗bundle of rights‘.43 This approach 
treats the concept of property as a number of specific rights, such as the rights to use, 
possess and control the property.
44
 From the realist perspective, rights-based 
approaches are too detached from legal reality to be used as a reliable method for 
describing the legal system. Under this definition property loses any social meaning 
as it can only be defined in legal terms, which removes any conceptual boundary for 
‗property‘. Therefore, as Penner points out, this definition could be equally used to 
describe many other areas of the law such as contract or tort.
45
 In fact some 
commentators have gone so far as to argue that ‗contract‘ can therefore be seen as a 
form of property.
46
 Seipp has warned against expanding our notions of property in this 
way; ‗[t]hus expanded, the concept of property threatens to disintegrate. If it includes 
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everything, does it mean anything?‘47 When facts no longer become relevant in our 
classification of property, it becomes a non-realist concept. 
 
The bundle of rights approach has sometimes been equated to a ‗realist‘ approach, as 
for example by Dagan who argues that ‗property as a bundle of rights‘ captures the 
essence of ‗property‘ as a human construct.48 However, Merrill and Smith have 
explained that the reason for the realist adoption of ‗bundle of rights‘ is that it signals 
that ‗property‘ had no fixed meaning.49 For these realists, if property was simply a 
‗bundle of rights‘, it would mean that we should abandon ‗property‘ altogether as a 
legal concept. This is only necessary if we maintain the wide version of ‗property‘. 
The ‗bundle of rights‘ analysis may be useful in analysing the operation of property 
interests, but it does not add anything to the initial step of identifying of what can and 
cannot fall within ‗property‘. Since the bundle of rights explanation of property is not 
grounded in social reality, it subsequently fails to identify the factual circumstances 
that influence the decisions of the courts.
50
 The only achievement of the bundle of 
rights approach to ‗property‘ is to construct a version of ‗property‘ which would have 
no place within a realist concept of private law.  
 
Redefining the Unity of Property 
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As Penner has stated, ‗we cannot ‗flexibly‘ apply property to anything we choose 
without leading ourselves into confusion about the reasons why we have the concept 
in the first place, and misunderstanding its usefulness to us.‘51 Certainly there are 
other situations which share factual characteristics with property; with regards to 
equitable interests and ‗intellectual property‘ we are talking about assets which are 
identifiable, specific and transferable. But it is worth reminding ourselves that factual 
similarities alone should not determine whether or not we can identify a realist 
concept. We must search for patterns between facts and judicial outcomes. The 
concept of property which is presented throughout this thesis can be summarised as 
follows; it consists of title, and direct control of a specific and corporeal thing. 
 
Property as Direct Control of Tangible Things 
 
Title  
 
By breaking down legal concepts such as property we can avoid some of the 
confusion which is produced by absolute legal rules. In the context of property two 
terms have proven difficult; ownership and possession.
52
 Ownership carries the 
connotations of an absolute right to a thing, which we looked at earlier.
53
 It is also the 
case that lawyers often use the phrase ‗to own‘ when describing a number of rights 
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including those under a contract.
54
 In Harris‘ discussion of ownership, he indicated 
that possession might be a more factual term.
55
 However, the phrase can be just as 
misleading as possession does not always require physical possession of the property. 
For this reason, we adopt ‗title‘ instead, a reference to the connection between 
individual and the thing. In disputes about property, one of the main elements in 
proving that one person has a superior interest than another is to show title. 
 
Economists have identified the ‗first in time‘ approach to the allocation of title.56 
Although we are looking at title first, it is inextricably linked to control; it is not 
enough merely to be the first person there, it is also important to take control. From 
then on, the title is established. It is a very simple proposition, but the first one to take 
control of goods or land will find that the courts are more likely to side with him than 
with a person who arrives on the scene afterwards.
57
 Importantly, first in time is also a 
fact; it is proved by evidence that A‘s title existed before B‘s. Thus we see that finders 
can gain title to land or goods; this can be defeated by those who came before them in 
time, but it will not be defeated by those who come along afterwards.
58
 Once title is 
established, it can be passed along, transferred or divided. It becomes a fact which we 
can witness and identify in the real world. We will see throughout the thesis that title 
is an important element in determining private law disputes; in other situations title is 
also the element which creates the overlap with claims involving bank transfers and 
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trust interests. The conceptual analysis presented here merely sees this fact as one of 
multiple facts required for this concept of property; its presence in other situations 
does not mean that they should also be referred to as ‗property‘.  
 
 
Direct Control 
 
Title alone cannot explain property without the additional element of control. A title-
holder has an interest in the thing, but if the control element is lacking then this will 
not fall under our concept of property. This happens quite often in practice; 
freeholders can rent land to a tenant, who will then gain primary control.
59
 Similarly, 
a title holder of goods may lend them to someone else, who will also gain primary 
control.
60
 In both cases the original title-holder retains title, but control passes and 
creates another title in the hands of the tenant or the lendee. Control is, therefore, also 
required to explain who can enforce property interests at common law.
61
 This has 
proven especially important in the sale of goods, as the sale of a particular item may 
transfer title, but until the sellor commits an act which signifies that he is also 
transferring control, then the buyer will lack a proprietary interest.
62
 It is also 
important in the context of land; the various actions which are available to protect 
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property at common law such as trespass to land and private nuisance, require control, 
which is usually demonstrated by occupation. 
 
It is, therefore, important to note that not all title-holders will enjoy direct control over 
the property. If this was not the case, a defendant could find that he is liable to 
multiple claimants for the same act.
63
 Wonnacott provides a convincing explanation 
that if this was not the case any claim for the unauthorised use of another‘s land could 
lead to the defendant being liable to the landlord, the tenant and the beneficial 
owner.
64
 This position is reflected in the judgment of Lord Lloyd in Hunter v Canary 
Wharf ‗[i]t follows that the quantum of damages in private nuisance does not depend 
on the number of those enjoying the land in question.‘65 The requirement of control of 
the property, therefore, has an important role in limiting the potential liability of 
defendants by restricting the number of title-holders who are able to sue. It also makes 
it easier to avoid liability; defendants only have to concern themselves with the most 
identifiable individual, namely the person in control. A title without control would 
leave the concept of property incomplete.  
 
The Requirement of Corporeal Things 
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Our efforts to redefine property also takes us back to its traditional meaning; as Seipp 
has stated, property simply meant an interest in a thing.
66
 Although medieval lawyers 
restricted this term to chattels, we can also adopt the wider view that it applies to land 
as well. Property can only be a useful concept if it is narrowly restricted to interests in 
corporeal things. Merrill and Smith have referred to this as a somewhat crude and 
basic definition.
67
 However, the term ‗property‘ only starts to lose its descriptive 
value when it is used to describe beneficial interests and intellectual property rights. 
This analysis is important for the simple reason that there is an identifiable pattern in 
the way that the courts treat the title-holder. As Cane points out, at common law the 
courts primarily use the term ‗property‘ to describe interests in physical things in the 
form of land or chattels.
68
 Interests in property are protected under the guise of a 
variety of actions which traditionally form part of the law of tort.
69
 For our purposes, 
we need not do this and they can be seen as falling under our concept of property. The 
main essence of these actions is that the subject of the claim relates to something 
tangible, whether that is in the form of land or moveable things. In all of these 
situations we see that standing to sue also follows the pattern set out here; the first in 
time to control a thing has a better title than others, and intentional interferences with 
this interest will be protected by the courts, even against innocent defendants. For 
example, interests in land are protected by claims for nuisance, the rule in Rylands v. 
Fletcher,
70
 trespass to land
71
 and also by the statutory scheme which requires land 
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registration and other formalities.
72
 Chattels are also protected by the various actions 
for wrongful interference with goods.
73
 It should also be recognised that, since the 
concept of property is multi-factual, the interest is not limited to the tangible thing 
itself.
74
 Take, for example, a claim in nuisance for an interference with the possessor‘s 
enjoyment of the land. This can arise even where there has not been any physical 
interference with the property itself, such as in those cases where a neighbour causes 
excessive noises or pungent smells.
75
 The claimant‘s interest is not confined to the 
physical interferences with the property that they possess, but it provides one of the 
key components in this pattern of property. 
 
Explaining the Importance of Tangible Things 
 
By identifying these core facts, we can begin to see why property is protected this 
way. One of the most important factors that influence the courts in their treatment of 
‗property‘ is the historical and cultural significance of tangible things. Under the 
feudal system, land was the main way in which status was protected under English 
law, and thus the courts traditionally afforded landowners a high degree of legal 
protection.
76
 Similarly, in the time before the industrial revolution most economic 
assets were in the form of chattels, such as livestock or the products of skilled 
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labour.
77
 This would continue even after the industrial revolution; a point made by 
Arnold who stated that ‗[i]n the 19th century, the wealth of nations consisted of 
railroads, factories and goods.‘78 The accumulation of wealth within the economy, 
which is an essential step in the development of capitalist economies, requires a 
settled concept of property. Although today money plays a much more central role in 
representing wealth and status, this is a relatively new development. Despite the rise 
of money as the primary means for accumulating wealth, money plays a particular 
role as the primary means of facilitating transfers. When we look at corporeal things 
the situation is different; even today property plays a much wider role. Witting notes 
that one of the notable characteristics of our culture and history is that people look to 
attain land and material possessions.
79
 For example, when people purchase luxury 
automobiles they have extra value because of their non-essential features.
80
 Land and 
material possessions can also attain significant personal value that far outweighs its 
economic value on the open market. This was noted by Lord Nicholls in Attorney 
General v Blake; ‗[t]he buyer of a house may be attracted by features which have little 
or no impact on the value of the house.‘81 Tangible things still stand as important 
symbols of wealth and status in our society.
82
 
                                                 
 
 
77
 P O‘Brien, ‗British Incomes and Property in the Early Nineteenth Century‘ (1959) 12 Economic 
History Rev 255. 
78
 T Arnold, ‗Judge Jerome Frank‘ (1957) 24 Univ of Chicago L Rev 633 at 637. 
79
 C Witting, ‗Distinguishing Between Property Damage and Pure Economic Loss in Negligence - A 
Personality Thesis‘ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 481 at 505. A similar point is made by J Gordley in  
Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2006) at 61-65. 
80
 B Dubois and P Duquesne, ‗The Market for Luxury Goods: Income versus Culture‘ (1993) 27 
European Journal of Marketing 35 at 42-43. 
81
 [2001] 1 AC 268 [HL] at 282. 
82
 This has been shown in a number of psychological studies; RW Belk, ‗Three Scales to Measure 
Constructs related to Materialism: Reliability, Validity, and Relationships to Measure of Happiness‘ 
(1984) 11 Advances in Consumer Research 291; AN Christopher and BR Schlenker, ‗The impact of 
perceived material wealth and perceiver personality on first impressions‘ (2000) 21 Journal of 
Economic Psychology 1; PT Vargas and S Yoon, ‗On the Psychology of Materialism: Wanting Things, 
Having Things, and Being Happy‘ (2006) 7 Advertising & Society Rev, Article 5. 
  
108 
 
 
 
 
Measures Applied by the Courts 
 
Once it has been shown that a defendant has interfered with the claimant‘s direct 
control of the property, the measures applied by the courts are quite predictable, 
depending upon the nature of the interference. Where the defendant has interfered in 
this relationship it will be open to the claimant to claim for actual losses or 
alternatively the market value for the use of the property. There is little difficulty with 
the first measure, as the court will make an award based on the cost of repairs or 
replacing the damaged property.
83
 It also permits the claimant to pursue a claim based 
on the subsequent rise in value of an asset, as in the Court of Appeal decision in IBL v 
Coussens.
84
 The second measure allows the court to put an objective valuation on a 
defendant‘s unauthorised use of the property.85 Generally, these are regarded as 
‗strict‘ liability claims, which are particular to the concept of property. Apart from 
interests in our physical integrity, no other interest receives the same level of 
protection from the courts. From a realist perspective, this narrower version of 
property is indeed a useful concept. 
 
Why Property is distinct from Equitable Interests 
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The narrow version of property presented here excludes beneficial titles.
86
 This can be 
summarised for two reasons; firstly, the factual make-up of beneficial titles is 
different from what we see in this property concept, and secondly the interests are 
treated differently by the courts. However, the distinction between the common law 
conception of property and the equitable principle of beneficial ownership is often 
overlooked by judges and academics.
87
 If we compare the narrow use of property at 
common law, we can see that equitable ‗property‘ is a much more flexible and 
expansive concept. Firstly, an equitable ‗property‘ interest can attach to corporeal as 
well as incorporeal things. Worthington has traced the development of wider notions 
of ‗property‘ in equity when compared with its use at common law, noting that in 
equity different types of assets are recognised as ‗property.‘88 So for example one can 
set up a trust for tangible property,
89
 intellectual property
90
 and even contractual rights 
to sue for performance.
91
 Secondly, in trust arrangements the beneficial title holder 
and the person in control of the asset are separate persons. In fact, where one has an 
immediate right to possess and control the property this will usually indicate that there 
is no equitable ‗property‘ interest.92 Notably, when compared to the version of 
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property which has been developed here, the separation of the control and the benefit 
of an asset inevitably carries an added degree of risk. As Sitkoff points out, the 
absence of such control creates a risk which is more generally known (at least to 
company lawyers)
93
 as an ‗agency cost‘: when someone else is given responsibility to 
do something for you, it is possible that they will fail to do it in accordance with their 
instructions, or might deliberately breach their duties.
94
 This lack of control makes it 
less justifiable to impose strict standards on third parties, as we have already noted 
that this is important in the operation of claims in our core concept of property.  
 
These distinctions are legally significant; this explains why the title of the beneficiary 
can be defeated by the bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
95
 It also explains 
why this defence is usually not available for property interests.
96
 What we see in the 
comparison between common law property and the wider concept of ‗property‘ at 
equity is that tangibility and direct control both provide a clear demarcation between 
the two concepts. It makes little sense to use the same term to define both areas of 
private law; property can have no descriptive utility as a legal concept if we have to 
include equitable version of ‗property‘.  As noted throughout this section, we need not 
set up a complete divide between these concepts; an overlapping analysis still permits 
us to draw similarities, especially when the facts are the same. An example is where a 
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beneficiary has title and control.
97
 In those cases, the interest will indeed be a 
proprietary one. Without control, that cannot be the case. 
 
Intellectual Property 
 
It is useful to note that the common law does not offer any direct protection for 
‗intellectual property‘ rights. The issue has been traced by Deazley, who has referred 
to the ‗myth‘ of copyright at common law.98 Although there are a number of common 
law claims where the courts protected these types of interests, there was no 
comprehensive or purposeful attempt to develop rules to serve this purpose. The 
closest we see is the tort of passing off.
99
 However, as some commentators have 
noted; ‗all that the common law protects through its passing off action is the goodwill 
between a trader and his customers which the mark helps to sustain; there is no 
property in a name as such.‘100 The tort of passing off was no more a property interest 
than the interest in one‘s reputation.101  
  
In the absence of any comprehensive regime for protecting ‗intellectual property‘, the 
legal protection afforded to the owners of ‗intellectual property rights‘ has been 
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developed primarily within a statutory framework.
102
 There are indeed similarities in 
the responses given to these interests with our core concept of property. For example, 
as with common law property rights, the owners of ‗intellectual property rights‘ have 
a claim against unauthorised uses of their ‗property‘, even against those who are 
unaware that they are interfering with the owner‘s interest.103 Also, the measure of 
damages for unauthorised use of another‘s ‗intellectual property‘ right is in most 
circumstances the market value that the defendant would have reasonably been 
expected to pay for the right to use the protected asset.
104
  
 
Nonetheless, the absence of a tangible thing is relevant from a realist perspective. By 
limiting the common law property actions to corporeal things, the subject matter is 
also restricted to things which, by their very nature, are limited resources.105 The 
subject matter of ‗intellectual property‘ rights on the other hand, constitute pieces of 
work that can easily be reproduced.
106
 In the past, the legislative provisions 
sometimes failed to recognise this; as in the measurement of damages for breach of 
copyright, which were assessed on the full economic value of the property. This was 
heavily criticised by the House of Lords in British Leyland Ltd. v Armstrong Ltd.
107
 In 
such cases the claimant has not been deprived of the asset itself and there is therefore 
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less justification for imposing liability for the full value of the economic asset.
108
 
Furthermore, this provided the copyright owner with a financial reward that was 
disproportionate to his production costs.
109
 This was recognised by Parliament soon 
after the British Leyland case when it introduced the Copyrights, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988.
110
 Under this Act, it is no longer possible to claim for the full value of these 
interests, even when they have been copied or used by a defendant. It is important to 
recognise that ‗intellectual property‘ is distinct from property.111 A final and very 
important distinction lies in the fact that it is only the title holder who is protected in 
these cases. So a licensee, even when given an exclusive license, cannot sue others for 
making use of copyrighted recordings; only the title holder can.
112
 Again, the 
distinction need not be absolute, but at the same time there are clear differences 
between these types of interests. As Cohen noted, simply calling these interests 
‗property‘ cannot hide what in reality is a very different situation.113 
 
Conclusion on the Concept of Property 
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Once we recognise the multi-functionality of property we can see that the 
requirements of title, control and a ‗thing‘ provide the courts with a unifying concept 
that helps to identify the various functions of property law. These facts are not 
exclusive to the concept of property, and indeed the same issues that influence the 
courts‘ decisions in property may be relevant in other situations. The proposition is 
that we need not apply the same language to refer to these similar situations; we can 
recognise that these areas are overlaps. It has been contended that the disintegration of 
property is a result of the expansive use of the phrase ‗property‘. No useful definition 
of property can be achieved if we try to incorporate all of the cases where the courts 
have referred to ‗property rights‘. A narrower concept is required, and it is argued 
here that property requires the presence of corporeal things, control and title. Once 
property is redefined as a narrower, more realistic concept, it becomes a valuable and 
essential expositive device in our understanding of private law. The leftovers can be 
explained using an overlapping analysis, and we do not need to stretch the concept of 
property to explain these situations. In the next chapter we explain the interaction of 
money and property, and in the final chapter we explain the trust mechanism, both of 
which are overlaps of property. Thus, a narrower approach does not at all require us to 
reject situations which fall outside our core concept. 
 
3. Contract 
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Unlike ‗property‘, English contract law is more narrowly defined.114 In fact, it may 
appear that we are attempting to expand the law of contract as it is argued that the 
‗intention to create legal relations‘ requirement is unhelpful and artificial. At the same 
time, we narrow our definition by removing unilateral contracts and deeds. Our 
definition of ‗contract‘ refers to an agreement between two parties that requires an 
exchange of something of economic value.
115
 Although ‗agreement‘ and ‗exchange‘ 
are legal definitions of facts, they can still be defined outside the science of law.
116
 
Just as with our concept of property, we are dealing with an area of private law that 
covers a wide range of activities. As a result of this, it is worth keeping in mind that 
the factors involved in the concept of contract are not normative conditions, but they 
do help to reveal the patterns of contract.  
 
The Unity of ‘Contract’ 
 
There are a number of special types of contract each with their own specific rules and 
principles, which might suggest that the concept of contract is too wide to be of any 
practical use. This was one of the arguments presented by Atiyah in his critique of 
modern contract.
117
 Contracts of employment, consumer purchases, shareholder rights 
and marriages are now regulated by their own particular sets of rules and statutory 
regulations. It has subsequently made much more sense to place these contracts within 
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contextual subjects such as employment law, consumer law and company law.
118
 
Special approaches apply in these situations, which are not applicable in general. For 
example, unfair contract terms are unenforceable in consumer contracts, regardless of 
whether they have clearly been agreed under the terms of the contract.
119
 We also see 
special rules on terminating contracts and the content of each party‘s rights in the 
employment context.
120
 From the realist perspective, we cannot ignore the fact that 
the remedies available may differ considerably depending on the context of the 
situation. In company law the relationship between the shareholders and the company 
is said to be contractual;
121
 however, it is debateable whether the rights of the 
shareholder can be regarded as contractual.
122
 As noted in one of the leading company 
law textbooks, ‗there is a conflict here between proper recognition of the contractual 
nature of the company‘s constitution and the traditional policy of non-interference by 
the courts in internal affairs of companies.‘123 Therefore, it appears that we cannot 
have any conceptual unity for all of these specialist areas; different facts are present, 
which result in different approaches by the courts. 
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The development of special rules in certain contexts appears to undermine the value 
of any general law of contract. Nevertheless, what we see in these contextual areas is 
an overlap between common law and statute. Therefore, the basic elements of these 
special contractual relationships are still dependent on the recognition of an exchange 
and agreement. These statutory provisions alter the patterns of judicial responses by 
identifying additional facts; but the core factual elements remain.
124
 The overlap 
arises because of the presence of contractual elements and the factual context, which 
brings into play the specific rules enacted by legislation. For situations where the 
legislation is silent, it is still important to be aware of the general law of contract in 
predicting how the court will deal with the situation. Therefore, despite the 
development of contextual ‗contracts‘, they do not undermine the need to identify a 
basic concept of contract. We can proceed on the basis that we are not looking to 
incorporate the similar but distinct forms of contract which fall within these statutory 
regimes. 
 
Promises and Contract 
 
In achieving an objective and fact-based approach to contract formation, it is 
necessary to reject some of the elements of classic contract doctrine. Firstly, the ‗will 
theory‘ places central importance on the intentions of the contracting parties. As 
Smith notes, ‗[t]he traditional and still orthodox view of the nature of contractual 
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obligations is that they are self-imposed promissory obligations.‘125 An example is 
provided by Fried who argued that contracts are enforceable as they constitute 
promises, which in turn are morally binding.
126
 This raises the question as to what is 
the moral content of promising. The most obvious justification for the binding force 
of promises is the fact that they are likely to be relied upon by the promisee.
127
 
However, in contract, it is not necessary for the promisee to base his claim upon his 
reliance on the promise and, moreover, reliance on its own will not be sufficient to 
establish a contract between the parties.
128
 Another, more significant issue with 
promising is that not all promises are enforced in the law of contract.
129
  
 
What is enforced in the law of contract is an ‗agreement‘; a correlation between the 
expressed desires of both parties. The differences between a promise and an 
agreement may at first appear slight.
130
 According to Penner an agreement identifies 
the need to establish a common ground, whereas a promise identifies unilateral 
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intent.
131
 Agreement is, therefore, important as it explains why not all promises are 
enforced, as not all promises are reciprocated. It is also difficult to see how the 
promissory theory can be relevant in cases where there is an immediate transfer of 
services, goods or money. For example, in some cases agreement is evidenced by an 
immediate exchange.
132
 As Penner also points out, it is difficult to apply the word 
promise to explain this situation, as promise ‗creates a future, or executory 
obligation‘.133 This formed one of Atiyah‘s criticisms of traditional contract theory, as 
it ignores the prevalence of non-executory contracts.
134
  
 
Reliance and Contract 
 
 
Reliance theories seek to explain the enforceability of agreements. As Smith points 
out, few reliance theories attempt to explain all of the law of contract.
135
 Atiyah, for 
example, separated cases into reliance-based and benefit-based claims. The origins of 
this reliance approach can be traced back to the legal realist movement. Llewellyn, for 
example, identified reliance as the initial justification for official intervention in 
private disputes.
136
 Indeed, according to Milsom, reliance provided the original basis 
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for assumpsit, which in turn provided the springboard for our modern law of contract 
and tort.
137
  
 
It was the work of one of Llewellyn‘s fellow realists, which would have a profound 
impact on US private law through the incorporation of reliance-based liability in the 
American Restatement of the Law of Contract.
138
 Corbin‘s work was very much in the 
realist mould; he pointed out to the compilers of the Restatement that many promises 
were enforced even in the absence of consideration. Corbin‘s response was to 
establish a secondary mechanism for the recognition of contracts, which was available 
when the defendant could reasonably expect a promise to induce the promisee to act 
upon to his or her detriment. It is, however, important to note that Corbin saw reliance 
as an alternative form of consideration.
139
 The resulting provisions in the American 
Restatement do distinguish consideration and reliance, but treat them both as types of 
contract. What this means is that a contract can be valid even without reliance. This is 
why reliance-based approaches do not provide a complete account of contract law.  
 
Secondly, it is generally accepted that a reliance-based approach does not protect 
one‘s full expectations. Despite the description of the reliance-based claim as a 
contractual one, section 90 of the Second Restatement provides a flexible remedy in 
cases of reliance. Therefore, reliance based and bargain based ‗contracts‘ are treated 
differently by the courts. For this reason we separate reliance from contract. However, 
we also recognise that in many cases an overlap with contract may exist where the 
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claimant relies on an agreement made with the defendant. The overlapping analysis 
allows us to recognise the co-existence of contract and reliance-based claims, which 
avoids the problem of having two very distinct forms of ‗contract.‘ If we regard legal 
concepts as multi-factual (e.g. contract involves more than one factual event), there is 
no reason why one or more of these factual elements cannot be recreated in other 
contexts.  
 
An Agreement between the Parties 
 
In this section, we adopt a less technical approach to contract. This includes the 
rejection of the ‗intention to create legal relations‘ as it is argued that it is an unhelpful 
term. As noted at the start, Llewellyn stated that ‗the eternal quest recurs for wider 
synthesis- but one which will really stand up in issue.‘140 We are, therefore, only 
adopting narrower concepts when it assists in predictability. If a high level of 
generality can be achieved which aids in predicting judicial behaviour it can be 
adopted. At the same time, some situations fall outside of our core concept of 
contract; those are unilateral contracts and deeds. 
 
Defining Agreement 
 
When trying to establish whether there is an agreement between private parties, a 
frequent problem for the courts is that both parties might have completely different 
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perceptions about what has been agreed.
141
 According to Cohen, in many cases, 
‗[l]itigation usually reveals the absence of genuine agreement between the parties ab 
initio.‘142 Indeed, when considering the nature of the contract, the courts look past the 
subjective intentions of both parties. Thus the courts have developed an objective 
approach when identifying the agreement between the parties.
143
 This focuses upon 
the external manifestation of the agreement, for example if there is a written 
agreement then it will be the written terms that are enforced by the court.
144
 This will 
be so, even where there is evidence that the written terms do not correspond to the 
actual intentions of the parties.
145
  
 
We need to take a realistic view of agreement, which is what Holmes and Llewellyn 
adopted in their analysis of contract.
146
 For Holmes, an agreement was premised ‗not 
on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.‘147 
In more recent times, Howarth has also adopted a detached and objective approach to 
agreement.
148
 The content of the agreement will largely depend on what has been 
expressed by the parties, but it does not necessarily represent the promises or 
intentions of the parties. This is not without controversy.
149
 However, the criticisms of 
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the objective approach are based on the misconception that it makes the parties‘ 
intentions irrelevant. The parties are free to treat the contract however they wish; it is 
simply the case that when the issue reaches the court, the court is faced with the 
prospect of having to ‗pick a side.‘ The courts avoid this by focusing on what is 
observable in the dealings between the parties. 
 
Although offer and acceptance are helpful indicators that an agreement has been 
reached, we need to avoid an overly technical and narrow definition of these facts. In 
many cases, the search for separate instances of ‗offer and acceptance‘ is futile and 
misleading.
150
 Cohen gave the example of ‗[a] citizen going to work boards a street 
car and drops a coin in the conductor's or motorman's box,‘ and pointed out that, 
although this would be regarded as a contract, there was no apparent offer or 
acceptance.
151
 Although Cohen argued that there was no ‗agreement‘ here, it needs to 
be pointed out that his formulation of agreement was narrower than the one adopted 
here. In Cohen‘s example, there is a single instance where the external observer 
would conclude that an agreement has been reached, which is when the ‗citizen‘ drops 
his coin in the box. The lack of a wider version of agreement, which looks at the 
context of the situation, was attributed by Llewellyn to the almost inevitable 
formalisation of contract formation.
152
 The formalisation of contracts is precisely 
what happened in the development of the covenant, which initially began as a flexible 
method of enforcing agreements, before the courts introduced the requirement that the 
                                                 
 
 
150
 J Steyn, ‗Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men‘ (1997) 113 LQR 
433 at 435, referred to cases where negotiations for building work are not finalised but ‗[i]n the 
meantime the work starts. Payments are made. Often it is a fiction to identify an offer and acceptance‘ 
(at 435). 
151
 M Cohen, ‗The Basis of Contract‘ (1933) 46 Harvard L Rev 553 at 568-569. See also Lord 
Wilberforce in New Zealand Shipping Co v Satterthwaite (The Eurymedon) [1975] AC 154 (PC). 
152
 K Llewellyn, ‗What Price Contract?: An Essay in Perspective‘ (1931) 40 YLJ 704 at 710. 
  
124 
 
 
agreement was made under seal.
153
 According to Llewellyn there is a tendency to look 
for a single form which represents formation; whether that is by seal, the shaking of 
hands, or, as in the experience of English private law, an offer and acceptance.
154
 As 
Cohen‘s example shows, agreement need not be defined in this way if it is to account 
for most contract situations.  
 
 
Situations which are not Agreements 
 
The identification of agreement can only make sense if we recognise that it does not 
apply to all cases which are described as ‗contract.‘ A unilateral ‗contract‘ is one 
where the ‗offeror‘ expresses that he or she will do something, on the condition that 
the ‗offeree‘ performs a requested act. The most well known example is the ‗unilateral 
contract‘ in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Co, where the defendants issued an 
advertisement offering to pay £100 to anyone who contracted influenza after using 
their product.
155
 In cases such as Carlill, a binding ‗contract‘ can only arise after the 
‗offeree‘ has carried out the performance set out in the ‗offer‘. Since it is not a 
binding contract before that moment, the legal consequences of finding a contract do 
not apply to this situation, and it makes little sense to refer to it as a ‗contract‘ at all. 
This was the view of Llewellyn, who thought that the predictable patterns of contract 
could only be achieved by rejecting unilateral contracts.
156
 Instead they should be 
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placed ‗in the freak-tent as an interesting and often instructive curiosity.‘157 That said, 
it would appear that a unilateral contract has some binding effect where partial 
performance has begun, as stated by Waller LJ in Schweppe v Harper ‗[w]here there 
is an offer to pay for the performance of a certain task, part performance can produce 
a contract under which that offer cannot be withdrawn.‘158 Even so, it still supports 
the proposition made by Llewellyn that we should distinguish ‗unilateral‘ and normal 
contracts, as up until partial performance no contract will be found. Therefore, it is 
not a contract at all; this would instead fit within our reliance-based approach which 
we set out in Chapter 6. 
 
Agreement and Contractual Terms 
 
The nature of the agreement determines the extent to which the court can flesh out the 
contractual obligations of the parties. However, Collins has criticised the objective 
interpretation approach as it conceals ‗a hidden premiss which sets standards of fair 
play‘.159 For example, where the courts have sought to protect vulnerable and weaker 
parties, the court has reasoned that the party who was seeking to escape onerous terms 
did not really agree to them.
160
 This approach is not just used by the courts to exclude 
unfair contractual terms, as terms are often implied under the basis that the courts are 
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fleshing out the actual agreement between the parties.
161
 So, in some circumstances, 
the courts will imply certain terms that are necessary for business efficacy if the term 
is necessary to make the contract work.
162
 In other situations the courts will imply 
terms of quality or that require the promisor to behave in a certain way.
163
  
 
Nonetheless, even in these situations, the courts will still act within the conceptual 
boundaries of the parties‘ agreement. It is through this external manifestation of the 
agreement that the court imposes certain standards that are aimed at protecting weaker 
parties and satisfying the reasonable expectations of both parties.
164
 The courts will 
rarely imply a term where the agreement expressly excludes this, unless there are any 
statutory provisions which require such a term to be incorporated.
165
 It is sensible to 
conclude that the agreement between the parties is never conclusive in determining 
the nature of the terms which the courts will incorporate within the contract. 
Nevertheless, there is a correlation between the nature of the agreement and the extent 
to which the court can add terms. In general, the clearer the agreement, the less likely 
it is that the court will add anything to the terms of the contract. Agreement is, 
therefore, not just an example of an empirically observable fact, but also plays a role 
in determining the boundaries of the concept of contract. 
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The Requirement of Bargain 
 
To complete the conceptual framework of contract, an agreement must also be 
accompanied by an exchange between the parties. Corbin took the view that 
consideration was an unhelpful term, and that greater certainty would be achieved by 
adopting the phrase ‗bargain‘.166 Like agreement, this is a fact which is required for 
there to be a contract. The requirement of consideration has sometimes been defined 
as the requirement that consideration must move from the promisee; in essence this 
prevented third parties from enforcing the contract. For example, in Tweddle v 
Atkinson, the claimant was trying to enforce a promise between his father and father-
in-law.
167
 Although the agreement was for his benefit, the claim failed as he had not 
provided consideration. In Williams v Roffey Bros,
168
 the Court of Appeal confirmed 
that the implication of this rule is simply that the claimant cannot be a third party to 
the contract, a rule which has been slightly modified by statute. There are additional 
rules, such as the requirement that consideration must be something which is of 
ascertainable value in the eye of the law and that past consideration is not good 
consideration. In essence, they are mechanisms for identifying bargains. 
 
Atiyah argued that consideration was a mechanism for deciding whether there was a 
good reason for enforcing a promise.
169
 Smith also takes the view that the requirement 
of exchange has an important role as a formality requirement that provides evidence 
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of the agreement between the parties.
170
 In this role, the doctrine of consideration 
eliminates the need for other formality requirements such as evidence in writing, 
which would slow down the process of sales and purchases.
171
 However, as Smith 
points out, this cannot be the only role of consideration as contract law in civil legal 
systems manages to operate without this requirement.
172
 In response, it can be pointed 
out that consideration also performs the channelling and cautionary functions 
identified by Fuller.
173
 The cautionary function ‗raises clear concerns about whether 
the promisor reflected carefully on his promise.‘174 The channelling function 
harmonises the form of enforceable contracts, reducing uncertainty and also reducing 
the need for litigation. Too much litigation would be a waste of time and resources, 
and therefore the requirement of exchange addresses the wider issue of facilitating the 
ease of transactions. From a practical point of view, it makes sense to have a flexible 
method of identifying which agreements can be enforced. 
 
In addition, economic analysts have emphasised that enforcing exchanges provides an 
‗economic‘ function, which is to encourage people to engage in the market place.175 
To maximise wealth, it is essential that economic gains are actively pursued by 
claimants through bargains and exchanges, and the courts are reluctant to reward 
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those who merely rely upon promises by others.
176
 This means that an agreement to 
pay income to one‘s wife will not be contractual and neither will agreements that are 
described as binding in honour.
177
 The implications of the ‗efficient exchange‘ 
explanation is also demonstrated in the way in which the courts will take a very loose 
interpretation of ‗exchange‘ where there is a clear economic function behind the 
arrangement.
178
 For example, the courts have recognised an ‗exchange‘ even where 
one party has provided a nominal payment.
179
 Consideration itself does not provide 
any normative explanation for the law of contract, but it is one of its core facts. 
 
Cases Which Fall Outside Contract 
 
In some cases one party has not provided anything beneficial under a contract. 
Instead, the party may rely on an agreement. An example is Williams v Roffey Bros,
180
 
where the claimant was already under contract with the defendant, but, because the 
claimant was facing financial difficulties and the defendants wanted to avoid a penalty 
clause with a third party, they agreed to restructure their contract.
181
 In the Court of 
Appeal it was concluded that this gave rise to a new contract, even though it appeared 
to lack consideration. We should not simply accept that because this was described as 
a contract that it is to be regarded as one. As Chen-Wishart pointed out, the award in 
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Williams was not based on expectation damages as we see normally in contract, but 
the actual value of the work.
182
 This correlates to an argument which we fully develop 
in Chapter 6 in regards to reliance-based claims for non-contractual services. 
Similarly, a reliance-based analysis explains another case, De La Bere v Pearson 
where Williams LJ found that consideration was established by providing a 
newspaper with a question which could be published as this ‗might obviously have a 
tendency to increase the sale of the defendants' paper.‘183 Today one can see that this 
would be a simple Hedley Byrne v Heller type case. We do not need to accommodate 
these cases within the concept of contract under an overlapping analysis, as there are 
alternative concepts which can achieve these results. 
 
Deeds 
 
Since we are adopting contract as an expositive device, we can see what happens in 
the absence of consideration, which forms an integral factual element of the concept 
of contract. The deed requirement is much more onerous than the necessity of an 
exchange between the parties, as the agreement must be made in writing in the 
presence of a third party witness, and it must also be very clear that the deed is 
intended to be a binding agreement.
184
 This indicates that promises can have some 
relevance in determining the behaviour of the courts. However, the high evidential 
burden that is required in the absence of an exchange and the slightly different 
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treatment of deeds indicates that the courts are reluctant to enforce promises without 
any additional factors.
185
 Again, we do not need to stretch our core concept to 
incorporate non-bargain agreements. 
 
Measure of Damages 
 
Expectation Damages 
 
The boundaries of the concept of contract are defined by the presence of both 
agreement and exchange. Within these situations, we see a predictable set of judicial 
responses. Where a defendant has breached his contractual obligations he will be 
liable to pay ‗expectation‘ damages, which will put the claimant in the same position 
as if the contract had been performed.
186
 Nevertheless, since the contract is an 
amalgamation of agreement and bargain, the agreement will not determine the 
damages for a breach of contract.
187
 Therefore, it is usually necessary to show that the 
defendant‘s breach has resulted in a financial loss or failure to make a profit for the 
claimant.
188
 When deciding whether to make an award for a breach of contract, the 
courts will also require the claimant to mitigate his loss, by considering alternative 
possibilities to limit any losses.
189
 The duty to mitigate losses prevents the 
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unnecessary waste of resources and provides a limit to the potential liability of 
defendants. It is a principle that Atiyah said was difficult to justify on a purely 
theoretical basis,
190
 but when we acknowledge that contract performs a wider role 
than simply enforcing agreements, this rule starts to make more sense. 
 
Finally, it should always be remembered that we are not attempting to construct a 
complete picture of the law of contract. There are indeed several rules and principles 
which can apply in the creation and operation of a contract. All we are seeking to do 
is to establish the boundaries and the usual responses for this concept. There are many 
contextual contracts where the results seem out of place with the ordinary approach. 
These are explicable on the basis that additional facts can alter the approach to these 
contact situations. Predictability can only be established by recognising that other 
facts can be relevant. There are cases where the normal rules of contract cannot, in 
truth, predict the result. For example, in the case of A-G v. Blake,
191
 the court applied 
a measure to strip profits from a former double agent who had an agreement for the 
publication of his memoirs. Although it has been occasionally followed, it lies as an 
isolated decision.
192
 One cannot use this decision for predicting the law at present as 
no discernable pattern seems to be emerging. The odd decision which steps out of line 
does not reduce the conceptual structure to an empty shell. 
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Conclusion on the Concept of Contract 
 
The various functions and principles in contract law led Atiyah to argue that the ‗the 
theory is in a mess.‘193 Admittedly, there is no unifying principle behind the law of 
contract. However the combination of these apparently contradictory approaches is 
not problematic in practice. In most cases it is not difficult to identify a contractual 
relationship, and the behaviour of the courts in interpreting the agreement is usually 
quite predictable. Moreover, the expectation measure of damages is also regularly 
applied, and it is only in limited circumstances mentioned above that the courts have 
taken a different approach. The apparent inconsistencies in the case law can be better 
understood once it is acknowledged that the law of contract is an expositive device; 
the boundaries of the concept do not fully explain how the courts apply it; it merely 
assists in predicting its application. 
 
4. Tort 
 
If the boundaries of property are drawn widely, then the same can also be said of the 
boundaries of tort; Rudden once identified around seventy five torts in the common 
law legal systems.
194
 We make no attempt to search for a narrower concept of tort, 
instead we focus on one particular area of tort, which is negligence. As Birks stated 
‗[t]ort courses now centre on negligence, and many never look at anything else.‘195 By 
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doing this, we have immediately narrowed the overall scope of the law of tort, and 
kept what in practice is its most important area.
196
 First, we will look at attempts to 
explain tort law as a coherent subject to justify this much narrower approach. Then we 
will explain how even negligence itself must be broken down to form a narrower 
concept if it is to be a useful concept. We take our lead in this regard from James, who 
himself has been described as a modern realist.
197
 James noted that tort law was 
simply everything which did not appear to fit into contract,
198
 a proposition also noted 
by Waddams.
199
 Applying an overlapping approach, we need not shoehorn every 
claim into contract, tort or property. This is not as drastic as it may sound; in 
particular, we see no need to treat the protection of property as falling under a law of 
tort.  
 
Attempts to Explain Tort as a Unitary Concept 
 
Corrective Justice 
 
In Chapter 2 we looked at the methodology of Weinrib‘s attempts to classify private 
law. For Weinrib, tort law is characterised by the correlation between the tortfeasor 
                                                 
 
 
196
 T Weir, ‗The Staggering March of Negligence‘ in J Stapleton and P Cane (eds), The Law of 
Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (OUP 1998). 
197
 F James, ‗Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process‘ (1959) 8 Buff L Rev 315. 
See C Robinette, ‗Can There Be a Unified Theory of Torts? A Pluralist Suggestion from History and 
Doctrine‘ (2005) 43 Brandeis LJ 369. 
198
 F James, ‗Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process‘ (1959) 8 Buff L Rev 315 at 
315. 
199
 S Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal 
Reasoning (CUP 2003) at 10. 
  
135 
 
 
and the victim. Tort law is concerned with limiting the independent pursuit of one‘s 
separate interests where this wrongfully infringes on another‘s rights. Within tort law, 
Weinrib looks for normative structures; intentional torts are united by their search for 
intention, negligence is connected by the act of the defendant and the harm suffered 
by the claimant.
200
 One of the major concerns with this approach is that Weinrib 
himself concedes that his theory is not one that can easily identify the specific 
structure of the law.
201
 
 
Even if we accept that corrective justice lies at the heart of tort law, the search for 
correlativity ignores the often complex situations which give rise to tortious liability. 
Take, for example, Weinrib‘s attempt to explain vicarious liability rules. Weinrib has 
argued that corrective justice would justify vicarious liability where an employee has 
been at fault, as the employee‘s actions in the course of his employment provide the 
connection between the employer and the victim.
202
 However, Cane points out that 
this ignores the fact that liability may be strict in the event of a non-negligence tort 
such as trespass to land, and it will arise regardless of the employer‘s fault.203 This is 
why, once again, the preference is for overlaps. One need not explain vicarious 
liability using the same principles as for negligence in general. Simply recognising 
that the status of the defendant is a fact, and that this can alter the requirements and 
results of the core concept, provides a more open account. A similar problem, again to 
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do with overlaps, arises from Weinrib‘s analysis that different standards apply to 
different tortfeasors. As we have seen, Weinrib sought to distinguish public from 
private law.
204
 However, Weinrib then recognises that ‗special‘ considerations apply 
to cases where the defendant is a public authority.
205
 In other words, this is a ‗hidden‘ 
overlap, which we will deal with further on.
206
 One cannot adopt a rigid classification 
between private and public law, only to then use a grey area to explain cases where 
elements of both seem to have been relevant. It is only by recognising that overlaps 
happen in the first place that this conclusion can make any sense.  
 
Duties, Rights and Interests 
 
In Chapter 2 we touched upon Birks‘ classification of the law of torts as any breach of 
duty.
207
 This approach has proven popular amongst some scholars.
208
 However, as 
Birks admitted, this does not distinguish tort from breach of contract, which leads to a 
very wide area of law. As Stevens explains, the biggest problem with this category is 
that it also fails to indicate what types of responses will be made by the courts.
209
 As 
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Fleming once stated, ‗[t]his is certainly not a very helpful definition.‘210 In short, this 
has very little descriptive quality. For this reason it simply cannot be adopted under a 
realist approach as it obscures facts and does not identify them. 
 
Stevens has offered an alternative account which develops Birks‘ definition; in short a 
breach of duty is a breach of somebody‘s right. The rights-based approach divides the 
law into primary and secondary rights. As with McFarlane, to an extent there are 
some similarities between the arrangement adopted by Stevens and the one presented 
here. Both this approach and the one presented by Stevens, for example, criticise the 
general duty of care, and seek to distinguish negligent acts which cause physical 
injuries and those which result in pure economic losses. This is for the simple reason 
that Stevens only seeks to recognise those rights which correlate between the 
decisions of the courts, and there is no more grandiose definition of rights.
211
 
However, by presenting ‗rights‘ as the justification for tort law, it allows Stevens to 
argue that various rules and doctrines should be decided in a different way. For 
example, he argues that vicarious liability should be limited to situations where it can 
be said that the acts of an employee represent the acts of the employer.
212
 For that 
reason the rights-based approach mixes description with prescription. Stevens‘ 
analysis depends on what Holmes would call the ‗brooding omnipresence in the 
sky‘;213 the law enforces primary rights which we can only recognise and identify 
because there has been a ‗tortious‘ act. This criticism is noted by Murphy, who 
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questions how a rights-based approach helps to predict the law.
214
 An overlapping 
approach allows us to recognise the distinctions as well as the points of similarity.  
 
The final approach to consider at this junction is the one proposed by Cane.
215
  Cane 
adopts an expositive approach to classifying tort law, which seeks to identify interests 
and sanctioned conduct. As we noted in the previous chapter, this has parallels with 
the methods of the realists.
216
 Cane also identifies four main interests which are 
protected in tort; interests in personal integrity, property interests, contractual rights 
and monetary wealth. The benefit of this approach is that Cane is looking to identify 
facts in relation to each interest and also the fact which determines that the conduct is 
‗tortious.‘ However, Cane‘s methodology seems to obscure the ‗end product‘ which 
must occur for many tort claims; it is not enough to have an interest, and sanctioned 
conduct, we also look for what happened and how it happened. The methodology here 
does not seek to show that every instance is treated the same by the courts, simply it is 
looking for the most discernible pattern. Indeed, outside of negligence the differences 
between personal integrity and property become much more apparent. Although we 
adopt property as an independent concept, it is argued that for the most part the 
protection afforded to personal integrity and property against careless acts is the 
same.
217
 However, since negligence is the largest area of tort law and touches on 
many other areas, it is the best place to start for our analysis. 
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Negligence 
 
It is proposed that any attempt to find unity within the ‗law of tort‘ would require 
unnecessarily wide definitions, which would provide little assistance in predicting the 
law. We do not seek to do this; instead we argue that we can take negligence as a 
conceptually distinct area. There may be overlaps with other ‗torts‘, but this must be 
identified by independent analysis, which is outside of the scope of this chapter. Thus, 
acts of carelessness may be relevant in providing a lower level of damages in other 
torts when compared to intentional acts.
218
 This is not meant to sideline these claims; 
whereas Birks‘ miscellaneous category was a place for causative events which did not 
fit into his main categories, the presence of other torts which may overlap poses no 
such problem to the approach presented in this thesis. It is also intended to be a 
warning against efforts to harmonise various ‗torts‘, which accords with the views of 
Fleming and Weir.
219
 Indeed even within the current ‗sphere‘ of negligence, the 
search for unifying principles has caused untold chaos and confusion. For this reason 
we seek to construct a much narrower version of negligence than the wider version 
which is currently used in English private law. 
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Our core concept of negligence requires (i) damage (ii) damage of a physical nature 
and (iii) careless physical acts. Notably, this also leads to a narrower version of 
‗negligence‘ than its current application. Of central importance to this narrower 
version is the removal of pure economic losses from this core concept. This does not 
mean that those cases are wrongly decided, simply that we are looking for an 
alternative analysis, which is more fully developed in Chapter 6. We also remove 
many omissions cases. This is on the basis that much of the case law involves public 
authorities or employers, where different considerations arise in comparison with 
disputes between private individuals. Again, we do not need to adopt a discrete 
separation of these situations from negligence. Instead, the argument is that we can 
avoid stretching what is a realist concept by recognising that an overlapping analysis 
can provide both separation and comparison. Firstly we expressly reject the idea of a 
‗duty‘ of care as it does little to explain the law. Instead it is argued that the duty is 
little more than a control device. This also requires us to distinguish omissions and 
pure economic losses. This leaves a narrower concept which in fact covers the 
majority of the case law, and allows these other situations to be regarded as overlaps. 
 
Rejecting the ‘duty’ of care 
 
One of the problems in constructing a realist concept of negligence is the role of the 
duty of care.
220
  As Buckland noted, the duty of care has a long-standing tradition in 
English law, and it can be traced as far back as the 19
th
 century.
221
 This duty is 
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presented as a prerequisite to any successful claim in negligence.
222
 Despite the 
tradition of this ‗duty‘, it is arguable that it plays a limited role as a useful guide. 
Arguably, this is a result of trying to include too much within a single principle. This 
is not a new idea; writing in 1935 Buckland argued that the duty of care is ‗incapable 
of sound analysis and possibly productive of injustice‘.223  
 
McBride has provided a strong defence of the role played by the duty of care 
principle.
224
 He presents an example where a manufacturer produces cars with faulty 
brakes, who fails to inform its customers of the defect. As McBride himself concedes, 
this example ignores the statutory mechanisms for preventing such unscrupulous 
behaviour.
225
 Nevertheless, McBride argues that the duty can require action even 
before any injury has occurred. The only authority to support this point is E Hobbs 
(Farms) Ltd v Baxenden Chemicals,
226
 where it was stated that a manufacturer had a 
duty to inform existing customers of any faults which it subsequently discovers. 
However, the failure to inform customers did not result in any increase to the level of 
damages. It is a duty without a legal consequence, despite the reprehensible behaviour 
of the manufacturer. Therefore, it is an irrelevant duty from a realist perspective. 
Moreover, to argue that this deterrent effect exists arguably does more harm than 
good. Even if it was reflected in the case law, it would provide a weak deterrence.
227
 
To use an argument which would resound with Bentham, it is only by recognising the 
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law‘s failure to address this serious issue that we could ever hope to achieve a legal 
mechanism which achieves the deterrent objective.
228
 The realist‘s separation of is 
and ought should not be interpreted as an attempt to prevent changes in the law. 
Description is simply the first and necessary step in this process. 
 
Adopting the Control Device Explanation 
 
The more sensible analysis, therefore, is that the duty of care is simply a controlling 
device.
229
  This is the approach adopted by Cane who concludes that ‗the duty of care 
concept operates negatively to impose limits on the potentially enormous breadth of 
the principle that people ought to be liable for negligently-caused injury.‘230 This is a 
perfectly acceptable restriction, but how the phrase ‗duty‘ assists in this exercise is 
questionable. As Conaghlan has stated, a more open account of these policy-driven 
reasons is required.
231
 Instead we see the duty being adopted as ‗an attempt to play 
down the role of policy in judicial decision-making.‘232 This, we argue, has been 
necessary because negligence is being deployed in too many situations. When we 
remove omissions and the liability of employers from the equation there is very little 
need for a control device in most cases. Statute has already done this in regards to the 
liability of occupier‘s of land; it is clear that an occupier can be liable for acts or 
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omissions because of the fact that they occupy land.
233
 It is this combination of facts 
which explains the cases of omissions, not any general duty of care. 
 
Take for example the liability of public authorities.
234
 Now, one must always be 
careful with one‘s realist credentials, as the realist generally argued against any 
attempt to provide a rigid distinction between private and public law.
235
 However, it 
does appear that the status of the defendant is a fact which is of relevance in any 
decision.
236
 This has been pointed out by Samuel who argues that any discrete 
distinction between private and public law is undesirable, but then goes on to 
conclude that it can also be a useful fact for distinguishing different decisions.
237
 
Indeed the patterns are there. Much of the work provided by the control mechanism in 
duty of care is to protect public authorities from an open liability for careless acts 
which result in harm to others.
238
 So, for example, a general reluctance to allow 
actions against the police force may lead to the court denying liability under the 
language of the duty of care.
239
 There are many reasons for providing different 
standards where the defendants are doctors, local authorities and police forces. As we 
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will see below, the status of the defendant is also relevant in any discussion of 
omissions, as in some cases public bodies can be liable for failing to act.  
 
 
Omissions 
 
Public bodies 
 
 
Since our core concept of negligence requires positive acts,
240
 it leaves a number of 
cases where the courts have still recognised liability for omissions. The relevance of 
the status of the defendant is also important in regards to omissions; most of the cases 
involve public bodies or employers. Just as there are different reasons for excluding 
liabilities where the defendant is a public body, it is also the case that in some 
situations a public body will be liable where they have been provided with powers to 
look after the claimant. So, recent developments have seen the liability of public 
bodies extend to failures to prevent domestic abuse,
241
 failures in child care,
242
 and 
cases involving the liability of police forces for failing to prevent prisoners from 
committing suicide.
243
 A public body has a different role to play in society from 
private individuals, and thus the limits of liability we saw above (where the courts can 
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exempt liability where it would be fair, just and reasonable to do so) is balanced with 
the possibility of liability for failing to act. 
 
Employers 
 
We also see the relevance of what Llewellyn identified as a ‗law of associations.‘244 
This factual element presents another specialised approach, as employers are liable for 
the acts of employees. Fleming argued that liabilities imposed on employers can be 
described as a quid pro quo for the benefits that employers receive from their 
activities.
245
 In a way, it can be said that employers are liable because they have set in 
motion the activities where the damage occurs. However, Waddams is surely right 
that to find a solitary premise for the rules on vicarious liability is unnecessary; they 
serve a number of functions.
246
 The case law shows that it is not just a case of profit 
stripping as a defendant may be liable even if they are a non-profit organisation.
247
 
This is not simply a tangential discussion of vicarious liability, this tells us that 
employers have potential liabilities which exceed those of other private individuals. 
The courts are much more willing to place liability on employers. We mentioned 
earlier the contextual differences which arise when a contract governs an employment 
relationship. The presence of special rules need not undermine the core concept of 
contract, instead we can recognise the overlap with the employment context. We are 
not saying that all cases involving employers must be taken out of the core concept of 
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negligence, but instead that the core concept need not accommodate those cases 
which are particular to employment situations. 
 
It is not just that employers can be liable for the careless acts of employees, but also 
for not protecting their employees.
248
 The courts have recognised the importance of 
the employer in the life of the employee, and the requirement that employees take 
positive steps to look after the well-being of their employees. In these cases it is more 
realistic to refer to ‗duties‘ as the employer is expected to look after the employee and 
if this is done carelessly, the employee can sue for damages.
249
 It seems almost otiose 
to say it, but these cases demonstrate the problems inherent in trying to identify a 
common duty in all of these cases, since the courts expect different standards 
behaviour from different defendants, even when the damage suffered by the claimant 
is of the same nature.  
 
We can summarise the majority of these cases as overlaps with the core concept of 
negligence where the addition of alternative facts can be sufficient in the absence of a 
positive physical act.  This provides a good example of how the overlapping concept 
analysis works; since a concept is a collection of facts, in cases where one of the core 
factual elements is missing it will be much more difficult to establish liability. Since 
we have explained these cases, we can return to our core concept of negligence; a 
careless act which creates a danger, resulting in physical injury to the claimant. 
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Social Reality of ‘Negligence’ 
 
Once we get past the cases of omissions, much of the confusion in the law of 
negligence is caused by attempts to construct a single conception of ‗duty‘ which can 
deal with non-physical harms. In fact, the issue of ‗duty of care‘ becomes an 
unnecessary gloss when our focus is purely on physical harms. The law of negligence 
is grounded in empirically observable reality not because of some elusive concept of 
duty or responsibility, but by the requirement of physical acts and physical losses.
250
 
Stapleton points this out when she states that ‗a defendant who, by his own positive 
act, has carelessly caused physical damage to the claimant or his property is always 
held to owe a duty of care to the victim.‘251 The simplicity of this approach lies in the 
fact that, as opposed to other forms of losses, ‗[t]he infliction of physical injury to the 
person or property of another universally requires to be justified.‘252 
 
The Requirement of Carelessness  
 
This may be a debatable conclusion, but carelessness is a fact. Now admittedly, it is a 
much harder to identify carelessness as a fact than it is to discover other elements 
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such as physical damage.
253
 No attempt is made here to justify ‗carelessness‘ as an 
obvious and unimpeachable fact; none of the facts which we look for are clear and 
unquestionable. We simply rely on an enquiry as to whether this fact provides a 
perceptible boundary which distinguishes things in the real world. Further, given that 
we have narrowed the scope of this claim, the varying standards that are in particular 
applied to public authorities and the health service (where more leniency is 
afforded)
254
 and also in relation to employers (where a stricter liability is applied), we 
find that carelessness becomes much easier to identify. 
 
Acts 
 
In our narrower version of negligence, we also look for positive acts. According to 
Cane, this forms the paradigm scenario of negligence.
255
 Admittedly, it is not always 
easy to distinguish acts from omissions. For example, a man who parks a car on a hill 
and forgets to put the handbrake on will be liable if the car rolls down the hill and 
injures someone.
256
 However, Honore has explained that, in general, a required act is 
satisfied by asking whether the defendant intervened ‗in the world so as to bring about 
change.‘257 The US Third Restatement on Torts also adopts this position, and 
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separates omissions from the general inquiry.
258
 This analysis means that we do not 
need to adopt an artificial definition of acts; the focus is on the act which directly 
causes the danger or harm. Our perceptions of what is necessary only gets distorted 
when we start to take into account liability for omissions.  
 
Physical Damage 
 
It is contended that to construct a concept of negligence that is descriptive, it is 
necessary to take a narrow view of ‗loss.‘ This requires physical damage to things or 
to the bodily integrity of the claimant. The same position applies in the US Third 
Restatement of Torts, where there is a standard provision for liability for physical 
injuries.
259
 As we have seen in the paragraph above, much of the current formulation 
of the ‗duty‘ is really spent on setting out rules which can apply to all types of losses. 
The concept of negligence will be much more useful if we narrow our concern to 
physical losses. This contains two factual elements; the requirement of loss (which 
could apply to pure economic losses and psychiatric damage) and also the necessity of 
physical damage (which excludes pure economic losses and psychiatric damage.)  
 
The requirement of physical loss plays an important function in limiting the potential 
liability of defendants, and it also prevents excessive litigation.
260
 As we noted earlier, 
in Anatomy of Tort Law, Cane argued that tort law can be seen as protecting a number 
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of different interests.
261
 Different interests call for different levels of protection. So, 
for example, the interest in one‘s bodily integrity and property is distinct from the 
interest in monetary affairs. As noted by Stapleton, there are convincing economic, 
moral and social reasons for placing more stringent levels of protection for interests in 
property and our physical well-being.
262
 Thus, in Murphy v Brentwood DC, Lord 
Oliver stated that ‗[t]he infliction of physical injury to the person or property of 
another universally requires to be justified.‘263 One should not assume that the 
question of physical loss is always straightforward,
264
 but the law is much clearer 
when we focus on constructing a core concept which does not account for all types of 
losses. 
 
Overlap with Reliance 
 
In particular, this explains why it is necessary to have an overlapping approach which 
can allow us to construct narrower concepts. We can aspire to say that one should not 
cause his or her neighbour financial loss, and there may be moral, economic and 
social reasons for saying that this should be the case. But causing financial harm 
raises particular concerns. Generally, we expect individuals to safeguard their own 
financial health.
265
 According to Heydon, there is no general responsibility to ensure 
the gains or even status quo of one‘s neighbours; in fact our economy dictates that 
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first and foremost we should encourage individuals actively to seek gains at the 
expense of others.
266
 As one Australian judge has explained, there are clear 
differences in the policies which underlie claims for physical injuries when compared 
to pure economic losses; ‗pure economic losses frequently result in mere transfers of 
wealth. The claimant's loss is the defendant's or a third party's gain [whereas] harm to 
a person or property ordinarily involves a new loss to social wealth.‘267 Some 
economic losses, however, are easily avoidable and the desire to protect these 
interests requires an additional limiting factor in addition to the loss suffered by the 
claimant. For most of the cases, the sufficient control mechanism is reliance, and this 
overlap of negligence, reliance and financial loss is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The conclusion which must be drawn is that it is not possible to construct a general 
law of negligence and neither is it possible to reduce negligence to a single factual 
element.
268
 People are not obliged to act carefully every time they come into 
proximity with others.
269
 This may sound strange, but as Markesinis has argued, 
English law ‗has always displayed a pragmatic tolerance towards institutions which, 
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though superfluous, cause little harm‘.270 Negligence traditionally covers cases where 
the defendant has committed an act which has caused physical damage to the property 
or bodily integrity of the claimant.
271
 Under the rubric of the duty of care, the courts 
have retained a device which provides a flexible method of limiting claims in 
negligence.
272
 However, the incorporation of claims for omissions of public 
authorities and claims for pure economic loss have seen the boundaries of this claim 
being stretched too far (as a descriptive tool.)
273
 For this reason, a more coherent 
concept of negligence emerges when claims for pure economic loss are removed from 
the core framework for negligence. We return to these claims in Chapter 6, where it is 
explained that claims for pure economic loss represent an overlap between elements 
of negligence and reliance-based claims. Thus, we need not remove these claims from 
negligence altogether; the overlapping approach allows us to recognise that since it 
does not fall into the core concept of negligence, additional factual elements are 
required. 
 
5. Identifying a basic Framework for English private law 
 
The Overlapping of Legal Concepts 
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One may question the appropriateness of separating concepts like property and 
contract, as property rights are often created or altered by contracts. Further, it is 
apparent that we have a concept of property, and at the same time, an independent 
concept of negligent damage to property. As Llewellyn pointed out, the structure need 
not be neat and tidy and inevitably areas within the schema may cut across each 
other.
274
 This framework is not intended to provide a series of analytical questions, 
such as ‗is it property or a personal obligation?‘, ‗if it is personal then is it contract or 
tort?‘ Instead the aim is to show that the basic legal concepts which are frequently 
used by lawyers can be an invaluable tool in predicting the behaviour of judges and 
revealing the various goals and functions of private law. The legal framework is, 
therefore, used to treat like cases alike by reference to the facts of the cases and the 
decisions of the courts, rather than through a rigidly structured system of 
categorisation. Neither does this legal framework presuppose that legal concepts are 
‗metaphysical‘ or capable of being somehow detached from reality. The simple truth 
is that the utility of these legal concepts lies in the fact that they provide a bridge 
between the more general private law functions and social reality.  
 
The relationship between legal concepts and social reality is, therefore, of extreme 
importance in simplifying the incredibly complex body of rules, principles and 
policies that exist within the legal system. A good description of the law should 
arrange the legal system in a way that treats legal concepts for what they are; 
expositive devices for predicting judicial behaviour. The complexity of our private 
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law not only creates the possibility that the concepts will overlap, but in fact makes it 
almost inevitable. This has been observed by the courts when, for instance, they have 
had to address the issue of concurrent liabilities.
275
 For example, a defendant might be 
simultaneously liable under a contract and in negligence for causing some avoidable 
harm to the claimant.
276
 If the facts are exactly the same, we should not be surprised if 
the outcome is too. The overlap is not simply concerned with concurrent claims; we 
also often see contracts where the subject of agreement is the use or transfer of 
property; it is not at all surprising that a contract for the sale of land will have 
different requirements than a contract for the sale of services. Finally, much of the law 
of tort is concerned with protecting property against harmful acts. Since this is not 
designed as an exclusive system of categorisation, this does not undermine the utility 
of this conceptual framework. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Classification will inevitably involve generalisations and the simplification of legal 
concepts. We have attempted to draw the boundaries of these concepts as close as 
possible to observable reality; things which can be tested and identified outside the 
language used by lawyers. It needs to be remembered that (a) we are not arguing that 
any of this structure is normative, and (b) there are always differences in our 
interpretations of the real world. The objection has been made against concepts that 
simply make reference to further legal terms and principles. A system of classification 
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that draws the lines of generalisation too low will begin to lose any element of 
predictability. At the same time, a system of classification which draws the 
generalisations at too high a level will cease to have any descriptive utility. The 
balance needs to be achieved. Unfortunately, real rules are often stretched beyond 
their ordinary meaning to achieve the desired result and the law abandons the facts 
which are necessary for predictability. Property becomes more than the material and 
tangible; contract becomes a tool to describe any situation where there is a promise; 
and negligence is expanded to cover omissions and non-physical losses. The 
categories or concepts which are over-generalised will stand only as paper rules. As 
the legal realists pointed out, paper rules do not produce certainty.
277
 Although these 
concepts may have begun their lives as relatively well settled and understood 
concepts, they soon lose their usefulness if they become the only analytical tools 
within which we try to shoehorn all private law claims. If judges are required to act 
within the confines of fixed or exclusive categories then they will almost inevitably 
expand these ideas to cover new and novel problems. There seems to be an almost 
crippling fear of stepping outside of the comfort zone of contract, tort or property.
278
  
This is much more likely to cause uncertainty than a less doctrinal and more practical 
approach to legal reasoning.
279
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After setting up the main concepts in our structure, the thesis will now go on to 
consider many of the areas that we have removed from the three concepts of property, 
contract and negligence. The following chapters explore the overlaps in money 
claims, reliance-based claims and the law of trusts. In particular, these are areas which 
share overlaps with the concepts looked at in this chapter. These further overlaps 
would probably be considered by followers of Birks to be the legal equivalent of the 
platypus. The platypus was often described by biological taxonomists as a quasi-
species
280
 (the similarity with quasi-contract in Justinian‘s Institutes is striking). The 
existence of quasi-species in the natural world does not undermine the efforts to 
classify biological organisms, but rather it illustrates that even in the natural sciences 
there are limits to the utility of classification. For this reason, it is of fundamental 
importance that we recognise the overlapping nature of legal concepts in the English 
legal system. It enables dialogue between different branches of the law and the 
creation of new legal concepts to adapt to novel situations or gaps within the legal 
framework. The concepts of English private law interact and indeed overlap. We 
should not reject this; instead we should recognise that this assists the wider 
objectives of achieving a descriptive classification of private law.  
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 A Moyal, Platypus: The Extraordinary Story of How a Curious Creature Baffled the World (Johns 
Hopkins UP 2004). 
CHAPTER 5: MONEY TRANSFERS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the concept of money and the relevance of 
monetary transfers within private law claims. Claims concerning the transfers of 
money are sometimes placed in property,
1
 contract,
2
 the law of trusts and unjust 
enrichment. Although we are arguing that money should be regarded as a special type 
of interest, an overlapping analysis does not require the separation of money transfers 
from these other concepts; facts can be relevant in more than one concept. Indeed it 
would be surprising if elements such as title and control were relevant in property but 
not in money claims. Even so, we have determined that tangibility is an essential 
component of the concept of property, and most money claims involve intangible 
assets. Furthermore, money itself is legally significant, even in its tangible form it 
‗weakens‘ the concept of property and requires a special approach. As we have said 
throughout, the presence or absence of other facts can alter the response of the courts.   
 
                                                 
 
 
1
 See generally D Fox, Money as Property Rights (OUP 2008): ‗Money in its different forms belongs to 
that class of assets called ‗personal property‘ (at 18). Since a narrower concept of property has been 
adopted in this chapter, it is sufficient to note that the strict liability regime of the common law only 
applies to money when it is corporeal and it is not being used as currency: E McKendrick (ed), Goode 
on Commercial Law (4
th
 edn, LexisNexis 2009) at 486-487 and Miller v Race [1758] 1 Burr 452, 97 
ER 398. 
2
 Money is also sometimes classified as a contractual arrangement such as where a bank receives funds 
which are to be held in a personal account for a customer. See B McFarlane, The Structure of Property 
Law (Hart 2008) at 12-13. 
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Our definition requires; money, to which the claimant has title and control, which is 
then transferred to the defendant. Our view, therefore, is that every money claim 
shares a strong overlap with our core concept of property. Nonetheless, we identify 
two legally significant facts which alter the dynamics of this concept; the first being 
that in the vast majority of cases, the interest lies in intangible money. Secondly, 
money itself is legally significant. As Nussbaum once stated, ‗[m]oney is a 
fundamental concept of the law. There are perhaps few other juridical notions of 
greater importance.‘3 The view presented is that even if money is in tangible form, it 
should not be regarded as ‗property‘. The presence of money as the subject matter 
dilutes the proprietary nature of the claim. 
 
It must be noted at the start that, whilst not completely rejecting the ‗unjust 
enrichment‘ analysis outright, we seek to modify, and as always, narrow the concept. 
At the start of this chapter, we explain why we have modified unjust enrichment and 
also why this narrower approach is to be preferred. In particular, the failure to 
distinguish property and money leads to the error of over-generalisation; under unjust 
enrichment the two concepts would be treated the same when in reality they are not. A 
further concern lies in the failure of current theories to recognise the importance of the 
defendant‘s actions in either inducing a money payment or after they receive one. It is 
argued that an overlap is becoming apparent between an element from our core 
concept of negligence and these cases of money payments. This can be found when 
the positive act of the defendant results in losses to the claimant. In these cases a 
special measure is being introduced by the courts to protect the interest of the 
                                                 
 
 
3
 A Nussbaum, ‗Basic Monetary Conceptions in Law‘ (1937) 35 Michigan L Rev 865 at 866. 
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claimant. The final overlap we see is in cases involving an agreement between the 
parties. In short, these cases show that, not only is there no wider principle of unjust 
enrichment, there is also no wider principle of money transfers. For this reason, we do 
not adopt the terminology of ‗unjust enrichment‘. Facts alter cases, and it is the 
identification of facts, not principles, which assists in predicting the law.  
 
Opposing Theories of Monetary Transfers: Unjust Enrichment and Resulting 
Trusts 
 
As the law in this area is dominated by ‗unjust enrichment‘, it will be worthwhile 
distinguishing the approach in this chapter. Unjust enrichment, as it is currently 
understood in English law, consists of enrichment at the expense of the claimant, 
where there is a recognised unjust factor, without any available defence.
4
 Examples of 
unjust factors are claims for mistaken payments or restitution for payments made 
under unenforceable agreements. There are several reasons why a narrower approach 
which focuses on money transfers is preferable to a wider concept of unjust 
enrichment. Firstly, the patterns of judicial responses in this area are not of general 
application.
5
 In particular we argue that non-monetary transfers are governed by the 
rules on property, trusts or reliance-based claims. Again, reference can be made to 
Cane, who noted that different interests call for different levels of protection.
6
  Thus, 
                                                 
 
 
4
 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL); Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v IRC [2006] 
UKHL 49, [2007] 1 AC 558. A wider version of unjust enrichment is where there is an absence of legal 
basis for the receipt of an enrichment; P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2005) at 108-114; 
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v IRC [2006] UKHL 49, [2007] 1 AC 558. 
5
 I Jackman,   The Varieties of Restitution (Federation Press Sydney 1998) at 4. 
6
 P Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart 1997). 
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the one recurring idea in this chapter is that the patterns which can be found in cases 
of money transfers are not of general application for other types of transfers. 
 
Therefore, it is argued that the requirement of enrichment only serves to confuse in 
this area, as it is always established in monetary transfers. The only relevance for this 
wider idea of enrichment in the context of money transfers would be to explain those 
cases where a defendant receives money and makes an expenditure which he would 
have made anyway.
7
 It is unnecessary to adopt this approach; the recipient of a 
mistaken payment receives an abstract measure of wealth, a view also shared by 
Birks
8
 and Sheehan.
9
 This leaves the only other application of enrichment as a way of 
incorporating non-monetary ‗enrichments‘. Outside of the context of monetary 
transfers, enrichment has proven an elusive and difficult term, especially in relation to 
non-contractual services.
10
 Non-contractual services in the form of services are 
outside of the scope of this chapter, but we explore this in more detail in Chapter 6. It 
has even proven controversial in claims based on property, as it has been argued that a 
recipient who does not receive title is never enriched at all.
11
  
 
Thirdly, the ‗at the expense of‘ requirement is only necessary if we want to 
incorporate into our enquiry all gain-based awards. This would allow us to use the 
same approach for money which is received not only from the claimant, but also from 
third parties, such as unauthorised profits of fiduciaries and gains made from the 
                                                 
 
 
7
 E.g. Scottish Equitable v Derby [2001] EWCA Civ 369, [2001] 3 All ER 818. 
8
 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2005) at 78-79. 
9
 D Sheehan, ‗Identifying Gain in the Law of Restitution; in C Rickett (ed), Justifying Private Law 
Remedies (Hart 2008) at 336-337. 
10
 See generally, J Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (Clarendon 1991) from 39-44. 
11
 W Swadling, ‗Ignorance and Unjust Enrichment: The Problem of Title‘, (2008) OJLS 28 627 at 642-
643. 
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receipt of the claimant‘s property. Yet, the rules on property, trusts and agency can be 
explained without reference to unjust enrichment. Fourthly, despite the statements by 
numerous academics that there is strict liability for the receipt of monetary transfers, 
there are various defences such as good faith purchase or expenditure in good faith, 
which would not apply to recipients of another‘s property.12 A more specific 
identification of the factual elements involved in claims for the restitution of money 
transfers is, therefore, required.  
 
Unjust Factors 
 
To a limited extent, the area where we share a common ground with ‗unjust 
enrichment‘ is the idea of ‗unjust factors‘. In other words, it is sensible to take the 
view that no core concept can explain all claims arising from money transfers, and 
that in every claim additional elements are required.
13
 However, one major difference 
is that we do not find uniformity in the approach of the courts for all cases of money 
transfers; each individual ‗fact‘ has an important impact on how the courts will deal 
with any dispute. Therefore, it must also be noted that, whilst not rejecting the ‗unjust 
enrichment‘ analysis outright, we seek to modify the concept to aid in predicting the 
law.  
 
Moreover, although we acknowledge the conceptual clarity provided by an ‗unjust 
factors‘ approach, it is argued here that they are in desperate need of realignment. To 
                                                 
 
 
12
 Fowler v Hollins [1872] LR 7 QB 616. 
13
 M Chen-Wishart, ‗Unjust Factors and the Restitutionary Response‘ (2000) 20 OJLS 557. 
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explain what is meant by this, a brief overview is required. Birks characterised the 
main grounds for restitution as claimant-orientated, meaning that the justification for 
restitution centred on the intention of the claimant.
14
 When aligned in this way, 
restitution did not require any initial inquiry into the actions of the defendant, as he 
was liable merely for receipt of the money.
15
 This is certainly true for mistaken 
payments,
16
 but whether it is true for other enrichments is extremely questionable. 
Nonetheless, the claimant-orientated approach to mistake has, as Hedley noted, 
influenced the formulation of the other unjust factors. Most are presented in a way 
which indicates that it is the intention or acts of the claimant which provides the 
justification for awarding restitution.
17
 For example, ‗failure of consideration‘, where 
money is paid for a purpose which fails, was said to be an example of a conditional 
intention. Although this does not sound problematic, further on in this chapter it is 
explained that restitution for ‗failure of consideration‘ is based on an agreement (not 
necessarily one to repay the money.) However, there is no evidence that the courts 
will impose restitution for uncommunicated conditions. Thus ‗failure of condition‘ 
requires the initial knowledge of the recipient. We argue that this is not just a 
difference in the relevant facts; it is also argued that the availability of the change of 
position defence will not be available in this situation, whereas it is for mistaken 
payments. Indeed, in a recent monograph on the change of position defence, Bant 
found no cases which supported the view that change of position can apply to this 
                                                 
 
 
14
 McKendrick uses the term ‗plaintiff orientation‘ to describe the focus of the ‗unjust‘ factors; E 
McKendrick, ‗Tracing Misdirected Funds‘ [1991] LMCLQ 378. 
15
 P Birks, ‗The Role of Fault in the Law of Unjust Enrichment‘ in W Swadling and G Jones (eds), The 
Search for Principle: Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chieveley (OUP 1999). 
16
 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (rev edn, Clarendon Press 1989) at 140; ‗my 
judgment was not properly exercised (or, was not exercised at all) in the matter of your getting (the 
enrichment).‘ 
17
 S Hedley, ‗The Empire Strikes Back? A Restatement of the Law of Unjust Enrichment‘ (2004) 28 
Melbourne Univ L Rev 759 at 767. 
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alternative ‗unjust factor.‘18 We return to this at the end of the chapter, in our 
discussion of the overlap between contract and monetary transfers.
19
 From a realist 
perspective, again it reveals that even in cases of monetary transfers, there is no 
uniform approach. This is why we argue that recognising the overlap with contract is 
the best way of understanding the ‗failure of consideration‘ cases. 
 
The claimant-orientated approach has even been stretched to cases where more 
obvious reasons for restitution are present. For example, according to some academics 
the unjust factor in cases of stolen money is ‗ignorance‘;20 the supposed justifying 
element is not that the defendant has stolen money, rather that the claimant was 
‗ignorant‘ of the transfer. By focusing the inquiry on the claimant, we hide the fact 
that the more serious issue is that the transfer was induced by the recipient. The 
relevance of this lies in the nature of the remedy; we argue further on that the courts 
are now regularly applying specific restitution (this term is used in preference to the 
‗constructive trust‘ but it operates in the same way) in cases involving fraud, even 
when the initial payment was due to an error made by the claimant.
21
 For our 
purposes, this is an overlap with tort. Although there is not enough space here to 
discuss other ‗unjust factors‘ such as duress and undue influence, this chapter also 
serves as a warning against any attempt to reduce these issues to a claimant-orientated 
                                                 
 
 
18
 E Bant, The Change of Position Defence (Hart 2009) at 197-198. 
19
 See text at n 136 in this Chapter. 
20
 W Swadling, ‗Ignorance and Unjust Enrichment‘(2008) 28 OJLS 627 at 629-630. The term also has 
what may be called the badge of legitimacy, as it has its roots in Justinian‘s Institutes. R Zimmermann, 
The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Juta & Co 1995) at 850-851. 
21
 Getronics v Logistic & Transport Consulting (QBD, 30 April 2004). Please note that we use this 
term to explain the ‗proprietary response‘. Specific restitution is used to avoid the word property as this 
would only serve to confuse given what we have set out in the previous chapter. Furthermore, we do 
not apply the phrase ‗trust‘ for the similar reason that we develop a very different concept of trust in 
Chapter 7. 
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approach. One could not hope to accommodate all of these other factors into a generic 
approach for monetary transfers.
22
  
 
The overall argument which is presented throughout this chapter is that monetary 
transfers involve a number of complicated issues, and these have a particular impact 
on the way in which the courts decide the cases. Understanding the relationship 
between monetary transfers and property cannot be achieved without adopting an 
overlapping approach; unjust enrichment is over-inclusive and does not identify the 
very important factual distinctions between these concepts. That is why ‗unjust 
enrichment‘ is not adopted as the explanation of these cases. Furthermore, the 
‗enrichment‘ of the defendant certainly is relevant in these cases, but this is part and 
parcel of the receipt of money. We also avoid the fiction of having to claim that 
someone is enriched when they transferred the money elsewhere, as in the recent case 
of Jones v Churcher.
23
 There, both defendants were held liable for allowing a 
mistaken payment to be transferred to a third party. Neither were enriched by this set 
of events, but they were nonetheless liable. Arguing that enrichment is strict makes 
little sense when we consider that the change of position defence is said by most to be 
a test of continuing enrichment.
24
 
 
Absence of Basis 
 
                                                 
 
 
22
 Even within each ‗unjust factor‘ there are complexities which are not immediately obvious. This is a 
further warning against over-simplification. See N Enonchong, ‗Presumed Undue Influence: 
Continuing Misconceptions?‘ (2005) 121 LQR 29. 
23
 [2009] EWHC 722 (QB), [2009] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 94. 
24
 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2005) at 208-219. 
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The danger, from a realist perspective, of this claimant-orientated approach can be 
found in the proposals for an ‗absence of basis‘ approach to the ‗unjust‘ requirement. 
In the wake of the swaps litigation, Zimmermann and Meier,
25
 and also later on 
Birks,
26
 called for an absence of basis approach which would avoid the need to 
establish an unjust factor. An absence of basis approach would ask whether (a) the 
payment was made to satisfy a valid obligation, or (b) was it made voluntarily to 
achieve some outcome.
27
 If neither (a) nor (b) applied, (or (b) did apply and the 
purpose had failed), a claim for restitution could succeed.
28
 Birks concluded that this 
approach would be preferable to the attempts that had been made by the courts to 
explain the swaps cases ‗on the uncertain metaphysics of mistake.‘29 In response to 
this proposal, Virgo has pointed out that one must question how the absence of basis 
approach correlates to the case law.
30
 For example, as we will see further on,
31
 the 
courts have often refused restitution under the ‗failure of consideration‘ ground where 
there has been partial performance of the condition.
32
 Under Birks‘ approach, 
restitution would be readily available in this situation.
33
 The consequence of the 
                                                 
 
 
25
 R Zimmermann and S Meier, ‗Judicial Development of the Law, Error Iuris, and the Law of 
Unjustified Enrichment - A View from Germany‘ (1999) 115 LQR 556-565. 
26
 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2005) at 129-142. 
27
 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2005) at 129. 
28
 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2005) at 129. 
29
 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2005) at 113. 
30
 G Virgo, ‗Demolishing the Pyramid- The Presence of Basis and Risk-Taking in the Law of Unjust 
Enrichment‘ in A Robertson and H Tang (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Hart 2009) at 484-486. See 
also C Hunt, ‗Unjust Enrichment Understood as Absence of Basis: a Critical Evaluation with Lessons 
from Canada‘ (2009) Oxford U Comparative L Forum 6 at text after n 41 
<http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/hunt.shtml> accessed 18 January 2011. 
31
 See text at n 158 in this Chapter. 
32
 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2005) at 119-125. 
33
 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2005) at 120-121. 
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absence of basis approach is that it expands the situations where restitution is 
currently available, which runs against the concern to limit the scope of the action.
34
  
 
Another significant criticism of the absence of legal basis approach is that it does not 
assist in describing the circumstances where restitution will be awarded. Birks himself 
recognised this problem.
35
 He acknowledged that the absence of basis approach would 
leave ‗the law of unjust enrichment abstract and further out of touch with the Clapham 
Omnibus‘.36 In other words, it would leave unjust enrichment even further removed 
from a realistic description. This is because legal concepts need to assist in predicting 
the circumstances of liability. By trying to include too much within ‗unjust 
enrichment‘, the task becomes impossible. A higher level of abstraction makes it more 
difficult to predict cases, and therefore, the absence of basis approach should also be 
avoided.  
 
Money as a type of ‘Property’ 
 
Another method for dealing with money transfers would be to regard them as 
examples of ‗property‘. The ‗proprietary‘ approach for money transfers is best 
exemplified by Watts, who describes monetary payments as the ‗proprietary 
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 G Virgo, ‗Demolishing the Pyramid- The Presence of Basis and Risk-Taking in the Law of Unjust 
Enrichment‘ in A Robertson and H Tang (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Hart 2009) at 487-488.   
35
 He stated that it requires us to ‗begin the account at invalidity and abstain altogether from explaining 
the causes of invalidity.‘ P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, OUP 2005) at 125. 
36
 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2005) at 125. The point is also made by Barker, who 
argues that the absence of basis frames the cause of action at too high a level of generality. K Barker, 
‗Responsibility for Gain: Unjust Factors or Absence of Legal Ground? Starting Points in Unjust 
Enrichment Law‘ in C Rickett and R Grantham (eds), Structure and Justification in Private Law: 
Essays for Peter Birks (Hart 2008) at 63. 
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principle‘, which involves transfers of money and goods.37 Watts argues that ‗there is 
no general need to distinguish between transfers of goods and transfers of money‘.38 
Even the strongest money claims can be defeated by third parties who act in good 
faith, the same cannot be said of tangible property. Furthermore, the defences 
available are significantly different.
39
 We will consider another ‗property‘ argument 
further on when we look at specific restitution, namely the idea that the reversal of 
some transfers is based on the ‗vindication of property rights‘.40 This vindication 
analysis is not applied to all monetary transfers, hence we will leave this discussion to 
one side for the time being. 
 
A more recent approach, which also treats monetary transfers as part of the law of 
property, is provided by Fox.
41
 Fox states that ‗[t]he assets which fulfil money‘s 
economic functions can all be categorized as varieties of personal property.‘42 This 
conclusion is attributable to the wide definition of ‗property‘ adopted by Fox, who 
sees ‗property‘ as something which has the hallmarks of transferability and 
excludability, which was earlier discussed in Chapter 4.
43
 Even though he adopts this 
wide definition of ‗property‘, Fox still appears to recognise that claims involving 
money transfers often overlap with the concepts of ‗trusts, contract and personal 
property.‘44 Denning LJ, (writing extra-judicially) also took the view that claims for 
transfers of money were based on a concept of ‗property‘ whereby the money ‗in 
                                                 
 
 
37
 P Watts, ‗Restitution – A Property Principle and a Services Principle‘ [1995] Restitution L Rev 49. 
38
 Fowler v Hollins [1872] LR 7 QB 616, Miller v Race [1758] 1 Burr 452, 97 ER 398 
39
 United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank [1941] AC 1 (HL) at 7. 
40
 See text at n 102 in this Chapter. 
41
 D Fox, Property Rights in Money (OUP 2008). 
42
 D Fox, Property Rights in Money (OUP 2008) at 5. 
43
 See text above n 29 in Chapter 4 . 
44
 D Fox, Property Rights in Money (OUP 2008) at 4. 
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justice and equity belonged to the plaintiff.‘45 Furthermore, he also distinguished 
between conversion, which was available for claims involving tangible money, and 
the claim for money had and received, which was available for ‗money generally.‘46 
Denning recognised that the two claims ‗overlapped‘; in many occasions the results 
were the same in trover and for money had and received, but that this was not always 
the case. On the basis that we established in Chapter 4 that property was limited to 
tangibles, we need not extend property to explain the treatment of money which is 
often transferred as an intangible asset. The concepts are not exclusive, but the 
importance of the factual distinctions between these concepts dictates the application 
of special rules for claims involving tangible money. The overlap, where money is in 
the form of property, is fully developed further on. The first step, then, is to set out 
how the courts treat transfers of intangible money. 
 
2. Money as an Overlap with Property 
 
There are many complicated economic and theoretical issues about the nature of 
money which are beyond the scope of this chapter, although we do mention these 
briefly in this section. At the start, it is necessary to reiterate the realist methodology. 
As a legal concept, monetary transfers do not have normative force, and neither does 
it require uniform treatment in all situations. We are instead searching for general 
patterns based on facts and judicial outcomes. However, we cannot hope to provide a 
                                                 
 
 
45
 AT Denning, ‗The Recovery of Money‘ (1949) 65 LQR 37 at 38. This view was one that he had 
expressed earlier in his career. Whilst acting as Counsel for the claimants in United Australia Ltd v 
Barclays Bank [1941] AC 1 (HL), Denning KC stated; ‗[t]he action for money had and received is 
founded on a concept of property, that is, that the money belongs in justice and equity to the plaintiff‘ 
(at 7). 
46
  AT Denning, ‗The Recovery of Money‘ (1949) 65 LQR 37 at 40. 
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realist account of monetary transfers without further narrowing our focus. The basic 
concept of a monetary transfer requires three factual elements; (i) money, (ii) title and 
control of this money (before the transfer) and (iii) the transfer of that money. What 
this chapter will reveal is that money itself is a significant fact and the rules developed 
by the courts rely heavily on the presence of a monetary transfer.  
 
Money 
 
The word ‗money‘ is one with which we are all familiar, but it is also a term that is 
difficult to define.
47
 As Proctor points out in the latest edition of Mann on the Legal 
Aspect of Money; ‗‗money‘ has a variety of different meanings in different situations, 
and individual cases require separate scrutiny; no hard and fast rules exist in this 
area.‘48 Therefore, as a general term of description, ‗money‘ may appear to lack any 
factual meaning.
49
 It may be hard to provide a concrete definition of money, but it 
does appear that something can become ‗money‘ through the patronage of large 
financial institutions, such as the state or banks.
50
 Thus non-state authorised methods 
of payment can be regarded as money if they are expressed by reference to state-
authorised units of currency, and so long as the currency is intended to serve as a 
general measure of value and exchange.
51
 Accordingly, a bank account with a credit 
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 C Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (OUP 2005) at 5. 
48
 C Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (OUP 2005) at 8. 
49
 C Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (OUP 2005) at 9. 
50
 C Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (OUP 2005) at 35-37. 
51
 As noted by E McKendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law (4
th
 edn, LexisNexis 2009) at 486, the 
State theory would exclude bank payments from the definition of money, also C Proctor, Mann on the 
Legal Aspect of Money (OUP 2005) at 35-36. 
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of £1000 has the same value as a unit of currency as £1000 in cash.
52
 At the same 
time, this definition would also preclude government bonds, store credit or vouchers, 
which are not intended to be of general use, but are special arrangements between 
private individuals.
53
 Therefore, we need not account for these types of assets. As a 
factual element, money is something which can, and indeed is identifiable by 
reference to common practice.  
 
Title and Control 
 
In most cases, title is an important element in a claim for restitution. Since we adopt a 
multi-factual approach to concepts, the requirement of title and control does not 
simply make this the same as property or trusts. Nonetheless, this does provide an 
overlap with those concepts. Immediately we also restrict the analysis here to money 
transfers, and remove any consideration of the conferral of services (which are 
considered in the next chapter.) If title is to have any legal significance, then it will 
predictably provide the claimant with the means of enforcing that title in cases of 
what Birks described as ‗non-consensual transfers.‘54 That means that it should, 
presumably, be possible to regain money when it is stolen, or more commonly, when 
the payment has been induced by fraud. Another example of a non-consensual 
transfer would be mistaken payments, which we deal with further on. 
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 C Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (OUP 2005) at 37. 
53
 C Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (OUP 2005) at 37. 
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 P Birks, ‗Receipt‘ in P Birks and A Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart 2002) 213 at 218. 
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Transfers 
 
The next requirement is that this money has been transferred from the claimant to the 
defendant. Just as money is a fact, so too is the transfer of money. One of the essential 
characteristics of money is its ease of transfer; its very purpose is to facilitate the 
movement of goods and services. The ease of transferring money reflects commercial 
and social reality. An owner can easily transfer money not only by physical delivery, 
but also by authorising withdrawals from a bank account through cheques, passing on 
account details, standing orders and direct debits. In contrast, transfers of land usually 
require contracts to be made in writing while transfers of chattels also require writing 
or delivery of the thing.
55
 Thus, it is much more likely where money is being 
transferred that mistakes will be made, or that the owner may not fully comprehend 
the consequences of the transfer. Therefore, claims arising from transfers are much 
more important in relation to money than in relation to tangible things. In relation to 
money, a transfer is an identifiable fact; this is because the rules regarding transfers 
are governed as much by the practice of the banks as by the decisions of the courts. In 
short, there will be many situations where claimants will want to reverse transfers of 
money. In turn, this is reflected by the need to restrict the circumstances where such 
claims can be made, so as not to undermine security of receipt. As Hedley notes, this 
concern calls for a narrow definition of the grounds for restitution for monetary 
transfers.
56
 It has, therefore, been necessary for the courts to narrowly define the 
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 Irons v Smallpiece (1819) 2 B & Ald 55,106 ER 467. 
56
 S Hedley, ‗Restitution and Taxes Mistakenly Paid‘ [2003] 5 Web JCLI 
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circumstances where claims based on monetary transfers can be made because of 
simple mistakes.
57
  
 
Intangible Money 
 
In practice, most claims for the restitution of money will not rely on the presence or 
identification of tangible moneys. Most payments involve a transfer of an intangible 
form of money. This is because, as Fox notes, around ‗3.5% of the money held in the 
British economic is actually represented by corporeal currency in the form of coins 
and banknotes‘.58 These cases are more complex than those involving tangible money. 
This is due to the fact that, as Hedley points out, in most cases the transfer includes at 
least four parties; ‗the payer, the payee and each of their banks.‘59 This intangibililty 
element also impacts on the way in which courts treat transfers of money. Further on, 
it is argued that the courts (and statute) require higher standards of the recipients of 
tangible money than they do for those who receive intangible money. The element of 
intangibility, therefore, further weakens the strength of the claimant‘s interest. 
 
3. Mistaken Payments 
 
                                                 
 
 
57
 See the concerns of Lord Hoffmann in Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL): 
‗allowing recovery for mistake of law without qualification, even taking into account the defence of 
change of position, may be thought to tilt the balance too far against the public interest in the security 
of transactions‘ (at 401). Also, Lord Porter, in Reading v Attorney General [1951] AC 507 (HL): 
[unjust enrichment] ‗forms no part of the law of England and that a right to restitution so described 
would be too widely stated‘ (at 514).  
58
 D Fox, Property Rights in Money (OUP 2008) at 43. 
59
 S Hedley, A Critical Introduction to Restitution, (Butterworths 2001) at 91. 
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To demonstrate the argument presented above, it will be useful to look at restitution 
for mistake. The reasons for reversing mistaken payments, even those made 
carelessly, are not immediately apparent. Smith points this out when he states that 
liability without fault ‗is, for many commentators, a puzzle‘.60 This puzzle can only be 
solved by adopting a realist account. Carelessness is a legally significant fact, and 
although it may provide a reason for restitution, we should also recognise that it 
provides a reason for not giving the claimant the strongest possible protection. By 
making a transfer under mistake, the claimant relinquishes control of his money, 
leaving him with his title and little more. The absence of control affords the title 
holder the lowest form of protection. Whereas the current approach is to reject the 
relevance of fault, it is argued here that elements of fault are important in these 
claims. A claimant will only be able to claim restitution for a careless error, but not 
for a reckless one. This seems to be the real basis for the distinction between mistakes 
and mispredictions which is adopted by most unjust enrichment scholars. As part of 
this approach, the key issue is the degree of care taken by the claimant.
61
 What this 
means, therefore, is that we have a situation where the factual matrix includes 
elements of property and also the element of carelessness from our concept of 
negligence.  
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 L Smith, ‗Restitution: The Heart of Corrective Justice Symposium: Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment‘ (2001) 79 Texas L Rev 2115 at 2115. 
61
 A good example is Dextra Bank and Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica [2001] UKPC 50, [2002] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 193. The claimants were careless, and despite the conclusion that this was not relevant in 
the case, it does provide the best explanation of the decision. In particular, it was noted that whereas the 
defendant had acted in complete good faith without notice of the nature of the transaction, the trial 
judge had criticised the conduct of Dextra as ‗less than prudent‘, at [16]. Birks himself concluded that 
the facts of Dextra were very similar to the earlier House of Lords decision in RE Jones Ltd v Waring 
and Gillow Ltd [1926] AC 670 (HL), in P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2005) at 145. In RE 
Jones it was concluded that the claim could succeed as a mistaken payment. In RE Jones itself it is 
notable that Lord Sumner, who was in the majority, concluded that neither party was at fault, at 693. In 
contrast, Viscount Cave, who would have denied the claim for restitution, took the view that the 
defendant had acted ‗unwisely‘ and possibly even ‗recklessly‘, at 682. 
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To summarise, the relevance of this carelessness element really depends on one‘s 
point of view. If one is attempting to construct an entire concept around mistaken 
payments, then the mistake is the reason for recognising a claim for restitution. Yet, if 
we approach it from a different angle, and compare it to other situations such as 
money which has been stolen or paid under an agreement, then the mistake in fact 
tells us that the carelessness is a reason for not providing a stronger claim for the 
claimant. We will also demonstrate that it is not every error for which one can claim 
restitution. The law seemingly draws a distinction between careless and reckless 
errors. 
  
Carelessness 
 
In Barclays Bank v Simms,
62
 Goff J proposed a causal test for a mistaken payment, 
which has recently received support by Lord Walker in the Deutsche Morgan Grenfell 
v IRC judgment.
63
 This test asks whether the payment would have been made ‗but-
for‘ the mistake.64 Tettenborn has criticised the causal test for being too wide, giving 
an example of a father who would not have provided for his daughter if he had known 
she was marrying a man that he detested.
65
 Even Birks described the ‗causal test‘ as a 
‗disarmingly simple proposition‘, which required further ‗qualifications and 
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 Barclays Bank v Simms & Cooke [1980] QB 677 (QB). 
63
 [2006] UKHL 49, [2007] 1 AC 558 at 591 and 609 respectively. 
64
 Barclays Bank v Simms & Cooke [1980] QB 677 (QB). 
65
 A Tettenborn, Law of Restitution in England and Ireland (2
nd
 edn, Cavendish 1996) at 61. 
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exceptions‘.66 In short, the causal test of mistake is a simplistic tool that does not fully 
explain when restitution will be available for mistake. Hedley also argues that it is 
difficult to accept that the causal mistake is ‗reasonable, at least without the 
introduction of defences going far beyond those currently envisaged.‘67 A more 
descriptive account of mistaken payments is required. 
 
Given the very wide definition of mistakes, one of the controlling devices for 
preventing restitution for all types of mistakes is said to be the distinction between 
mistakes and mispredictions. Both Birks and Sheehan adopt a definition of mistake 
that is restricted to errors of fact, i.e. where the transfer is due to a mistake about a 
current state of affairs, rather than predictions about what will happen in the future.
68
 
The explanation for this distinction is that the mistaken payor has not taken the risk 
that the payment was made under an error, whereas the mispredictor has taken the risk 
that the prediction may not come to pass.
69
 This ‗risk‘ analysis is a neat way of saying 
that the degree of care taken by the claimant will be relevant in determining whether 
or not restitution will be awarded. The very basis of the distinction between mistakes 
of fact and mispredictions explicitly accepts that the latter constitutes a higher degree 
of carelessness.
70
 It is suggested here that there is no need for such an artificial 
restriction as this. Instead, the more sensible analysis is that the error is a careless one, 
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 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2005) at 139.  
67
 S Hedley, A Critical Introduction to Restitution (Butterworths 2001) at 107. 
68
 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (rev edn, Clarendon Press 1989) at 147-148; D 
Sheehan, ‗What is a Mistake‘ (2000) 20 Legal Studies 538 at 551-552. ‗It is here necessary to observe - 
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but not a reckless error. This explains why there are cases which succeed despite 
being mispredictions, and also why others fail despite being examples of mistakes.
71
 
The key is carelessness, not recklessness. 
 
The guidelines of the mistake and misprediction distinction are indeed useful, as 
generally a misprediction which is not part of an agreement will not allow restitution 
in commercial transactions. We should not ignore the fact that the courts are not 
applying a rigid test of mistake or misprediction. This supports the proposition that 
the real issue is the reasonableness of the error. A clear dividing line between 
mistakes and mispredictions will only serve to confuse this issue. 
 
The Nature of the Claim 
 
What distinguishes most claims for mistaken payments from some of the other ‗unjust 
factors‘, is that the award provided by the court will nearly always be a simple claim 
for repayment of an equivalent sum.
72
 This is what has been described by Birks as the 
first measure.
73
 The first measure is more commonly referred to as a ‗personal‘ claim, 
one that lies against the recipient for the value of the money. It is similar to a debt, as 
the recipient is under no obligation to return the specific money he received. Although 
this claim is stated to be one of strict liability,
74
 the defendant will not be liable if 
generally speaking he or she has been made worse off by the innocent receipt of the 
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 Kerrison v Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co (1911) 81 LJKB 465 (QB). 
72
 For example in Lord Abinger CB in Calland v Loyd: ‗[t]here is no doubt that if I pay money to A., 
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money.
75
 The reason for identifying this as the ‗first measure‘ was that Birks also 
sought to establish the availability of a second measure which would provide the 
claimant with an interest which would bind third party volunteers. In cases of 
insolvency this would be of extreme importance. As Watts explains, the most 
sophisticated analysis is present in Birks‘ final writings, when he stated that the 
second measure was available for initial failures of basis (i.e. mistakes) but not 
subsequent failures (i.e. failure of consideration.)
76
 This was more generally explained 
by Burrows under the basis that where there is an initial failure, the claimant has not 
taken the risk of the defendant‘s insolvency. Lord Millett, writing extra-judicially, has 
pointed out that this position has ‗no firm support in authority and none in 
principle‘.77 Therefore, as of yet, English law does not recognise this second measure 
merely because there has been a careless payment. We argue that the courts are 
moving towards a limited means of protecting such interests, but only where there is 
an additional factual overlap with elements of tort and criminal law, which we discuss 
after defences. In summary, there is only one type of response to a mistaken payment, 
which is a claim for the repayment of an equivalent sum of money which does not 
grant any rights in insolvency and is restricted to the recipient of the funds. 
 
Defences 
 
                                                 
 
 
75
 Jones v Commerzbank AG [2003] EWCA Civ 1663; (2003) 147 SJLB 1397. 
76
 P Watts, ‗Birks and Proprietary Claims, with Special Reference to Misrepresentation and to Ultra 
Vires Contracts‘ in C Rickett and R Grantham (eds), Structure and Justification in Private Law (Hart 
2008) at 363-365. 
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 P Millett, ‗Proprietary Restitution‘ in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law 
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It is now well established that a number of defences apply to claims for the receipt of 
money transferred under mistake, the most unique one being ‗change of position‘. We 
restrict our discussion of this defence to mistake as it is questionable whether it 
applies in other situations. For example, Bant has recently stated that the defence 
seems to be of little application in cases of undue influence or duress and has noted 
the fact that it has not been applied in cases of payments made under a condition 
which subsequently fails.
78
 Even more enlightening is the dictum of Lord Walker in 
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v IRC, where he stated that ‗the defence of change of 
position could seldom, if ever, apply to wrongfully exacted tax.‘79 This has been 
affirmed in subsequent decisions.
80
 The only authority which suggests that change of 
position is relevant outside of the context of mistaken payments is Lipkin Gorman v 
Karpnale.
81
 Even so, it must be noted that this defence would probably not have been 
available if the claimants had pursued their claim for ‗specific restitution‘ which, on 
the current state of the law, would have been available to them. It seems that the 
defence is primarily restricted to mistaken payments. 
 
Whereas other systems have a defence which looks at the relative fault of the parties, 
the English approach attempts to remove the relevance of fault altogether.
82
 This has 
not proved easy to do. Under the approach which the courts have adopted, it is said 
that a defendant can avoid liability, if they can show that they have made an ‗extra-
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80
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ordinary‘ expenditure in the honest belief that they are entitled to the money.83 It has 
also been said that the defence will not be available where the claimant is a 
‗wrongdoer.‘ Nonetheless, the courts have struggled to define and to apply this 
defence.
84
 The most obvious reason is pointed out by Hedley, who explained that the 
defence seems inadequate to deal with complex financial planning.
85
 A similar point 
was recently made by Lord Brown in the Supreme Court, who has stated that ‗[a]s is 
well known, common law restitution claims are, at the best of times, far from 
straightforward. Not the least of their difficulties…is the defence of change of 
position.‘86 Bant has sought to explain it more generally as a mechanism which 
prevents restitution where the transfer is ‗irreversible.‘87 This is an important 
approach as it recognises changes in social circumstances which may be a result of the 
payment. This is supported by a number of authorities, which show that the English 
courts are moving closer to the approach in the Restatement of the Law of Restitution, 
which looks at relative fault.
88
 Although we talk of ‗good faith‘, it is argued here that 
the relevant degree of fault is that the defendant has suffered a detriment and does not 
have knowledge about the mistake or is recklessness as to the origins of the money. 
Therefore, where the defendant has paid the money away, it is necessary for the 
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 Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548 (HL); ‗the mere fact that the defendant has 
spent the money, in whole or in part, does not of itself render it inequitable that he should be called 
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84
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claimant to demonstrate that the recipient has knowledge that the payment was made 
under a mistake
89
 or was acting recklessly.
90
 A careless payment by the defendant will 
not prevent the defence of change of position.
91
 The requirement works well, as we 
have already seen that a claim will fail if the payment was made recklessly, and so 
defendants will only be deprived of the change of position if they are more at fault 
than the claimant.
92
  
 
Summary on Mistaken Payments 
 
According to Huber, if carelessness was a bar to restitution, then corporations would 
likely spend much more resources on administrative departments.
93
 Beatson and 
Bishop have also justified the restitution of mistaken payments on this basis.
94
 The 
simple fact is that any society must accommodate the inevitability of mistakes, 
especially when we take into account the inevitable agency costs of a complex 
economy. But it is when those mistakes are easily avoidable that we stop talking 
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341. In this case, Chambers QC stated that the bank‘s assistance in transferring money from the 
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about ‗mistakes‘ and we become less sympathetic. This has an inevitable influence on 
the way in which the courts identify whether or not the transfer was made under a 
mistake.
95
 Therefore, fault underlies this claim; it is available for mistakes which are 
careless, not reckless, and the defendant can only escape liability if he has been 
careless, not reckless in his dealings with the money. The standards of care which we 
see in negligence are hidden beneath the language of unjust enrichment. What we see 
is a complex overlap between property and negligence. An even clearer overlap 
occurs with tort more generally: the positive act of the defendant in turn leads to a 
stronger form of protection. This is the focus of our next section. 
 
4. The Overlap of Tort, Criminal Offences and Monetary Transfers 
 
 
As indicated above, Birks argued that a second measure was available in claims for 
mistaken payments. We have already stated that, generally, no such claim is available 
for mistaken payments. In cases where this second measure is available (which we 
will refer to as ‗specific restitution‘) the overlap lies with facts which are relevant in 
criminal law; namely knowledge or recklessness about the origins of the money and 
an attempt to deprive the claimant of this money.
96
 Before we explore this, we must 
first distinguish this type of claim from two alternative approaches; the first treats 
specific restitution as a ‗trust‘ and the second would only permit specific restitution 
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 For example, Lord Scott in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v IRC, suggested that restitution would not be 
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after the claimant rescinds the transfer. Both need to be rejected to fully understand 
the developing patterns. 
 
Overcoming the Tracing Issue 
 
The first problem that our analysis faces is that to claim for specific restitution, the 
claimant must identify that the defendant received the money in the first place. To do 
so, the money must be traced.
97
 Traditionally, it has been said that there are two sets 
of tracing rules: common law tracing and equitable tracing. First, it is said that, at 
‗common law‘, it is only possible to trace into substitute assets, and once there has 
been a mixture that the tracing process comes to an end.
98
 This is one of the main 
reasons for the paucity of common law tracing claims. ‗Equitable tracing‘, on the 
other hand, has no such problem tracing intangible money into mixtures. However, it 
has been stated that (a) there must be a breach of trust or (b) that there must be an 
initial fiduciary relationship, such as in a trust or agency situation.
99
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Although these rules have been laid down by the courts, it is contended that the 
distinction between the two sets of tracing rules is merely a paper rule which is not 
reflected in reality. If this was an accurate account of the law, it would not be possible 
to trace money in the absence of an initial trust or fiduciary relationship. Even so, 
there are clear indications that intangible money can be traced even where there has 
not been any breach of trust or fiduciary duty. A recent example is Barclays Bank Plc 
v Kalamohan,
100
 where Proudman J concluded that money could be traced into assets 
which had been purchased by a customer, who had induced fraudulent transfers from 
a bank. According to the judge, the defendant ‗was acting in breach of fiduciary duty 
and the moneys were received by or on behalf of the defendants in circumstances 
where it would be unconscionable for them to retain them.‘101 This conclusion was 
reached despite the fact that the defendant was not a fiduciary, but merely a customer 
of the claimant bank. The courts are merely paying lip service to the requirement of a 
fiduciary relationship, which is misleading and will lead to confusion about the phrase 
‗fiduciary.‘ A realist account must search for something more accurate to describe 
when specific restitution is available. 
 
Rejecting the ‘Trust’ Explanation 
 
One of the added benefits of the phrase ‗specific restitution‘ is that it indicates that the 
claim is not based on property or trusts. McFarlane, for example, takes the view that 
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specific restitution imposes a ‗trust‘ on behalf of the claimant.102 This view is also 
present in cases such as Henry v Hammond, where Channell J considered that 
situations with mixtures of money would be regarded as either a trust or mere debtor 
relationship.
103
 This analysis needs to be avoided: the trust already is a large concept, 
and loses its descriptive value when it is used in too many situations. The point was 
made by Lord Nicholls who argued that the application of the ‗trust‘ concept to third 
party recipients ‗distorts the ordinary principles of trusteeship‘.104 For this reason, the 
word trust is not used in this chapter to describe general claims for the return of 
money, even for those cases where the courts use the phrases ‗resulting‘ or 
‗constructive‘ trusts.  Instead the phrase ‗specific restitution‘ is adopted.105  
 
Rejecting the Vindication of Property Rights Approach 
 
It is first necessary to consider the arguments made by those who propose that 
‗specific restitution‘ is only available in claims based on the ‗vindication of property 
rights‘. This is exemplified by the writings of Virgo, Swadling, Grantham and Rickett, 
which distinguish cases where the claimant enjoys a continuing interest in money 
(where this represents a ‗proprietary interest‘) from ‗personal‘ claims for unjust 
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enrichment.
106
 Firstly, it will be apparent that, just as we reject the use of the term 
‗trust‘, we also do not adopt the language of ‗property‘ to distinguish cases where 
specific restitution is available. While we agree with the premise that a mistaken 
payment is very different from cases of misapplied trust funds or even ‗resulting trust‘ 
cases, it does not mean that specific restitution is never available for a mistaken 
payment. Rotherham has correctly criticised this debate for being based on absolute 
categories, and a failure to realise that different legal concepts may also be 
interlinked.
107
 The vindication of property rights approach makes the same error as 
the ‗unjust factors‘ approach, by attempting to provide a claimant-orientated 
explanation as the sole criteria for determining the appropriate response. In some 
cases, it clearly is relevant that the claimant placed some restrictions on the transfer of 
money and, in those cases, specific restitution can be attributed to the acts of the 
claimant. We look at this in Chapter 7, under our discussion of resulting trusts where 
we argue that this element of ‗control‘ provides another overlapping factor with 
property. However, it is also argued here that specific restitution can be established 
through the actions of the recipient. This has not proven popular with those endorsing 
the vindication of property rights approach, but as we shall see it is certainly 
supported in the case law.
108
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Rejecting the ‘Rescission’ Analysis 
 
To show how confused the law is in this developing area, we find yet another 
competing analysis. The other analysis which must be rejected is the rescission 
analysis that has been adopted by Rimer J in Shalson v Russo
109
 and Etherton J in 
London Allied Holdings Limited v Lee.
110
 Hacker describes this as the power-model of 
‗proprietary restitution‘, where the order for specific restitution originates from the 
claimant‘s decision to rescind the transfer.111 This approach would rule out specific 
restitution where the recipient passes on money or becomes insolvent before the 
claimant exercises the right to rescind. Again, it seeks to justify an order for specific 
restitution by reference to the actions of the claimant. Despite the judicial support for 
this analysis, it does not correspond to the way in which the courts have actually been 
applying specific restitution in both mistaken transfers and also fraudulently obtained 
money.  In the latter type of cases, specific restitution is available at the moment of 
receipt.
112
 This is demonstrated by the very simple fact that specific restitution is 
available against the fraudster even before the claimant has rescinded the transfer. For 
example, in Bank of Ireland v Pexxnet,
113
 four defendants were involved in a 
fraudulent transfer to a Swiss bank account. Before the claimants even discovered that 
they had been deceived, the money had already been passed on to third parties. 
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Specific restitution was available even against the third party recipients of the money. 
Even in London Allied Holdings v Lee, where Etherton J claimed to be applying the 
rules on rescission, the claim for specific restitution was successfully made after the 
money had been transferred to the wives of the defendants.
114
 An even clearer 
example is Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft v IMB Morgan Plc,
115
 where many of the 
claimants had apparently been unaware that they had been the victims of fraud. 
Despite the fact that the recipient bank was insolvent, the claims for specific 
restitution were successful. The rescission analysis adds little except for confusion 
and would in fact have led to a different outcome in each of these decisions.  
 
According to Hacker, the relevance of the rescission model is that if the money had 
been transferred to someone who purchased the money in good faith before the 
claimant sought restitution, the money could not be traced into the third party‘s 
hands.
116
 This presumes that rescission resurrects the original legal title of the 
claimant and that this title will not be defeated by a good faith purchaser. It treats 
money in the same way as property, when they are clearly treated differently by the 
courts. The issue about whether the transfer is void or voidable is unnecessary given 
the fact that any claim for a transfer of intangible money, whether void or voidable, 
will be defeated by a good faith purchaser. As we will see in the following 
paragraphs, it is the defendant‘s knowledge and intent to deprive the claimant which 
explains specific restitution. In many cases, this correlates with the realisation by the 
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claimant that the money has been paid by mistake or under a fraudulent transfer. 
However, the key question is when the defendant becomes aware of this. 
 
Recognising the Overlap with Tort and Criminal law 
 
The argument presented here is that this ‗something else‘ is an overlap between the 
part of our tort element and standards imposed by statute. The tort element lies in the 
requirement that the defendant has committed a positive act which establishes the 
claim for specific restitution. The nature of that act is one of appropriation. The 
strongest authority for this comes from two comments made by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Westdeutsche v London Islington LBC, both of which have proven 
controversial.
117
 The first comment was his suggestion that ‗when property is obtained 
by fraud equity imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient.‘118 This has 
been criticised for circumscribing the equitable tracing rules, but we have already 
dealt with this argument. The second was that, if the recipient of a mistaken payment 
realises that the money was paid under a mistake, they are bound by conscience to 
hold that money for the claimant.
119
 This has undoubtedly been a controversial 
statement, as Chambers and Virgo have both argued that this should not be 
followed.
120
 One complication, identified by Millett LJ, is that this reasoning would 
suggest that in Westdeutsche itself specific restitution should have been possible once 
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the recipient discovered that the money was paid under a void contract.
121
 Millett‘s 
criticism in particular suggests that knowledge itself is insufficient, but this does not 
mean that it is not relevant. Our position is that the case law has developed along the 
lines set out by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, with an additional requirement that the 
defendant attempts to deprive the claimant of the money. No such conduct was 
present in Westdeutsche, as both parties recognised that the money was to be repaid 
and the only contentious issue was the quantum of interest. The reason why this 
analysis is important is that it would allow specific restitution in the situation where 
the recipient of a mistaken or fraudulently obtained payment empties his bank account 
and transfers the money to a third party.  
 
Recognising the Overlaps 
 
Specific restitution will not be available until the money is received by someone who 
attempts to deprive the claimant of this money. This is a positive act, thus creating an 
overlap with our core concept of tort. This is not the only overlap we see. The claim 
also brings in elements of criminal law. The relevant statute is the Theft Act 1968, 
which indicates that two factual elements are required. In particular, sections 15 and 
15A of the Theft Act 1968 define fraud as a dishonest appropriation with the 
‗intention of permanently depriving the other of it.‘ Furthermore, section 3 extends 
‗appropriation‘ to ‗innocent recipients who keep or deal with the stolen property as 
owner.‘ As this is an overlap, we are in no way saying that specific restitution requires 
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a criminal offence to be recognised by the court.
122
 Instead we are stating that two 
factual elements which are identified as relevant in the criminal context also have 
relevance in establishing specific restitution. The first is that the recipient has 
knowledge or shown a reckless disregard of the circumstances in which the money 
was transferred. For our purposes, this will more generally be referred to as the 
requirement of knowledge.
123
 The second, of equal importance, is that the claimant 
tries to permanently deprive the claimant of the money. By this, it is meant that the 
recipient deliberately transfers the money to another recipient or enters voluntary 
liquidation. This approach is applied both to fraudsters and innocent recipients. 
 
It will also be useful to explain that we are not attempting to construct specific 
restitution on the basis of unconscionability. Birks rejected any role for ‗conscience‘ 
in justifying specific restitution on the basis that it would be ‗too vague‘ and also was 
‗not sufficiently supported by history‘.124 The term conscience certainly is vague, and 
the reason for our avoidance of the term is that it does not identify any factual 
elements. Conscience may be the general principle, but a realist account is concerned 
with first identifying the factual elements of the concept if there is any pattern to be 
found. The argument is that there is indeed a pattern at play here, and the relevant 
facts are knowledge and an attempt to deprive the claimant of the money. Where both 
elements are present, we can predict that specific restitution will be available. That 
this may be described as ‗unconscionable behaviour‘ is neither here nor there.  
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Knowledge and Depriving the Claimant 
 
The requirements of knowledge and an act of deprivation are readily satisfied in cases 
of fraudulently obtained money transfers.
125
 On the basis of the cases which we 
discussed in the preceding section on rescission, this seems to be a straightforward 
proposition. What is more problematic is the argument that these facts can also 
provide the basis for specific restitution of mistaken payments. The first case that 
needs to be addressed is Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israeli-British Bank (London) 
Ltd.
126
  In Chase Manhattan, the claimant had mistakenly paid money to the recipient, 
who was declared bankrupt before the claimant realised the error. The case is of 
limited authority primarily because Goulding J was applying the law of New York, 
and wrongly concluded that the position under English law would be the same. 
However, the decision has been re-analysed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who argued 
that the decision was nonetheless a correct one.
127
 On the approach adopted here, the 
facts of Chase Manhattan would allow a claim for specific restitution. Both of our 
requirements were present in this case. Firstly, the recipient knew that it had received 
a mistaken payment, and, secondly, it took no steps for an entire month before 
voluntarily petitioning for a winding up order. Although this latter fact was not 
explicitly mentioned by his Lord Browne-Wilkinson, the defendant‘s voluntary act of 
liquidation seems to be the factor which made its actions ‗unconscionable‘ in this 
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case. As noted above, we do not need to apply broad generalisations such 
unconscionability once we have identified these legally significant facts. In Chase 
Manhattan, the defendant had knowledge of the mistake and committed an act which 
would have deprived the claimant of the money.  
 
This analysis is supported by Fitzalan-Howard v Hibbert
128
 which is similar to Chase 
Manhattan except for the fact that specific restitution was not available to the 
claimant. In Fitzalan-Howard, a substantial sum was mistakenly paid to the recipient, 
who was notified of the mistake. The defendant had an opportunity to repay the 
money, but there was no obvious need for urgency. A few days later the defendant‘s 
creditors withdrew their support and administrators were appointed. Although 
knowledge was present, the defendant had not intentionally deprived the claimant of 
this money. The appointment of the liquidators was the act of the bank, not the 
defendant itself. The claimant stood as a mere creditor, and specific restitution was 
not available in these circumstances. This analysis is also reflected in other cases that 
are described as being based on ‗mistake‘, such as Getronics v Logistic & Transport 
Consulting.
129
 In Getronics, it was unclear if the defendant had deliberately induced 
the payments. However, it was also apparent that, under the arrangement with the 
defendants, the claimants would make payments when the defendants forwarded 
invoices. The defendants had sent duplicate invoices and overcharged the claimants. 
Specific restitution was recognised for two reasons. Firstly, the defendants must have 
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known at some point that the payments were made under a mistake.
130
 Secondly, and 
importantly, the money was then paid to two other companies which were owned by 
the initial recipients. This act quite clearly was an act done to deprive the claimant of 
the money. Specific restitution is only available for mistaken payments when there is 
an overlap with tort, and more specifically when the recipient defendant has 
knowledge that the money was paid under a mistake and attempts to deprive the 
claimant of this money. 
 
Defences 
 
Bona Fide Purchaser 
 
Where specific restitution is available, and the money is in the hands of an innocent 
recipient, it will be necessary to address the merits of the claimant and defendant‘s 
claims to the money. Given the role of money as a means of facilitating transfers, 
where the money is transferred under a contract, the tracing process will come to an 
end, even if specific restitution was available. This was noted earlier in our rejection 
of Hacker‘s argument for adopting a rescission analysis. Additionally, we also have 
an overlap with the concept of contract, which provides a further justification for 
protecting the receipt by the third party. However, it is important to define the 
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standards in these cases. A recipient can only stand as a good faith purchaser if they 
do not have knowledge or are not reckless as to the origins of the money.
131
 The 
phrase ‗bona fide purchaser for value‘ conceals this issue. This is also relevant in 
transfers of tangible money, where a similar defence of bona fide purchaser applies, 
but the defendants are required to act without carelessness. This is discussed, briefly, 
in the next section. 
 
An example of this defence is the aforementioned decision in Shalson v Russo, where 
it was accepted that specific restitution was available due to the fraudulent nature of 
the transaction. In Shalson v Russo, the money was paid into an overdrawn account, 
which creates competing claims between the bank and the claimant. By crediting the 
bank account, the bank stands as a good faith purchaser. The same approach was 
applied in Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd where a 
fraudster had paid over money to his ex-wife as a lump sum as part of their divorce 
settlement, which also constituted the satisfaction of a debt.
132
 This clearly 
demonstrates that specific restitution does not provide the claimant with an 
undefeatable title. The courts balance the interests of third parties, even in cases 
involving fraud or deliberate attempts to deprive the money from the claimant. 
Although it may look like a trust, the claim for specific restitution stands as an overlap 
between the factual elements of a money transfer on the grounds of mistake, an 
element from tort and the statutory definitions of theft and fraud. At present, the 
unjust enrichment analysis is incapable of accommodating this basis of liability. 
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Conclusion on the Overlap with Criminal Law 
 
The analysis presented here is consistent with the developing case law in this area and 
demonstrates a predictable pattern which is emerging. It might sound quite elementary 
and straightforward, but the start of this section shows how (a) very few academics 
predicted this development and (b) even now the academics as well as the judges are 
failing to describe the operation of this claim properly. The tools which are being used 
to describe this area of law are deficient; broad concepts of unjust enrichment, 
vindicating property rights or a power-based rescission model, all of which are over-
generalised and lack predictability. For some reason, very few consider the role of the 
defendant in monetary transfers, one would suspect because we see the mistaken 
payment as the paradigm of a wider concept which simply does not exist. 
 
5. The Overlap of Money and Property 
 
Money in its Tangible Form 
 
Although the last section primarily focused on specific restitution for mistaken 
payments, it also established that specific restitution is available for stolen intangible 
money. As it was explained in that section, specific restitution is subject to the 
defence of good faith purchaser, which is not available where the defendant has 
knowledge or has acted recklessly as to the origins of the money. The brief point that 
we wish to make at this point is that, even in cases of money transfers, the element of 
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tangibility still has relevance. It creates another type of overlap, bringing the situation 
closer to our core concept of property; however, the presence of money, as stated at 
the beginning of the chapter, makes this a ‗weaker‘ form of property. Therefore, one 
would predict that the courts would provide a stronger protection of tangible money 
than they do for intangible money. 
 
This, it is argued, is in fact reflected in the case law. The significance of tangible 
money lies in the standards expected of recipients. As stated in the previous section, 
one must be extremely careful here, as the relevant standards are concealed by the 
generality of the phrase ‗bona fide purchaser for value without notice.‘ When a 
recipient receives stolen money, we stated that specific restitution is available, subject 
to a defence of good faith purchase where the defendant does not have knowledge or 
was not reckless as to the origins of the money. However, when we consider stolen 
tangible money, the defendant additionally is required to act with due care. In other 
words, we find a halfway approach between tangible things (which are generally 
protected through ‗strict liability‘ claims) and intangible money (where the standard is 
receipt without knowledge or recklessness as to the origin of the money). The reason 
for the special treatment of money was expressed by Diplock LJ; ‗[a] banker's 
business, of its very nature, exposes him daily to this peril….So strict a liability, so 
absolute a duty upon bankers, would have discouraged the development of banking 
business.‘133  There are many, often overlooked, examples in the case reports where a 
recipient was found liable for acting without ‗due diligence‘. These include Easley v 
                                                 
 
 
133
 Marfani & Co Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 956 (CA) at 971. 
  
197 
 
 
Crockford,
134
 Snow v Peacock,
135
  Clarke v Shee
136
 and Solomons v Bank of 
England.
137
 . It would be too simplistic to assume that the phrase bona fide purchaser 
means the same standard in all cases. In the context of tangible money, to avoid 
liability, a recipient also must act without carelessness. 
 
The standards expected of recipients of tangible money are further reflected in 
statutory provisions. These are special defences which apply to tangible and not 
intangible money. Section 82 of the Bills of Exchange Act, for example, provides a 
defence to banks where they receive stolen or altered cheques, so long any alteration 
is not apparent.
138
 Additionally, section 4 of the Cheques Act 1957 protects banks 
where they receive cheques or money in good faith and, importantly, without 
negligence. An example of this standard being applied by the courts is United 
Australia v Barclays Bank, where the House of Lords found the defendant to be liable 
for conversion as its employees had acted carelessly in accepting a fraudulently 
obtained cheque.
139
 According to Lord Atkin, ‗every bank clerk sees the red light 
when a company's cheque is endorsed by a company's official into an account which 
is not the company's. The manager, however, made no inquiries.‘140 In short, there are 
higher standards expected of the recipients of tangible money than intangible money 
payments. It is not only a predictable pattern using the overlapping approach, but it 
also reflects commercial reality. There are simply more opportunities for a recipient to 
realise that tangible money has been stolen, and this is reflected in the required 
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standard of care. Issues, such as this, can only be hidden away by general categories 
such as property or unjust enrichment. The cases, however, deserve independent 
analysis. In particular, they inform us about the overlap and interaction of property, 
negligence and money concepts. 
 
6. An Overlap of Money and Contract; Conditional Payments 
 
As with the overlap of money and property, the overlap of money and contract will 
also justify a special set of rules. The nature of this overlap lies in the fact that money 
has been transferred under an agreement between the claimant and the defendant. The 
overlapping approach avoids any need to place this within a contractual framework, 
but allows us to identify the legal significance of the agreement. The agreement 
element explains why monetary claims in these cases are treated differently from 
mistaken money or stolen funds. As Waddams notes, this ground of restitution for 
money payments can operate both outside of a contractual arrangement, but also 
within a contractual arrangement.
141
 On the analysis presented here, an exchange 
between the parties is not a necessary requirement. The defendant is liable to repay 
the money, even for gratuitous agreements. An example would be where an employer 
makes an interest free loan to one of its employees.
142
 It also needs to be noted that 
the grounds for this claim are usually sufficient to establish a reliance-based claim. 
The payor‘s reliance on an agreed state of affairs provides an added reason for the 
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award of restitution. As always under our overlapping approach, this causes little 
difficulty as there is no need for any discrete categorisation. This simply indicates that 
there are numerous reasons for justifying restitution in these circumstances, which are 
distinguishable from the situations explored earlier on in this chapter.  
 
There are four significant consequences of this overlap which separate ‗failure of 
consideration‘ from mistaken payments or stolen money. Firstly, restitution is always 
available for mispredictions where the parties have made an agreement on the basis of 
a future event.
143
 It is only where there is an uncommunicated condition that this basis 
for restitution will be unavailable. Secondly, the agreement will determine whether or 
not restitution will be available for partial performance. Thirdly, whether specific 
restitution is available will depend on the agreement itself and finally, the recipient is 
not subject to the change of position defence. 
 
Failure of the Agreed Condition 
 
The type of situation being considered here has long been recognised as a ground for 
restitution in English law under the basis of ‗failure of consideration‘.144 Considering 
that most unjust enrichment lawyers are critical of misleading language, it is 
surprising that this term is still in use, as ‗consideration‘ here has a distinct meaning 
from the term used in the law of contract.
145
 According to Virgo, consideration here 
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refers to the ‗reason‘ or ‗basis‘ for the payment.146 Therefore, it needs to be 
distinguished from contractual consideration, which, at least under the concept set out 
in Chapter 4, is concerned with an exchange between the parties. This means that 
restitution will also be possible where the contract is void ab initio and also when the 
contract is no longer in existence. For example, in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v 
Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd
147
 the claimant had made a payment to the 
defendant for the production of machinery. Before the contract could be completed, 
the contract was frustrated by the outbreak of war. The claimant, having never 
received the machinery, made a claim in restitution for the payment that had already 
been made, which was successful in the House of Lords. Their Lordships decided that 
the basis of the payment was merely one for the delivery of the machinery which had 
not been fulfilled.
148
 For our purposes, failure of condition will be used instead of 
‗failure of consideration‘ to describe these situations. 
 
Restitution for Mispredictions 
 
Despite Birks‘ argument that restitution was never available for mispredictions, this 
was contradicted by his recognition that restitution would be available for a 
                                                 
 
 
146
 G Virgo, ‗Failure of Consideration: Myth and Meaning in the English Law of Restitution‘ in D 
Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective 
(CUP 2002) 103. 
147
 [1943] AC 32 (HL). 
148
 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 (HL) at 56, 64 and 
83. Interestingly, it is doubtful that the same conclusion would be reached by a modern court, as an 
initial payment in such circumstances would usually be regarded as a down payment for the other party 
to start work on the machinery; Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Papadopolous [1980] 1 WLR 1129 
(HL) affirmed by the House of Lords in Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co and Other [1998] 
1 WLR 574. Subsequent decisions have indicated that in this situation there will be no failure of 
consideration at all, as the basis has succeeded and the claimant has taken the risk that the contract will 
not be completed. 
  
201 
 
 
misprediction when it was framed as a ‗failure of consideration‘.149 For example, the 
facts of a case like Fibrosa can easily be reanalysed as a misprediction that the 
contract will be completed, as the completion of the contract in that case was a future 
event. Birks tried to show that the appropriate formulation (misprediction or failure of 
condition) was dependent upon the strength of the condition.
150
 Accordingly, if it is a 
mere hope that an event will happen it would be a misprediction, but if the claimant 
has ‗taken pains to qualify the transfer‘ it would, instead, constitute ‗a failure of 
condition‘.151 This has the benefit of simplicity, and there is elegance to this approach. 
The real distinction seems to lie in asking whether the payment was careless or if it 
was made under an agreement. A claimant-orientated approach simply will not work 
with regards to money paid under conditions. It may appear to be a very slight 
difference of approach, but it could be very important. This is because the case law 
informs us that the condition must be one that is objectively ascertainable from the 
dealings between the parties.
152
 We can also see this by looking at Dextra Bank v 
Jamaica,
153
 as the claimant made a very clear point to the third party that the money 
was being transferred for a particular purpose, but the claimant was negligent in 
transferring its money in the first place.
154
 Therefore, the claimant could not use the 
failure of a condition ground, as this information had never been communicated to the 
recipient. For that reason, merely placing a condition upon a payment is not sufficient 
to lead to a claim for restitution, even if the claimant does ‗take pains‘ to make the 
purpose clear. Since the fact is one of agreement, it must be identified objectively. 
                                                 
 
 
149
 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (rev edn, Clarendon Press 1989) at 219. 
150
 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (rev edn, Clarendon Press 1989) at 219. 
151
 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (rev edn, Clarendon Press 1989) at 219. 
152
 Watson v Russell (1862) 3 B&S 34, 122 ER 14. 
153
 Dextra Bank and Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica [2001] UKPC 50, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193. 
154
 [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193 (PC). 
  
202 
 
 
 
Therefore, unlike cases of mistakes or fraudulently obtained money, the claim under a 
conditional payment cannot be established by simply looking at the actions of the 
claimant or the defendant. It requires a bilateral relationship which is established 
through an initial agreement. Not all commentators would agree with this statement; 
Matthews, for example, has argued that many cases of mistaken payments are really 
payments made for a purpose, and should be regarded as examples of ‗failure of 
consideration‘.155 Under Matthews‘ analysis, ‗failure of consideration‘ could be 
applied to cases where the purpose is not communicated. The more sensible view is 
that, as Birks himself noted, the condition must always be communicated to the 
recipient beforehand.
156
 If this was not the case, a claimant could make a payment and 
then, when he changes his mind, state that there was an undisclosed condition for the 
transfer. A good example of this is Thomas v Brown where the claimant paid a deposit 
for the purchase of a house and signed a statement which read ‗without prejudice to 
any question which may arise as to the contract of purchase herein‘.157 The payor 
refused to complete the transaction on the basis that the name of the vendor had not 
been disclosed. Nevertheless, this was not sufficient to establish a claim for failure of 
consideration. Admittedly it could be argued that the claimant was bound when she 
signed the contract and, thereafter, she forfeited the freedom to introduce a condition 
of the payment. However, the court did not decide on the validity of the contract 
itself, and the following statement from Patteson J in Duke of Cadaval v Collins was 
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cited with approval;
158
 ‗where there is bona fides and money is paid with full 
knowledge of the facts, though there be no debt, still it cannot be recovered back.‘159 
This may be simply an evidential requirement of proving the state of mind of the 
claimant. The more sensible analysis is that ‗failure of consideration‘ cannot be used 
where the claimant has failed to express the terms of the payment. The distinction 
would be relevant in some circumstances, for example if there is evidence that the 
claimant clearly placed a condition on the payment, but the recipient was not aware of 
this.  
 
The relevance of agreement is also reflected in the fact that the case law indicates that 
neither the payor‘s subjective intention nor the recipient‘s actual knowledge of the 
condition is essential in establishing a conditional payment. This provides a strong 
reason for recognising the overlap with contract and, in turn, recognising that the rules 
which we use to establish agreement in contract are also relevant in these cases as 
well. For example, in Guardian Ocean Cargoes v Banco do Brasil,
160
 Saville LJ 
stated that; ‗the understanding or agreement of the parties must be ascertained 
objectively, and that the parties‘ uncommunicated subjective thoughts cannot be 
called in aid.‘161 As it was established in Chapter 4, this is the same approach that the 
courts use when establishing the intentions of contracting parties.
162
 Since it is 
necessary for there to be an understanding between the parties, this would preclude 
restitution where the recipient refused to accept the condition, but the payment was 
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made regardless. The overlapping analysis helps us to reach this conclusion; a discrete 
categorisation of contract and money transfers (or ‗unjust enrichment‘) only conceals 
the importance of identifying agreement in both situations.  
 
Total Failure of the Condition 
 
The overlap between monetary transfers and the agreement element of contract will 
also be relevant when determining if restitution is available where partial performance 
of the condition has been made. This is one of the more controversial issues in 
restitution, as the courts have often stated that it is only when the condition fails 
totally that restitution for the failure of a conditional payment is possible.
163
 It has also 
led to some commentators to refer to the ‗primacy‘ of contract.164 However, it is only 
necessary to show the primacy of one concept over another if the classifier is adopting 
discrete categories. This is shown by the decision in Whincup v Hughes,
165
 where a 
father had paid a watchmaker to take his son as an apprentice for a period of six years. 
One year into the contract, the watchmaker died, resulting in the premature 
termination of the contract. Since the watchmaker had partially performed the 
condition, the father‘s claim for restitution failed. However, it would also seem that 
the courts will be willing to overlook any trivial or minor performance of the 
condition. If in Whincup v Hughes the recipient had passed away after only one or two 
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days had passed, the case law indicates that this will be considered as a total failure of 
consideration.
166
  
 
It is surely the agreement which determines the possibility of restitution in these 
cases, or more specifically, the courts‘ objective interpretation of the agreement. 
Returning to the Whincup case, it was stated that during ‗the early part of the term the 
teaching would be most onerous, and the services of the apprentice of little value; as 
time went on his services would probably be worth more, and he would require less 
teaching.‘167 So the court‘s decision was influenced by the possibility that the costs of 
the one year apprenticeship were equal to or possibly even higher than the fee paid by 
the father. This was an objective interpretation of the agreement itself; no evidence 
was required to support this possibility. The court will look at the condition 
objectively, and if partial performance is not precluded by the nature of the agreement 
then the court will have room to apportion the value received by this performance.
168
 
 
The clearest example of the courts allowing apportionment of a partially completed 
condition is in D O Ferguson v Sohl,
169
 where the court found that the claimant‘s 
payment for services was of a higher value than those actually performed. The 
agreement between the parties seems to have been the operative factor in determining 
the availability of restitution. In D O Ferguson, evidently the claimant had been 
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willing to pay for parts of the contract price as work progressed on the building.
170
 
This suggests that, if it appears that both parties have been willing at some point to 
apportion the payment for services, then it is likely that the court will allow the 
condition to be considered as a series of separable conditions.  
 
Strict Liability 
 
Since it is the agreement which governs the claim for the repayment of money, there 
is generally little application for the defence of change of position. The claim for 
restitution of money which is paid under an agreement is, therefore, more accurately 
described as one based on strict liability. This has argument has been made by 
Stevens who has stated that ‗the defence of change of position should rarely, if ever, 
succeed where the ground of recovery is failure of consideration.‘171 In Goss v 
Chilcott, Lord Goff, who delivered the Opinion of the Privy Council, accepted that, in 
principle at least, the defence of change of position could be available for failure of a 
condition.
172
 The defence did not apply in that case because the defendants knew that 
the money was expected to be repaid and they had transferred the money to a third 
party.
173
 As Birks explained, this suggests that the basis of the claim in Goss v 
Chilcott
174
 is distinct from the earlier cases of mistaken or fraudulent payments (as 
examples of ‗unjust enrichment‘) due to the fact that the change of position defence 
was not available. For Birks, the solution would be to make the defence available in 
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failure of condition cases, otherwise this becomes a ‗contractual‘ claim.175 Waddams 
explains that it would be too simplistic to argue that the claim is either contractual or 
based on ‗unjust enrichment‘, as elements of both concepts interact.176 The option is 
not ‗contract‘ or ‗unjust enrichment‘, and neither is it necessary to treat this in the 
same way as other ‗monetary transfers.‘ Thus, an overlapping approach recognises 
that the agreement is legally significant, but does not mean that it suddenly becomes 
contractual.  
 
More recently, Bant has also concluded that change of position will not generally be 
available for cases involving failure of consideration.
177
 Bant argues that it may 
sometimes be available and cites as an example the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts 
Act 1943). However, the scope of this ‗statutory‘ defence does not correspond to the 
general change of position defence. The Act only applies for expenditure which has 
been made ‗in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract.‘178 It is, in fact, 
a defence which relates to the nature of the performance and not for general changes 
of position. In essence, it is a more flexible method of ensuring that restitution will be 
available for partial performance when this is required under the agreement. For cases 
outside of frustration, it seems that the defence of change of position has little 
application. Recently, the Court of Appeal refused to allow a change of position 
defence where money was transferred under a void contract, and then was spent on 
investments which resulted in heavy losses for the recipient.
179
 After identifying the 
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principles of change of position, Aikens LJ essentially concluded that they did not 
apply.
180
 Aikens LJ did not express what would happen where it was not clear at the 
outset that the money would need to be returned, as for example in cases where there 
is a void transaction. The analysis is supported by the overlap that we have identified. 
These are not normal cases of restitution, and they will not be treated in the same way. 
An absolute rejection of change of position is not necessary, nor sensible. It does, 
however, indicate again that the presence of agreement in these cases provides an 
important factual element in determining the court‘s approach to money transfers.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
What we have seen in this chapter is that no single approach can explain or accurately 
predict how the courts will award restitution for monetary transfers. It has been 
argued that any general principle of unjust enrichment will lead to oversimplifications 
and will also lead to attempts to provide symmetry for all types of payments. The 
overlapping approach provides benefits due to the way in which it can identify and 
incorporate significant factual elements within the conceptual model of monetary 
transfers. We recognise that, at its core, the rules on monetary transfers display a 
pattern which makes it useful as a legal concept. At the same time, we recognise that 
this pattern can change in the presence of other legally significant facts. The 
complexity will lead to confusion if we do not recognise the points of distinction, 
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which have been highlighted by the overlaps in this chapter. Monetary transfers in 
general share similarities with our law of property; the claimant has title to the money, 
and despite the transfer, it is the identification of his initial title to the money that 
gives him the standing to sue for restitution. It also explains how that interest is lost. 
Just as with the law of property, there are certain actions which will result in the loss 
of title to which no recovery will be available. At the same time, it is of fundamental 
importance that we balance the title interest of the claimant with the receipt of the 
defendant. The very purpose of money is to facilitate transfers, and additionally, there 
are fewer warning signs that the transfer is faulty when a defendant receives 
intangible money. That balance is achieved, firstly, by allowing restitution only for 
careless, not reckless errors. Secondly, it is also achieved by recognising that the 
claim to restitution is defeated if the money is spent and the claimant cannot show that 
the defendant knew of the fault, or was reckless as to the origins of the money. Fault 
is therefore, despite the claims of some scholars and judges, clearly of fundamental 
importance.  
 
We have also seen how the overlapping analysis can be further developed. An overlap 
can exist as a combination of different factual elements, even where those factual 
elements already exist in other legal concepts. The example given has been specific 
restitution, which overlaps with tort by identifying a positive act committed by the 
defendant. This overlap also brings into play the factual elements that we know to be 
relevant in the Theft Act 1968. It would be unwise to assume that private law is 
immune from standards imposed by statute in criminal cases. The courts have clearly 
responded to this in the most recent cases, demonstrating how an overlapping 
approach permits the development of flexible and adaptive legal reasoning. In 
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somewhat prophetic terms, Virgo once concluded that the role of fault will ‗determine 
the future of the law of restitution generally, and unjust enrichment specifically.‘181 
The analysis presented here, in regards to the initial reasons for restitution, and the 
availability of specific restitution, show that this is already the case. 
 
Additionally, we have seen a stronger overlap with money and property, where money 
is in a tangible form. The rules are very similar to those related to recipients of 
intangible money, but the overlap recognises that the situation is slightly different. 
There are more possible warning signs that the money has been stolen in this context, 
and therefore a defendant will not simply be expected to act without knowledge or 
reckless disregard about the origins of the money, they will also be expected to act 
with due diligence. Finally, we have also seen another overlap with contract where the 
money is paid under an agreement. The agreement itself need not spell out that the 
money must be returned, but it does justify restitution as it is unlikely that restitution 
will be available in this context if no agreement has been reached. It has also been 
stated that the agreement itself determines whether partial performance will defeat the 
claim, and can also justify specific restitution. Our argument is that this type of 
restitution is a special type of overlap, i.e. one that is distinct from general restitution. 
From the realist perspective, this is demonstrated by the fact that the general defence 
of change of position appears to have little relevance. To restate the main point of the 
thesis, the overlapping analysis is one that is an invaluable tool in a realist 
classification. Narrow concepts allow us to focus more closely upon the facts which 
determine the decisions of the courts. It avoids over-generalising the law and assists in 
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predicting the decisions of the courts. As we have seen with unjust enrichment theory, 
this area of the law cannot be encapsulated by a single principle. The law is much 
more complex as this chapter has shown.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 6: RELIANCE 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Our concern here lies with situations that can more generally be described as reliance-
based claims, although even that term must be treated with care. We cannot presume 
that reliance refers to a single factual element. Nor, is there a general principle 
underlying this term ‗reliance.‘ We will begin the discussion by looking at the 
different ways in which the term ‗proprietary estoppel‘ is used within private law. The 
next step is to construct a basic definition of reliance that can provide us with a realist 
concept; i.e. a concept that is grounded in social reality, and in turn can be used to 
identify predictable patterns of judicial responses. It is then argued that this concept of 
reliance can provide a descriptive account of two areas of the law that have resisted 
attempts to classify them; the claim for economic loss under the Hedley Byrne v 
Heller
1
 principle, which has traditionally been regarded as a claim for negligence, and 
the claim for non-contractual services which is sometimes described as forming part 
of the law of unjust enrichment. As Atiyah pointed out, reliance is relevant in most 
areas of private law, but on its own it does not accurately describe or predict any area 
of the law.
2
  What we instead look for is the overlaps with our core concepts. 
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The Place of Reliance on the Map 
 
The concept of reliance raises potential issues of conflict with contract and tort, as it 
appears to have similarities with both concepts, yet it does not squarely fit into either 
of them. There are a number of ways to deal with this. We can ask for discrete 
categorisation, which requires reliance-based claims to be assigned to one or the other 
of these categories. There are those who try to frame reliance-based claims as 
examples of contractual obligations, such as Corbin, Atiyah,
3
 Hedley
4
 and Jaffey.
5
 
This requires expanding the concept of contract to include instances where there is 
reliance without offer, acceptance or even consideration. There have been just as 
many attempts to assign estoppel, or more generally reliance claims, within tort law; 
for example, Snyder 
6
 and Robertson.
7
  
 
Alternatively we can accept that this situation creates an overlap. To put it clearly, we 
argue that all reliance based claims involve elements of contract and elements of tort. 
The element of contract is the communication made from the representor to the 
representee. It operates in the same way as ‗offer‘ does in contract. It is a partial 
agreement. The tortious element is that the communication is a positive act; the 
requirement of a positive act is one of the factual elements that we identified in our 
analysis of the core concept of tort. All reliance claims represent ‗weak‘ overlaps with 
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contract and tort. By adopting this analysis, we can maintain the utility of contract and 
tort, and we avoid stretching these concepts beyond their settled meaning.  
 
A similar argument has been made by Dietrich, who points out that reliance-based 
claims overlap with both contract and tort, and that the two concepts are not mutually 
exclusive.
8
 The same observation has been made by Koziol, who concludes that there 
is a continuum between contract and tort where reliance lies, which consists of 
various constituent elements.
9
 For example, in the immediate aftermath of Hedley 
Byrne v Heller, which we argue is an example of a reliance-based claim, Stevens 
referred to the liability for economic loss as an ‗hermaphrodite.‘10 This admixture of 
contract and tort is possible because, not only are legal concepts multi-factual, but 
also because they do not operate in isolation from one another.
11
 Teeven provides an 
insightful explanation about why reliance-based claims have been favoured by legal 
realists, but often rejected by those who apply a more formalist approach to private 
law. For Teeven, the rejection of reliance has been fuelled by ‗the logic that 
commercial promises should be governed exclusively by a market bargain test.‘12 The 
sidelining of reliance-based claims is, therefore, the unfortunate consequence of 
attempts to discretely categorise private law.  
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2. The Overlap of Reliance and Property 
 
Proprietary Estoppel 
 
In this section, the analysis will centre on ‗proprietary estoppel‘, which is the most 
commonly accepted form of reliance-based claim in English private law. The analysis 
of ‗proprietary estoppel‘ will be invaluable, as it will establish the conceptual 
framework for reliance-based claims in general. The argument is that the reliance 
concept does not exist on its own;
13
 we see it overlapping with the core concepts of 
property, tort and contract in various contexts. The first issue we have to contend with 
is the argument, which is accepted by most commentators, that ‗proprietary estoppel‘ 
is based on unconscionability.
14
 It is contended here that the adoption of this term 
indicates either that that there is no discernible pattern of judicial behaviour or that the 
boundaries of ‗proprietary estoppel‘ have been set too wide. Since most commentators 
accept that there is a general pattern in ‗proprietary estoppel‘, it is a good indicator 
that the problem is that we are classifying too much material. In other words, we are 
trying to explain too many situations under the umbrella of ‗proprietary estoppel.‘ 
That is the position which is adopted in this section, which will then go on to 
distinguish two distinct types of claim which fall under the prevalent definition of 
‗proprietary estoppel.‘ There is a strong line of authority in cases which can be 
described as ‗proprietary estoppel‘ where the claim can be explained under the basis 
of reliance, and it is the analysis of these cases which will form the bedrock of this 
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chapter. However, as we shall see, not all ‗proprietary estoppel‘ cases fit into this 
model. These cases are based on ‗acquiescence‘, which, it will be argued, do not 
require reliance. Significantly, the two types of ‗proprietary estoppel‘ are treated very 
differently by the courts. For the purpose of clarity, we will refer to these two types of 
claim as ‗acquiescence‘ and the ‗reliance-based land claim.‘ 
 
In developing the definition of reliance which will form the central theme of this 
chapter, it is suggested that there is no free-standing reliance-based claim. This means 
that the claimant must identify further factual elements which will support the claim. 
In this way, the concept operates in a very similar fashion to the ‗unjust enrichment‘ 
analysis. However, we recognise that the contours of the reliance-based claims are 
altered depending on the presence or absence of other factual elements. In the context 
of land, reliance claims are ones which are made against the title-holder of the 
property. This is the first factual element which must be considered in all reliance-
based land claims; the title of the landowner provides a strong defence to any general 
claim based on reliance. Thus, it is argued that it is not sufficient to merely show 
detrimental reliance, whereas it will be sufficient outside the context of reliance-based 
land claims. The argument here demonstrates two different types of overlaps which 
can circumscribe the title of the landowner in reliance-based land claims. Where the 
claimant is in occupation of the property, he or she can rely on an inducement and 
demonstrate that their position has been altered. The element of occupation brings us 
closer to our core concept of property, as this provides a claimant with control, which 
can overcome the title of the landowner. Where occupation is absent, the overlap with 
property is even weaker. Hence to make a successful claim it will require the induced 
party to show that they have provided an adequate ‗bargain‘ before the court will 
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recognise a reliance-based land claim. This represents an overlap with contract, and 
since it is even further removed from the core concept of property, it will require 
strong evidence that there was a clear purpose for the benefits provided.  
 
It must be noted even at this point, that the identification of two routes to reliance-
based land claims are not intended to stand as ‗exclusive‘ categories. Clearly there can 
be situations where the claimant is in occupation and has provided a valuable benefit 
to the landowner.
15
 Thus, even within the general overlap of reliance and property, 
further overlaps can alter the way that the courts treat these claims. The first task is to 
identify what reliance means; proprietary estoppel is an ideal candidate for this 
enquiry, because there are two very different strands of this estoppel. Our 
differentiation between these strands will identify the core elements of reliance. We 
will then go on to look how reliance operates within the more general overlap with 
property. 
 
Reliance, Estoppel and Unconscionability 
 
Applying a realist approach to this section, it is not necessary or even desirable to 
identify any core principle which underpins reliance-based land claims. However, in 
contrast to the realist approach, the principle of unconscionability is often said to form 
the basis of the concept of all cases of ‗proprietary estoppel‘, including reliance-based 
claims.
16
 In this way, the claim is said to be justified on the basis that the defendant is 
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prevented from denying the interests of the claimant due to his unconscionable 
behaviour. Unconscionability is adopted as the unifying principle of estoppel by both 
Spence
17
 and Cooke.
18
 More recently, it was also described as ‗the key‘ which 
unlocks the door to proprietary estoppel by Lord Scott in Blue Haven v Tully.
19
  
 
Problems with Unconscionability  
 
Firstly, the term unconscionability indicates that the boundaries of ‗proprietary 
estoppel‘ have been drawn too wide, i.e. we are trying to accommodate too much 
within ‗proprietary estoppel.‘ Spence presents the term as a method of balancing eight 
considerations which the courts take into account when identifying 
unconscionability.
20
 These include looking at the strength of the representation, 
knowledge of the parties, nature of the relationship, vulnerability and the personal 
interests of both parties. The discussion of these various factors highlights that no 
single principle can encapsulate the issues which are relevant in ‗estoppel‘ cases. The 
‗unconscionability‘ indicates that it is not possible to identify any recurring factual 
elements in ‗proprietary estoppel‘ claims. Both Ferguson and Parkinson have noted 
that much of ‗equity‘ could be said to be based on the prevention of 
‗unconscionability‘, but that this should not conceal the requirements of the various 
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rules developed by the courts of equity.
21
 From the realist‘s perspective, this indicates 
that we are simply trying to explain too much under a single principle. ‗Proprietary 
estoppel‘ must, to be understood properly, be broken down into smaller concepts. 
 
Secondly, the term unconscionability also implies that the reason for the court‘s 
intervention is the behaviour of the defendant. It is almost the reverse of what we saw 
in relation to the ‗unjust factors‘, instead this time the focus is on the behaviour of the 
defendant. The classic example of unconscionability is the case of the man who stands 
by while somebody builds a house on his land. If the landowner knows that the 
builder mistakenly thinks he owns the property, he may very well be acting 
unconscionably if he later denies liability. However, ‗proprietary estoppel‘ can come 
into play even without such behaviour. In contrast, the man who agrees to let his ex-
wife live in his house and tells her he will put this in his will, has not acted with the 
same degree of unconscionable behaviour when he forgets to do this.
22
 It also seems 
fictional to argue that there is any unconscionable behaviour when the successor to 
the title-holder‘s estate denies the claim for ‗proprietary estoppel‘, without any 
knowledge of an act of inducement in the first place.
23
 Although the courts use the 
same language to refer to all ‗proprietary estoppel‘ claims, most reliance cases do not 
actually require the same level of ‗unconscionability‘ as we see in the classic example 
of the landowner who benefits from another‘s mistake. Nonetheless, the party who 
has acted in reliance may still succeed in establishing proprietary estoppel. 
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Just as there are those who see unconscionability as the key to estoppel cases, there 
are others who completely reject its role. Handley argues that unconscionability ‗has 
no real work to do and is little more than a vituperative and confusing epithet‘.24 More 
recently, McFarlane has echoed this viewpoint, stating that ‗proprietary estoppel, like 
contract or unjust enrichment, is not based on a general notion of justice or 
unconscionability.‘25 The more sensible analysis is that unconscionability can be 
useful in explaining a small part of the case law, but it should not be presented as an 
explanation of all types of ‗proprietary estoppel.‘ We shall see below that there are 
two very different strands of estoppel. One is based on reliance, and the other is based 
on ‗acquiescence‘. Although Robertson accepts a general principle of 
unconscionability, he recognises that ‗the requirement is fulfilled by the core elements 
of‘ reliance.26 It is submitted that there is no need to apply broad and nebulous 
concepts such as ‗unconscionability‘, as the majority of the cases in this area can be 
described much more accurately by reference to reliance and explaining its role as an 
overlapping concept. The following section will set out the distinction between the 
two forms of ‗proprietary estoppel.‘ 
 
The Two Forms of Proprietary Estoppel 
 
Identifying a narrower concept of reliance-based lands claims will be central to the 
argument that we can abandon unconscionability. As Milne explained, it is important 
                                                 
 
 
24
 KR Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election (Sweet & Maxwell 2006) at 20. 
25
 B McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (Hart 2008) at 452 and 456-457. 
26
 A Robertson, ‗Knowledge and Unconscionability in a Unified Estoppel‘ (1998) 24 Monash Univ L 
Rev 115 at 117. 
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to distinguish between two very different approaches to ‗proprietary estoppel‘.27 This 
debate about the correct formulation of ‗proprietary estoppel‘ can be traced back to 
Ramsden v Dyson,
28
 which is still regarded as one of the founding cases of modern 
‗proprietary estoppel.‘29 Lord Kingsdown‘s version of proprietary estoppel identifies 
the importance of establishing that there has been an inducement which is 
communicated to the other party. This is, in essence, the form of reliance which we 
adopt throughout this chapter. The other version of proprietary estoppel is to be found 
in the judgment of Lord Cranworth, who declared that there would be a duty to inform 
a mistaken improver of the owner‘s title, if the owner saw the claimant making these 
improvements. The distinction lies in those cases where the title-holder (the 
representor) communicates to the other party (the induced party) that they can use or 
live on the land (which is required for reliance), as opposed to those cases where no 
assurance has been communicated to the other party (this is based on the title-holder‘s 
acquiescence). For example, there is no communication in the aforementioned classic 
example of ‗proprietary estoppel‘, where the claimant is operating under a mistake 
and the defendant, knowing that the assumption is a mistake, does not correct him. 
The argument, which is developed below, is that cases of acquiescence are rare these 
days, and are treated differently by the courts from claims based on reliance. Under a 
realist approach, the two scenarios must, therefore be distinguished. 
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 P Milne, ‗Proprietary Estoppel in a Procrustean Bed‘ (1995) 58 MLR 412-417, 421 
28
 (1866) LR 1 HL 129. 
29
 Eg Lord Walker in Yeoman’s Row v Cobbe [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752 referred to the 
case as laying down the general principle of reliance (at [81]) and also referred to the decision as ‗the 
great case‘ (at [52]). 
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Reliance and Causation 
 
For the more general argument presented in this chapter, the other reason for 
separating the cases is that unless an unduly wide concept is adopted, it is extremely 
difficult to analyse cases of acquiescence as examples of reliance. This is because of 
the simple reason that the mistaken party is already going about making the 
improvements. Therefore, unlike the versions presented by Spence
30
 and Cooke,
31
 
reliance cannot be simply explained as a general ‗causal‘ link between the actions or 
inactions of the inducing party and the party who then alters his or her position. This 
is because it would be possible to show a ‗causal link‘ in cases of acquiescence 
between the failure to intervene and what the claimant has or has not done. For 
example, B mistakenly improves a piece of land, and A knows that B is acting under a 
mistaken assumption. If A stands by and allows B to continue in the mistaken belief, 
it will be possible to provide a causal link; B can simply argue that if A had taken the 
time to inform him of A‘s rights, B would not have continued to make the 
improvements. In other words, ‗but-for‘ A‘s silence, the improvements would not 
have been made. This very wide concept of reliance is present in Willmott v Barber, 
where Fry J stated that the defendant must have ‗encouraged‘ the claimant, which can 
be established through ‗abstaining from asserting his legal rights.‘32 It is also on this 
basis that Cooke, for example, concludes that there is a sufficient causal link to 
establish reliance in cases of acquiescence.
33
 This fictional account of reliance was 
more recently adopted by Lord Walker in Thorner v Major: ‗if all proprietary estoppel 
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 M Spence, Protecting Reliance: the Emergent Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel (Hart 1999) at 52. 
31
 E Cooke, The Modern Law of Estoppel (OUP 2000) at 28. 
32
 (1880) LR 15 ChD 96 at 106. 
33
 E Cooke, The Modern Law of Estoppel (OUP 2000) at 28. 
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cases (including cases of acquiescence or standing-by) are to be analysed in terms of 
assurance, reliance and detriment, then the landowner's conduct in standing by in 
silence serves as the element of assurance.‘34 This is an unnecessarily wide approach, 
and one that is likely to reduce the utility of reliance as a realist concept.  
 
Therefore, the more descriptive analysis is that reliance is concerned with whether the 
communicated representation caused the induced party to act as they did. Restricting 
reliance to cases which involve communication will not always prevent silence from 
providing the required representation in a reliance-based claim. As Birks noted, 
silence can be relevant in two situations.
35
 Silence may be relevant because it shows 
that the landowner acquiesced by allowing the other party to make use of the land and 
also not asserting their rights. In this way, silence does not give rise to reliance, but it 
is an example of acquiescence. However, in some cases, silence communicates the 
inducement, as in Thorner v Major
36
 where the representation was communicated as 
‗a matter of implication and inference from indirect statements and conduct.‘37 Cases 
where an inducement has been communicated and those where there has been no 
communication cannot be combined without drawing an unnecessarily wide degree of 
artificiality. This is why communication is the key to a reliance-based claim. It also 
provides the factual elements of reliance which form our basic overlap between 
contract and tort; communication is a necessary ingredient in any agreement, and it 
also represents a positive act by the defendant.   
 
                                                 
 
 
34
 Lord Walker in Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18, [2009] 1 WLR 776 at 793-794. 
35
 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (rev edn, Clarendon Press 1989) at 290-293. 
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 [2009] UKHL 18, [2009] 1 WLR 776. 
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Why the Distinction is Relevant 
 
It is not enough to show that there are factual distinctions between these two forms of 
‗proprietary estoppel.‘ We also must show that they are treated differently by the 
courts. Firstly, as Milne notes, the reliance-based approach to proprietary estoppel 
‗explains most of the case law‘ and ‗almost all the cases‘ fall under this approach.38 
Lord Walker has also noted that acquiescence claims are the rarest examples of 
modern ‗proprietary estoppel‘ cases.39 When looking at the cases, it is apparent that 
this form of proprietary estoppel is being applied in a much more stringent way by the 
modern courts than by the courts of the past. Modern claims based on acquiescence 
have little chance of succeeding, except in cases of border disputes between 
neighbouring landowners.
40
 An indication that the courts are taking a narrower 
approach to these claims is present in the Privy Council Opinion in Elaine Knowles v 
George Knowles.
41
 In this case, the claim failed on the basis that the owner of the 
disputed land had not encouraged his sister-in law that she would be granted an 
interest in the land, even though he had clearly acquiesced in her living there for a 
long period of time. Admittedly, an alternative explanation of this case is that it was a 
misprediction, not a mistake. This issue cannot be ignored as it had been previously 
stated by Fry J in Willmott v Barber that the ‗doctrine of acquiescence is founded on 
there having been a mistake of fact.‘42 However, Birks points out that this type of 
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 P Milne, ‗Proprietary Estoppel in a Procrustean Bed‘ (1995) 58 MLR 412 at 413. 
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 R Walker, ‗Which Side Ought to Win - Discretion and Certainty in Property Law‘ [2008] Singapore 
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40
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estoppel is available for both mistakes and mispredictions.
43
 Birks‘ analysis is 
supported by two Court of Appeal decisions in Jones v Stones
44
 and Lester v 
Woodgate,
45
 which demonstrate that, in acquiescence cases, the party seeking to 
establish the estoppel may have been acting under the belief that the acquiescing party 
would not enforce their rights in the future. This indicates that the real reason for the 
failure of the claim in Elaine Knowles was that it was one based on acquiescence, and 
that the courts are reluctant to recognise such claims. 
 
A clearer example of the courts either restricting the use of ‗acquiescence‘ or refusing 
to consider the claim altogether, even when the claimant was mistaken, is Katana v 
Catalyst Communities Housing Ltd.
46
 Here, the claimants were seeking to regain 
possession from defendants who had been granted sub-tenancies by the original 
tenant. The original tenant‘s conferral of the sub-tenancies was made in breach of 
covenant; however, the sub-tenants continued to occupy the property and had 
established businesses at these addresses. The claimants were at least aware of the 
presence of the sub-tenants, but did nothing about this until four years later when they 
sought repossession of the land. Nonetheless, the estoppel claim failed due to the fact 
that the landowner was said to be unaware of the full terms of the sub-tenancies. 
According to Patten LJ, the estoppel argument was not even ‗realistically arguable,‘ 
despite this being an obvious case of a landowner standing by whilst the claimant 
makes improvements to the land.
47
 Additionally, in National Trust v Timm,
48
 a claim 
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based on the defendant‘s standing by whilst the claimant operated a business on its 
land was dismissed on the basis that ‗inaction does not constitute a positive 
representation on which reliance is placed.‘49 Thus, the courts are applying a strict 
approach to cases of acquiescence, which has narrowed the circumstances where such 
claims can be made.  
 
Most importantly, from a realist perspective, cases of acquiescence rarely, if ever, 
lead to the court awarding the claimant the title to a legal estate. The more recent case 
law in this area proves that the scope for this claim is limited primarily to the right to 
use certain parts of the land, as in Jones v Stones
50
 or the more recent example in 
Lester v Woodgate which concerned parking spaces.
51
 This conclusion is given further 
support by the Opinion of the Board in Blue Haven v Tully,
52
 where Lord Scott 
approved of a statement made by Sir James Wigram VC, that cases which were based 
on acquiescence would never preclude the owner from full possession of the land. To 
do so would constitute ‗improving a man out of his own estate.‘53 Although the 
landowner may have acted ‗unconscionably‘, at the same time the courts will not 
deprive the landowner of the entire estate because of the failure to speak. The doctrine 
has a very limited role in cases involving boundary disputes between neighbours, but 
it is a much less potent tool than a claim based on reliance. 
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Two Patterns Which Explain the Role of Communication 
 
One of the concerns with ‗proprietary estoppel‘ in the acquiescence cases is that it 
seems to conflict with three patterns in English private law. These concerns, it is 
suggested, can be readily satisfied in cases of true reliance. The first is the importance 
of protecting the owner‘s title to the land, the second is the general reticence of the 
courts to impose liability for mere omissions.
54
 The first pattern, which the 
‗acquiescence‘ cases seem to be in conflict with, is the protection of title to land. This 
is not just a pattern which is seen in ‗judge-made‘ law, it is also reflected in statutory 
provisions such as those which prevent oral contracts for the transfer of interests in 
land.
55
 The attitude of the courts in cases of acquiescence cannot be properly assessed 
without having regard to the social circumstances which have enabled the role of title 
to take centre stage in our legal system. As Bogusz notes, the impact of legislation 
such as the Law of Property Act 1925 has led to the ‗alienability‘ of land, meaning 
that the courts have taken a less prominent role in determining the way in which they 
deal with land disputes.
56
  
 
Furthermore, in Yeoman’s Row v Cobbe,57 Lord Walker seemed willing to consign the 
acquiescence cases to the past: ‗[c]ases of unilateral mistake occurred quite frequently 
in the 19th century, when the construction of canals and railways, coupled with the 
complexity of unregistered conveyancing in those days, made it not uncommon for 
building works to be carried out on land whose owner (or part-owner) had not agreed 
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to the works.‘58 A similar point is made by Handley, who identifies the system of land 
registry, the intensity of land use and planning controls as factors which result in the 
decreasing relevance of claims based on acquiescence.
59
 The circumstances of 
Ramsden v Dyson, where the owner of a vast estate ‗acquiesces‘ to the claimant 
mistakenly improving the land engages less sympathy with a modern court. The 19
th
 
century example represented by the facts of Ramsden v Dyson of the owners of vast 
estates seems antiquated and out of touch with modern society.  
 
As we noted in our chapter in realism, we must account for the dynamism of law. As 
society changes, so too does the law. The modern prominence of ‗title‘ in the context 
of land reflects the fact that there is a predisposition to place a higher value on things 
which we already have, than on things which we have yet to obtain. This has been 
referred to as the ‗endowment effect‘, which indicates that owners are not to lose their 
land simply because they have allowed someone else to live there.
60
 This helps to 
explain why cases of acquiescence have become rarer. As title becomes a more 
prominent and important element in the distribution of land, it will require more 
legally significant acts to support a successful ‗proprietary estoppel‘ claim.  
 
With regard to the second pattern, liability in ‗acquiescence‘ cases is problematic as 
the landowner loses out because of the failure to take positive steps to displace the 
assumption of the other party. As Cooke has pointed out, this pattern is best 
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exemplified by the ‗traditional reluctance to attach liability to omissions.‘61 The 
reluctance of the courts to make people liable for omissions is regularly demonstrated 
by the treatment of negligent claims where the defendant is accused of failing to 
prevent the claimant from suffering harm.
62
 As stated by Lord Hoffmann in Stovin v 
Wise:
63
 ‗[c]ompulsory altruism needs more justification than an obligation not to 
create dangers to others when acting for one's own purposes.‘64 This reflects what one 
Canadian judge has referred to as ‗a philosophy of robust individualism,‘65  and what 
Stapleton refers to as ‗the core libertarian impulse.‘66 We take no view on the political 
leanings of this pattern, but simply recognise that the pattern is present in these 
judgments. In short, we can trace clear patterns throughout our private law of the idea 
that generally ‗no duty of affirmative action is recognized towards a stranger.‘67 The 
individual who ‗acquiesces‘ in these cases of ‗proprietary estoppel‘ merely plays a 
‗passive‘ role in the mistaken improvement.  
 
Indeed, the reluctance to impose liability for omissions certainly seems to have been 
heavily influential in the decline of the acquiescence claim. For example, in Elaine 
Knowles v George Knowles,
68
 Sir Henry Brooke, delivering the Opinion of the Board 
of the Privy Council, cited with approval the following statement made by Omrod LJ 
in E & L Berg Homes Ltd v Grey; ‗[i]t is a very unfortunate state of affairs when 
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people feel obliged to take steps which they do not wish to take, in order to preserve 
their legal rights, and prevent the other party acquiring rights against them.‘69 So not 
only must the claimant overcome the strength of the owner‘s title to the land, he must 
also deal with the fact that the ‗justification‘ is based on an omission by the 
landowner. If a passive defendant in cases of physical injuries is not expected to offer 
any assistance, even when they could easily protect the claimant, then it would be odd 
that a passive defendant is expected to offer assistance to correct the mistaken belief 
of another party. We can, therefore, explain the limited and diminishing role of the 
acquiescence cases. In the absence of reliance, the claim is a much more limited one.  
 
Reliance-Based Land Claims 
 
By removing the cases on acquiescence, a more realistic concept of reliance emerges. 
This reliance mechanism provides the foundations for reliance-based claims in 
general. In this more streamlined form, proprietary estoppel arises through the 
communication of a representation which leads to reliance by the other party. 
However, as has been noted, we must always keep in mind the value placed upon the 
landowner‘s title, which will not simply be defeated because of the expectations of the 
claimant. This means that, as with money transfers, a general approach to all reliance 
cases is not possible nor is it desirable. 
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Detrimental Reliance 
 
Although we have moved past unconscionability, it would be a disservice to ignore 
the attempt by Cooke to formulate a more general doctrine of estoppel. This is 
reflected in Cooke‘s attempt to construct a coherent doctrine of ‗estoppel‘, based on 
detrimental reliance. Cooke conceded that stronger instances of ‗detriment‘ were 
required in ‗proprietary estoppel‘, than in cases outside of proprietary estoppel.70 Our 
view is that detriment has not ever, without further specification, been sufficient to 
establish a reliance-based land claim. Therefore, it is only in limited circumstances 
where the title to land will be defeated, even when the landowner has communicated 
that the land will be given to the induced party. The argument presented in the 
following sections identifies these circumstances as being either long-term occupation 
of the land, or where the other party provides something beneficial to the landowner. 
Both of these factual elements create different types of overlaps: the element of 
control brings the claim closer to property, and the element of bargain brings the 
claim closer to contract. 
 
Another example of how detrimental reliance is unhelpful in this context is revealed 
by McFarlane‘s approach. One of the few attempts that have been made to classify 
‗proprietary estoppel‘ outside of the confines of unconscionability is McFarlane‘s 
rights-based approach. A recent example of how we can miss the fundamental facts is 
seen in McFarlane‘s view that in cases of ‗proprietary estoppel‘ reliance must be 
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reasonable.
71
 He gives, as an example, a landowner who promises to give a house to a 
nephew who spends his savings at the casino in reliance.
72
 But on the approach here 
this would never be sufficient as the nephew is not in occupation, and neither is he 
providing a bargain in return for the property. This is important, as many of the cases 
involve informal arrangements between family members or close friends. What may 
be unreasonable to most other people may have been completely reasonable in the 
circumstances and in the context of the relationship. Relying on a promise that 
someone will leave you a very valuable piece of land for free seems to be outside the 
ambit of ‗reasonableness‘. The error in reasoning can be attributed to the fact that, in 
pure economic loss cases, reasonable reliance is an additional control mechanism 
which is applied by the courts in claims for pure economic loss (we consider this 
further on in this chapter.) Without further specifying what type of detriment is 
suffered, either occupation or an unrewarded bargain, it is inevitable that we will 
resort to other control mechanisms even when they do not accurately describe the law. 
The context here is entirely different, and a search for uniformity is unnecessary and 
misleading. 
 
Our Approach; Overlaps 
 
Where a claimant seeks to establish a reliance-based land claim, there are two routes 
available. One stands as a closer overlap with our core concept of property, and the 
other stands as an overlap with our core concept of contract. Firstly, the claimant‘s 
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possession of the land will bring the situation closer to the core concept of property 
which was set out it Chapter 4. Secondly, another factor which can come into play is 
where the claimant has provided something in return for the benefit of the land, 
which, as we have seen, is something which is similar to the role of bargain in our 
concept of contract law. From Chapter 4 we know that these are legally significant 
facts. Note that they are not exclusive elements in reliance-based land claims, as it is 
possible that someone is in occupation of land, but that they have also provided the 
landowner with significant benefits.
73
 The argument is that where reliance is coupled 
with either possession or benefit to the owner, or both, it will be sufficient to establish 
an interest in the land. Notably, the oft-used phrase ‗detriment‘ is too simple and 
imprecise to describe how reliance is demonstrated in these cases. Detriment itself, in 
the context of land disputes, will rarely be sufficient on its own due to the strength of 
the landowner‘s title.  
 
The Overlap of Property and Reliance 
 
In Chapter 4, it was stated that control is one of the core factual ingredients of the 
concept of property.
74
 Although it is rarely mentioned as a central element in 
‗proprietary estoppel‘, control is the most common element in establishing reliance-
based land claims. For example, ‗possession‘ was a central element in Lord 
Kingsdown‘s pronouncement of the reliance-based claim.75 In this context, a specific 
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type of control is required; namely occupation of the land. This was clearly explained 
by Lord Denning when he stated that proprietary estoppel ‗arises from the expenditure 
of money by a person in actual occupation of land when he is led to believe that, as 
the result of that expenditure, he will be allowed to remain there.‘76 In these cases, the 
control element raises a particular concern about the value and use of the land to the 
occupier. As Robertson explains, ‗[a] person who occupies a particular home for a 
long period in the expectation that he or she is entitled to reside there for life will 
often develop a significant attachment to the home and may suffer a substantial 
emotional detriment if he or she is forced to make a new home elsewhere.‘77 A similar 
notion is discussed by Rotherham, who notes that where occupation is present, it can 
lead to the ‗endowment effect‘,78 which was mentioned earlier in this chapter.79 We 
do not just have to consider the landowner‘s title, but also the claimant‘s occupation 
of the land. Here we see that there is a tension between the occupier and the 
landowner; a successful claim may lead to the landowner losing his title, whereas the 
denial of the claim will take away the occupation of the claimant.  
 
At present, the current literature simply does not identify this clearly important issue. 
General categories of property, contract, tort and even unconscionability do not direct 
us to this element of occupation, which is both of social importance and also predicts 
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the law in this area. Our ability to describe the law is undermined when we try to 
describe too much: predictability cannot be achieved if we attempt to provide a 
mechanism that can account for cases of acquiescence and all types of reliance-based 
land claims. Instead, we can recognise different types of overlap with the reliance 
mechanism. Therefore, as it has already been stated above, it will not be argued here 
that all proprietary estoppel cases involve occupation. A reliance-based land claim 
can also succeed on the basis of a bargain between the parties.
80
 However, the 
occupation of the property provides the simplest and most common explanation for 
the court‘s intervention.  
 
Communication 
 
Reliance in this context can be broken down into three intertwined elements; there is a 
representation which has been communicated by the landowner, the occupier has 
made a long-term commitment to the land and there is a causal link between what was 
communicated and the commitment to the land. Thus, these cases show that 
communication is the first step in establishing a reliance-based land claim. A 
straightforward example is Pascoe v Turner, where the representor stated that ‗[t]he 
house is yours and everything in it.‘81 This can be contrasted with the recent Court of 
Appeal decision in Cook v Thomas;
82
 where the claim failed
83
 as there had never been 
any representation by the landowner that the claimants had anything other than a 
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temporary residence. Although the key to reliance is ‗communication‘, it need not be 
explicitly stated that the induced party can remain on the land indefinitely; it might be 
implicated. For example, in Inwards v Baker, 
84
 a father told his son, who was trying 
to find the money to buy a plot of land to build a house, that he should build the house 
on the father‘s land. Both parties knew what the purpose of the building was, and it 
was implied by the father‘s statement that the son would be allowed to live there.  
 
Control; The Property Element  
 
As we stated earlier, although it is regularly stated that detriment is required, a 
different view is taken here. Something more specific is required. For our purposes, it 
is occupation. It would also be sensible to talk about exclusive occupation. When 
control is shared between landowner and induced party, any occupation will be less 
relevant as the landowner has as much control, if not more, than the other party. For 
example, Jennings v Rice involved a degree of occupation, as the claimant stayed at 
the house each night for a couple of years, however at the same time the claimant 
owned his own house with his wife.
85
 Bright and McFarlane have argued that ‗this 
type of occupation is clearly less effective in establishing B's attachment to the 
property.‘86 The more sensible analysis is that occupation in this context requires 
exclusive control. The success of the claim in Jennings is attributable to the bargain 
between the parties and not attributable to the issue of occupation. 
                                                 
 
 
84
 Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29 (CA). 
85
 Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159, [2003] 1 FCR 501. 
86
 S Bright and B McFarlane, ‗Proprietary Estoppel and Property Rights‘ (2005) 64 CLJ 449 at 471. 
  
237 
 
 
 
According to Bright and McFarlane, a reliance-based land claim will not be 
established where there has only been a short-term occupation,
87
  or in cases where 
the occupier makes it clear that they might leave the premises at any point.
88
 A classic 
example of a long-term commitment by both parties is the Court of Appeal in Bibby v 
Stirling,
89
 where the landowner had apparently encouraged his neighbours to believe 
that they could use a strip of land for the rest of their lives. What was clearly 
important in this decision was the fact that the claimant had built a greenhouse on the 
strip of land, which was, according to Millett LJ, a ‗major construction.‘90 This can be 
compared to E&L Berg v Grey, where the estoppel claim failed, in part, due to the 
lack of any acts of a ‗permanent character‘,91 as the ‗home‘ which had been made by 
the claimant was a mobile home. The need for a long-term commitment is also to be 
seen in the Privy Council decision in A-G for Hong Kong v Humphreys.
92
 In 
Humphreys, both parties believed that a contract would eventually be completed, but 
the defendant withdrew from negotiations before this happened. Although the 
claimant had already taken possession of the premises, the claimant could not show 
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that there was reliance since it had expressly retained the right to withdraw from the 
negotiations at any time.
93
  
 
These cases show that detriment is not a necessary ingredient in reliance-based land 
claims. The pattern is identified through our overlap; title itself will not usually be 
defeated, merely because the claimant has suffered a loss. Detriment does not identify 
the relevant facts in these cases, but it is submitted that the presence of control 
‗strengthens‘ the claimant‘s interest and it is this element, when coupled with reliance, 
which can defeat the title of the landowner. Admittedly this argument that detriment is 
not sufficient is controversial. Lord Walker has argued that detriment is necessary, 
however, as his Lordship acknowledges, the courts take a very wide view of 
‗detriment‘ in such cases.94 This wide view even stretches to cover cases where it may 
be argued that the claimant has already received even more than they have lost.
95
  It is 
argued here that, whereas claimants will have to show detriments in other estoppel 
cases, it is not essential where the claimant has had continued occupation of the land. 
It is an unfortunate fiction that the courts state that this is required, and this fiction is 
only necessary if we try to accommodate all ‗proprietary estoppel‘ cases under a 
catch-all definition. An overlapping approach allows us to break the cases down 
whilst being able to acknowledge that there may be similarities with other forms of 
‗proprietary estoppel.‘  
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In the occupation cases, the key is whether the parties have committed themselves to 
the arrangement. If it is one from which both parties can easily withdraw then it will 
be difficult to demonstrate the necessary element of reliance. A classic example where 
commitment was shown is Crabb v Arun DC,
96
 where the claimant sold part of his 
land on the basis that he would be allowed to use council land as an alternative means 
of access. According to Lord Neuberger in Yeoman’s Row, this was ‗an act so 
unequivocal that it led to Mr Crabb irretrievably altering his position.‘97 A more 
recent example is the Opinion of the Privy Council in Henry v Mitchell,
98
 which 
confirms the relevance of this approach in cases where the claimant is already in 
control of the property. The Opinion of the Board was delivered by Sir Jonathan 
Parker, who stated that on the facts detriment and reliance were inextricably linked.
99
 
Furthermore, the claimant could establish an estoppel on the basis that he had ‗opted 
for a hard life, in which he has had to struggle to make ends meet and to provide for 
his family, in circumstances where more attractive prospects beckoned elsewhere.‘100 
This was even more recently confirmed by Rimer LJ in Malik v Kaylan where he 
upheld the decision of a trial judge who had concluded that occupation outweighed 
any benefits of rent-free accommodation.
101
 Accordingly, ‗[t]he judge knew perfectly 
well that he had paid no rent and knew also that he had always occupied the house: 
the latter point was at the heart of his thinking. I regard the judge's evaluation of how 
the equity should be satisfied as rational and understandable and well within the range 
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of decisions properly open to him.‘102 The extent of any detriment will be helpful in 
showing that the parties had committed to a long term arrangement, but it cannot be 
the exclusive justification. As we have seen, in this context it must be clear that the 
occupier has made a long-term commitment to the land in reliance on something 
which was communicated by the title-holder. This is what creates the overlap with 
property, as it demonstrates the extent to which the claimant controls the land. 
 
Causation 
 
The causal requirement only comes into the picture at this stage; once it has been 
shown that there has been (i)  a representation which was communicated and a (ii) a 
long-term commitment, it is then necessary to show that it was the representation that 
led to the long-term commitment. As noted by Cooke,
103
 this requirement is 
demonstrated by Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd.
104
 The case 
involved an option to renew a lease provided the occupier installed a lift, which 
turned out to be void. The first claimant had installed this lift, but it was concluded by 
Oliver J that this would have been done anyway, even without any representation as it 
was necessary for the operation of the lease.
105
 On this basis, there was no reliance 
and the claim failed. In contrast, the second claimant had in fact relied on the validity 
of the option to renew the lease, and this had been caused by the representations made 
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by the defendant. In contrast to the first claimant, the second claim succeeded. The 
decision demonstrates that causation is an integral part of the reliance inquiry, but 
only when communication has been established. This is important; if we were to take 
any other approach we would end up in the same area as the acquiescence cases. This 
requirement distinguishes reliance-based claims from acquiescence claims and paves 
the way for a successful claim. 
 
Justifying Occupation from a Realist Perspective  
 
Generally, the nature of the occupation will determine the award which will be made 
by the court. The stronger the commitment to the land is, the stronger the award made 
by the court will also be.
106
 In most cases, this is either the transfer of the freehold or a 
licence to remain on the land for the rest of the claimant‘s life. There are some cases 
where the courts will provide a much weaker remedy, which reflects the nature of the 
occupation. The case law supports the proposition that this would not lead to an 
interest over the entire estate. For example, where the occupation is merely for the 
purposes of running music lessons from the building
107
 this will clearly lead to a 
lower award than where the claimant has lived on the land as his home.
108
 Similarly, 
if the commitment to the land wanes, and the claimant has subsequently found 
alternative accommodation, it is unlikely that any reliance-based claim will 
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succeed.
109
 Since control is also important in establishing this claim, the induced party 
will usually only be able to claim the parts of the estate which they are in control of. 
Waddams gives the example of a gratuitous promise to give the other party some 
land, which leads to the promisee erecting a small building on the property.
110
 It 
would be misleading to suggest that any current approach can accurately predict the 
amount which is awarded in reliance-based land claims, but we can determine the 
patterns. We argue here that the overlapping analysis helps in this regard as it 
identifies the most important facts which seem to be influencing the courts at present. 
 
This is not simply an attempt to identify a coherent doctrine of reliance in place of the 
uncertainty created by the current orthodoxy of ‗unconscionability.‘ From a realist 
perspective, we have identified that control is relevant in property, and it will also be 
relevant where someone seeks to make a reliance-based land claim. Bright and 
McFarlane point out that ‗the fact that [the induced party] is occupying the property 
will often be a strong indication that a property right is necessary.‘111 This is because 
one of the important consequences of the claimant‘s presence on the land is that it 
reduces the possible disadvantages to third parties. As McFarlane points out, section 
116 of the Land Registration Act 2002 resolved a long debate about whether the 
interest of a claimant under a proprietary estoppel claim would be binding on third 
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parties.
112
 Nonetheless, this provision does not provide a blanket protection for all 
proprietary estoppel claims.
113
 Although it preceded the implementation of section 
116, the Court of Appeal decision in Lloyd v Dugdale demonstrates that occupation is 
an essential requirement when a claimant seeks to enforce any interests against third 
parties.
114
 According to the explanatory notes which accompanied the Land 
Registration Act 2002, apart from cases of actual occupation, the only other way for a 
proprietary estoppel claim to bind third parties is where the claimant first registers 
their interest as a notice on the land registry,
115
 which in practice is unlikely to have 
occurred.
116
 In contrast, as Dixon points out, under Schedules 1 and 3 of the 2002 Act, 
actual occupation also forms an overriding interest which need not be registered.
117
 
Therefore, the strongest protection will be provided to those cases ‗where the claimant 
is in actual occupation‘ which ‗is automatically protected without the need for 
registration.‘118 From a realist perspective, the overlap between reliance, land and 
occupation is an indispensible conceptual tool which identifies the way in which the 
courts will treat the claim.  
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3. The Overlap of Reliance, Property and Contract 
 
This second overlap shares much similarity with claims for non-contractual services, 
however, since the claim involves land, it raises special concerns which do not apply 
to claims for non-contractual services (these cases are looked at further on in this 
chapter.) We avoid calling this a complete overlap with contract, the reason being the 
same as our rejection of ‗unilateral‘ contracts. There may be agreement, but it does 
not ‗lock in‘ until the induced party has completed their side of the bargain. 
Therefore, there could be no such thing as an executory reliance-based land claim. 
The overlap arises due to the presence of the bargain element.  
 
The argument presented here is that if the claimant is not in occupation of the land, it 
will be necessary to show that the landowner has indicated that the induced party will 
have the land in return for providing a substantial benefit. This analysis has its roots in 
Walker LJ‘s ‗bargain-category‘ from Jennings v Rice.119 What was much more 
significant in Jennings v Rice was the fact that the claimant had taken time to look 
after and care for the landowner, who had made assurances that the property would be 
left to him. Accordingly, this is an example of a bargain; the representor 
communicates that the land will be left to the induced party, if the induced party 
provides valuable services. Although the ‗bargain‘ approach of Walker LJ has been 
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criticised by Gardner, and more recently by Mee, it will be argued that the criticisms 
made by these academics are resolved by the overlapping concepts analysis.
120
  
 
Criticisms of the Bargain Approach 
 
The bargain-approach was most strongly criticised by Gardner, who sought to 
demonstrate that there is no clear dividing line between bargain and non-bargain 
cases.
121
 Lord Walker himself has now conceded this point.
122
 Yet, we must approach 
this issue by keeping in mind what has been already established in the above section. 
The first reason is that, unlike Walker LJ‘s ‗categorisation‘ in Jennings v Rice, we 
have little interest in creating ‗categories‘ at all. Rather, we are developing a much 
more flexible conceptual analysis. Therefore, Gardner‘s criticism holds less weight 
once we have acknowledged that we are looking at concepts which cannot and should 
not be placed in discrete categories. Secondly, we have already argued that the 
strongest reliance-based claims for land arise where the claimant is committed on a 
long-term basis, but additionally that it could very well be the case that the induced 
party occupies the land whilst performing his or her side of a ‗bargain.‘ In short, there 
are two types of reliance based proprietary estoppel claims, but they can and often do 
overlap.
123
 Secondly, the other cases referred to Gardner are those where the ‗bargain‘ 
does not appear to be the condition for the gift of the land, ‗often, although the 
defendant does not require the claimant's acts, he is benefited by them, and freely 
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accepts them, and makes his promise expressly or impliedly in recognition of the 
claimant's having performed them and continuing to perform them.‘124 As will be 
explained further on, there is no need to accommodate these cases within the bargain 
cases, as they do not in fact fall under reliance in the first place. The more sensible 
analysis is to recognise that these cases are better understood in the context of 
informal arrangements for cohabitation, which is explained further on.
125
 
 
Communication  
 
Returning to the ‗bargain‘ cases, the first requirement is that the landowner has 
communicated that the land will be given to the induced party in return for some act. 
In some cases it obvious that the transfer of land is the purpose of a bargain, as in 
Yaxley v Gotts,
126
 where the landowner, using his father as his agent, requested the 
claimant to develop a block of flats, informally agreeing that the induced party would 
be given the ground floor flats. In most of the bargain cases, however, it is usually the 
case that the landowner will want the claimant to perform services for little or no pay, 
and that upon the death of the landowner the property will be left to the claimant. For 
example in Walton v Walton,
127
 the landowner told her son, who had been 
complaining about his pay, that ‗[y]ou can't have more money and a farm one day.‘128 
Similar examples are to be found in Re Basham,
129
 Gillett v Holt
130
 and Jennings v 
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Rice.
131
 In cases such as these, the statements made are reassurances which indicate 
that, so long as the current arrangement continues, the land will be left to the induced 
party. Although the induced party may already be performing the ‗bargain‘, the 
claimants in these cases have shown that the continued provision of their assistance 
was heavily influenced by the assurances made by the landowner. Just because these 
services have been provided in the past does not mean they will be provided in the 
future. Therefore, it is still necessary to show that the induced party was questioning 
their position at some point. 
 
The most recent example is the House of Lords decision in Thorner v Major, where 
the assurance between two ‗taciturn and undemonstrative‘ men was demonstrated 
when the landowner handed the induced party an insurance policy stating that it was 
for his death duties.
132
 In the context of the situation, this indicated that the farm was 
to be left to the induced party, who had been considering other opportunities. One of 
the important consequences of the Thorner v Major decision was that it clarified a 
point of confusion which had been produced by an earlier House of Lords decision in 
Yeoman’s Rowe v Cobbe.133 In Lord Scott‘s speech in Yeoman’s Rowe v Cobbe, his 
Lordship indicated that proprietary estoppel could only be established where the 
claimant believes that the defendant has made a clear and unequivocal assurance 
about the property.
134
 As McFarlane and Robertson point out, no assurance was 
present in Thorner v Major, and this conflicts with the case law on the types of 
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assurance that are sufficient to ground a proprietary estoppel.
135
 The communication 
need not be clear or unequivocal, but it must indicate that the land will be left to the 
claimant if he begins to provide a benefit (as in Yaxley) or carries on providing an 
intended benefit (as in Gillett v Holt or Thorner v Major.) Again we see that this is 
reliance based, as communication is a necessary, as well as factual, requirement 
which needs to be shown. Without such communication, the claim will fail, as pointed 
out by Lord Walker.
136
 As an example, Lord Walker refers to Lissimore v Downing,
137
 
where statements were made that the claimant would generally be looked after, but 
nothing was communicated about the ownership of the land. Therefore, the same 
pattern of reliance is required, even though the context is different. 
 
Bargain 
 
As it is not sufficient merely to have communication, the bargain element must be 
present. This can be broken down into two elements; one, that the bargain must be 
completed and, two, that the induced party is providing a benefit to the claimant.  
 
Complete Performance 
 
The first requirement is that the claimant has performed all of the required acts. 
Gardner has argued that this is not necessary, and that part performance is 
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sufficient.
138
 However, the only authority for this is Ottey v Grundy, 
139
 a case which 
arguably involved no reliance element at all.
140
 The rest of the cases in this area 
support the requirement that all of the beneficial acts need to be completed. This also 
explains why the claim in Yeoman’s Row v Cobbe failed. Unfortunately, this was not 
the reason cited by the court in Yeoman’s Row as the main justification for the failure 
of the claim was that both parties had commercial experience and knew that the deal 
was not a legally binding agreement. However, nearly all ‗bargain‘ cases are not 
legally binding; in Yaxley v Gotts there would have been no claim if the agreement 
had not been acted upon, and in the cases where land is to be left under a will, it is 
only when the landowner dies that anything becomes legally binding. This 
explanation is not convincing. The explanation provided by the court seems strikingly 
similar to the one made by the defendants that the agreement should not be enforced 
as it was ‗subject-to contract‘. Writing extra-judicially, Lord Neuberger has described 
the ‗subject-to contract‘ argument as ‗abracadabra law‘,141 but it is hard to see why 
the same criticism does not apply to the explanations provided by Lord Scott and Lord 
Walker in Yeoman’s Row.  
 
It is, therefore, submitted that the more accurate account of Yeoman’s Row is that the 
claimant must fulfil all required acts to succeed in the bargain-reliance claim. So, in 
the case of Yeoman’s Row, the planning permission was only part of a wider 
development plan. First, and quite obvious, was the requirement that the claimant pay 
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the landowner the purchase price of the land. Secondly, the claimant would have 
needed to actually build the properties which had been approved, subject to a charge 
over the property for the benefit of the owner. Admittedly, the claimant appeared 
willing to perform his side of the bargain at all times, but it must always be placed in 
the context of a land dispute. Everyone agrees that a simple contract is not sufficient 
to transfer interests in land, so in this situation the bargain must be completed. Again, 
note that there are numerous statutory provisions which inhibit the sale of land. The 
conclusion is supported by the comparison made by Lord Scott with Holiday Inns Inc 
v Broadhead.
142
  The case appears similar to Yeoman’s Row, as a developer obtained 
planning permission and, as businessmen, they knew that the contract was not legally 
binding. The important distinction was that when the agreement was made, the 
defendant had not yet obtained the land.
143
 The ‗title‘ issue was therefore not in play, 
and there was no requirement that the claimant performs all of the required acts. The 
patterns are there, but they can only be seen by adopting an overlapping conceptual 
analysis to the case law. If the representor already has title to the land, then full 
performance is necessary. This is because the landowner‘s title is stronger than the 
claimant‘s bargain interest when the bargain is incomplete. 
 
The harsh consequences of this requirement are ameliorated by the fact that the 
claimant can succeed on an alternative reliance basis, namely an agreement for non-
contractual services. Thus, in Yeoman’s Row, the claimant received a sum of money 
to reflect the work and skill he had used to obtain the planning permission. Obviously 
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this does not accord with the law of contract, but there is no need for the replication of 
contract rules in this context. Further support is provided by Mee,
144
 who points out 
that with many bargain-reliance claims, the landowner may not have anticipated 
events which would alter the decision to transfer the land. This can also be seen in 
cases involving non-commercial parties, such as Gillett v Holt, where the landowner 
had told the claimant the land would be his inheritance, but then attempted to exclude 
the claimant from his will after they had fallen out.
145
 The claimant believed he would 
receive the whole of the property, but what he in fact received was an order which 
allowed him to stay on the plot of land where he had set up home, and an award that 
reflected the value of the services he had provided. On the analysis presented here, the 
claimant in fact lost his bargain claim, but succeeded on the basis of occupation-
reliance, and additionally an agreement for non-contractual services. This explains 
why he did not receive an award which reflected the full extent of his detriment or his 
expectations.
146
 Therefore, the requirement of complete performance is not simply an 
issue concerning commercial parties, but applies in other situations as well.  
 
Valuable Bargain 
 
Although the overlap between contract and property results in a unique approach in 
this context, one similarity with the bargain element in contract is that the claimant 
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must show that they have provided something valuable in exchange for the interest in 
the land. This analysis is undoubtedly controversial, as the traditional understanding is 
that proprietary estoppel requires detriment, not the passing of a benefit. However, 
again this is an error caused by over-generalisation. It needs to be kept in mind that 
we have separated cases of long-term occupation, which form most of the case-law 
and where detriment is often satisfied by the element of long-term commitment. In the 
context of the bargain scenario, it is never enough to show that the claimant has 
suffered a general detriment. As with consideration in contract, it must be something 
which is valuable to the landowner, whether that is improving the value of the land 
(Yaxley v Gotts), helping with the business (Thorner v Major) or taking care of the 
landowner (Jennings v Rice.) Support for this bargain approach to proprietary 
estoppel can be found in Powell v Benney.
147
 Here, Sir Peter Gibson rejected the 
argument made by the claimants that their case was an example of a bargain, as the 
acts in question were done for the claimant‘s benefit and not for the defendant.148 
Another example is the recent Privy Council Opinion in Capron v Government of 
Turks & Caicos Islands & Anor (Turks and Caicos Islands).
149
 The claimants had 
been promised a plot of land for development, and reassurances were made which led 
to the expenditure of money in valuing and surveying the land. The claim failed, and 
Lord Kerr explained that this was due to the fact that no land had been identified for 
this development. In doing so, reference was made to Lord Scott in Yeoman’s Row v 
Cobbe. However, as we have seen, this explanation runs against the decided cases and 
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was doubted by the court in Thorner v Major.
150
 The only sensible analysis is that the 
claim fails because the acts done by the claimants were not done for the benefit of the 
landowner, as they provided no tangible benefit to the land or to the landowner. This 
again supports the overlapping analysis; detriment is too wide and unwieldy to 
achieve this result. It is instead the overlap with contract, through the element of 
bargain, which explains these cases. 
 
Causation 
 
For there to be a reliance-based claim, it must be shown that the communication led to 
the performance of the bargain. At this point, it will be useful to deal with the cases 
mentioned by Gardner, but which it has been suggested earlier on in this chapter do 
not involve any element of reliance. The cases all involve co-habitation between 
claimant and landowner, where the landowner promised to leave land to the claimant, 
but it had no impact on the claimant‘s actions. Wayling v Jones is one such example, 
where the claimant would apparently have lived with and helped his partner whether 
or not any assurances had been made in the first place. The courts justified the 
decision to recognise ‗proprietary estoppel‘ on the basis of ‗reliance.‘ The courts 
adopted a fictional account of reliance by concluding that the ‗burden of proof‘ is on 
the representor to show that the promise was not relied on. Similar reasoning was 
applied in Campbell v Griffin and Ottey v Grundy.
151
 This ‗presumption‘ was applied 
in all of the three cases mentioned above. The problem is that this is not an 
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evidentiary presumption. This is for the simple reason that the most obvious inference 
is that the performance has been provided out of love and affection for the friend or 
partner. Although he makes this point in a different context, Swadling correctly 
explains that when we shift the burden of proof in this way it creates merely a ‗false‘ 
presumption.
152
 Presumptions are perfectly acceptable when they identify the most 
likely inference from the facts. But in the context of these cases it is fictional, and so 
another explanation must be provided. 
 
McFarlane has attempted to explain this conclusion by arguing that, in many of these 
cases, benefits are being provided after the claimant has questioned what they are 
getting out of the relationship.
153
 This can indicate reliance, as we saw in Thorner v 
Major. To support his analysis, McFarlane cites the claimant‘s affidavit in Wayling v 
Jones, where it was stated that if the landowner‘s promise to leave a hotel to him had 
been reneged, he would have left.
154
 However, this selectively ignores the fact that the 
claimant also suggested that he would have remained and carried on working for the 
landowner whether or not the assurances were made in the first place. There was no 
moment of doubt where the past behaviour was jeopardised by what was or was not 
promised by the landowner. Similarly, it fails to explain Campbell v Griffin and Ottey 
v Grundy where, in both cases, the ‗acts of reliance‘ were already being provided and 
there was no evidence at all that the claimant would have stopped ‗performing‘ their 
side of the bargain if the promise had been reneged. If this had been the case then we 
could say that there has been reliance. 
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The problem with the above debate is the very fact that we are even trying to 
accommodate the cases within reliance in the first place. As commented by Lawson, 
‗[the requirement of reliance] does not appear to reflect accurately the dynamics of 
intimate sexual relationships‘ and that in Wayling v Jones the courts are ‗creating 
convenient fictions‘.155 Even before we get to the question whether these decisions 
can be described as bargain cases, it is questionable whether they should even be 
regarded as reliance-based claims at all. Lawson is correct that any search for reliance 
is unhelpful in these cases.
156
 The requirement of reliance would provide an 
unnecessary stumbling block in cases of co-habitation for two reasons. One, it will be 
difficult to identify a point in time when an assurance is made in some cases. In fact, 
in each of the three cases mentioned above, the landowner was deceased and the only 
evidence available about any conversations came from the claimants in these cases. 
Furthermore, according to Thompson, in most situations involving married or 
unmarried couples, it will be difficult to identify reliance, as any actions by the 
claimant will often simply constitute ‗behaviour which is an integral part of the 
relationship.‘157 The point has also been made by Hopkins, who recognises that 
Campbell v Griffin and Ottey v Grundy are difficult for the courts as they involve 
‗care provided in the context of a quasi-familial relationship.‘158 Hopkins goes on to 
argue that in these decisions, the courts are looking for co-habitation and evidence of 
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behaviour which goes beyond that expected of people in the claimant‘s position. This 
shares more factual resemblances with the approach under the ‗common intention 
constructive trust‘. Yet, the courts have unhelpfully adopted ‗proprietary estoppel‘ as 
the description of the claim. This can be easily explained. The reason for this becomes 
quite clear when we consider the criteria which were set out by Lord Bridge in Lloyds 
Bank v Rosset.
159
 His Lordship concluded that, for there to be a ‗common intention 
constructive trust‘, there must be either an express agreement to share the land, or a 
direct financial contribution to the purchase of the land. In Wayling, Campbell and 
Ottey, the indication was that property would be transferred after the death of the 
landowner, which precludes any declaration to share the land. Also, in none of these 
cases had there been any financial contribution to the purchase of the land. Therefore, 
the Court of Appeal simply used an alternative label of ‗proprietary estoppel‘ to 
justify awarding the claimant an interest in these cases. We return to this in Chapter 7, 
where we consider the classification of these cases. It will be argued that they show 
very little overlap with our core concepts.  
 
At this point, the bargain cases become much clearer, but also much narrower too. 
Again, it demonstrates how the overlapping approach to concepts allows us to identify 
clearer guidelines, while requiring us to find an alternative analysis for those cases 
that do not ‗fit.‘ We are not saying that Wayling v Jones, Campbell v Griffin or Ottey 
v Grundy are wrongly decided; they illustrate that the criteria for a ‗common intention 
constructive trust‘ in Lloyds Bank v Rosset are in fact too narrow, a conclusion which 
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has strongly been indicated in the House of Lords and the Privy Council.
160
 The need 
to use ‗proprietary estoppel‘ to reach this conclusion should be removed with the 
indications that non-financial contributions can and should be relevant in determining 
the interests of cohabiting couples. This argument will be picked up in the next 
chapter.  
 
Justifying the Role of Bargain from a Realist Perspective 
 
The nature of the bargain provides an important role in guiding how the court will 
respond to the reliance claim. Since this is not the same as a ‗contract‘, there must be 
proportionality between what has been provided and the interest in the land which is 
being sought.
161
 In other words, the bargain must be a strong one which reflects the 
value of the interest being claimed. Although this has been stated to be of general 
application, it seems quite clear that it does not apply to all proprietary reliance 
cases.
162
 In other words, we have already seen that the occupation cases are 
determined on the basis of the commitment made by the induced party to the land, and 
a long-term commitment may lead to a full transfer of the land even if the value of the 
land far outweighs the ‗detriment‘ suffered in that context. In the bargain cases, it is 
clearer that the extent of the interest reflects the value of the services. This is 
exemplified by Jennings v Rice, where the claimant had looked after the landowner 
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for many years, but it was felt that this benefit did not match the full value of the land 
and her assets. Another example is McGuane v Welch,
163
 where it was recognised that 
there was a bargain between the parties, but the court refused to fulfil it as the deal 
represented ‗a substantial undervalue and in respect of which the transferor had 
received no independent advice.‘164 So the courts will try to enforce the bargain, but 
since we have stepped outside the conceptual boundary of contract, the courts are not 
enforcing the full expectations of the induced party. Again, recognising that the 
operation of standard contract rules are ‗diluted‘ when the subject of the bargain is 
land, is invaluable to our understanding of these cases. 
 
Summary of the Overlaps in Reliance-Based Claims 
 
What we have seen within this section is that it would be nonsensical to try to group 
together all claims which the courts have referred to as examples of ‗proprietary 
estoppel.‘ The cases become much clearer when we define the requirement of 
communication and also define the requirement of reliance. Furthermore, reliance 
itself is not a sufficient explanation of any of the cases, which illustrates why, in the 
absence of a more detailed and realistic account of the case law, the law is currently 
regarded as discretionary and difficult to predict. By breaking the cases down into two 
types of overlaps which focus on either occupation, bargain, or in some circumstances 
both, a clearer picture emerges. Although it is not always easy to predict the precise 
awards in the cases, it is much easier than using any wider argument based purely on 
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contract or unconscionability. Only by looking for facts will the patterns begin to 
emerge. This shows that occupation still lies at the heart of reliance-based estoppel 
claims, particularly as it is the most compelling reason for interfering with the 
competing title of the landowner. The narrower application of the bargain cases is 
explained by the requirement of full performance and that a benefit has been received 
by the landowner. As stated above, this may appear to provide harsh consequences, 
but in bargain cases the claimant can usually make an alternative claim for the value 
of any services provided. Thus, in both circumstances, the level of award reflects the 
nature of the reliance; for occupation it is the type of occupation and level of 
commitment that determines the response, and for the bargain situation it is the nature 
of the bargain and how whether it provides a proportionate value to that of the land. 
These are not absolute rules, simply patterns that can be observed in predicting the 
behaviour of the courts. They cannot be understood, and certainly cannot be 
classified, without recognising the operation of overlaps. 
 
4. Reliance and Claims for Non-Contractual Services 
 
In regards to our next reliance overlap, we now have a mechanism to explain the 
majority of claims involving non-contractual services. These are cases where a 
claimant asks to be paid for work done in the absence of a contract. To restate the 
point from Chapter 4; our definition of a contract is an agreement to exchange. 
Sometimes, as Hedley has argued,
165
 the situations in these ‗non-contractual‘ 
situations are often very similar to contract. For this reason, Hedley seeks to place 
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them within the concept of contract. However, in contrast to Hedley‘s ‗contractual 
analysis‘, it is argued here that there is little to be gained by stretching contract to 
cover these situations. The explanation provided here is that the claimant is liable in 
circumstances which may be similar to ‗contract‘, but where the important element is 
reliance. As we have already seen, reliance means that the defendant must have 
communicated something to the claimant which has a causal effect on the claimant‘s 
behaviour. In this context, it is a desire to receive the conferral of the services in the 
first place. If the services were going to be provided anyway, there will be no claim. 
The similarity with contract lies in the fact that the services must have been provided 
under an agreement. This provides, once again, an important overlap. This time the 
overlap is with contract, without any overlaps with property. 
 
The issue of non-contractual services has been raised in a number of recent cases, 
such as Blue Haven v Tully,
166
 and Chief Constable of Greater Manchester v Wigan 
Athletic AFC Ltd.
167
 These decisions confirm that the defendant must communicate an 
intention to receive the conferral of the services. This is a reliance-based claim. A 
similar argument has also been made by McBride in ‗A Fifth Common Law 
Obligation‘,168 where the author concludes that this type of claim is not tortious, 
contractual or enrichment based.
169
 McBride identifies detrimental reliance at the core 
of these claims, an approach which reflects that taken in Australia after Walton Stores 
Interstate Ltd. v Maher,
170
 and also reflects the analysis that is primarily used in 
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America.
171
 Just as we saw in reliance-based land claims, we do not need to look for 
detrimental reliance. Reliance can be satisfied by showing that the acts done by the 
claimant are attributable to the inducement, which is part of a wider agreement 
between the parties. It is this element which provides the important overlap with 
contract. It may sound odd, but the bargain element is not required. This is for the 
simple reason that we do not need to show that the recipient of the services is giving 
anything in return. Before proceeding to set out this reliance-based agreement claim 
in more detail, we will deal with the two competing theories which have attempted to 
explain this area of law; unjust enrichment and contract. 
 
Unjust Enrichment Explanation 
 
As we saw in the last chapter, unjust enrichment, as it is currently understood in 
English law, is said to consist of enrichment at the expense of the claimant, where 
there is a recognised unjust factor,
172
 without any available defence.
173
 There are two 
reasons for rejecting the unjust enrichment analysis in the context of non-contractual 
services; the first being that are no cases which indicate that the paradigm ‗unjust 
factor‘ has any application in cases of non-contractual services. Secondly, the 
requirement of enrichment is simply not reflected in the case law. We will deal with 
these issues in turn. 
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The Unjust Factor 
 
The first concern with unjust enrichment is that the paradigm unjust factor of mistake 
is seemingly precluded in any claim for non-contractual services. Liability can only 
be established where the defendant has made an agreement to receive these services. 
A more explicit rejection of mistake as an unjust factor for non-contractual services 
can be found in the judgment of Smith LJ in Chief Constable of Greater Manchester v 
Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd.
174
 The case involved a disagreement between the Chief 
Constable and a football club about the necessary level of policing for games at the 
club‘s home ground. The Chief Constable believed that a higher number of police 
officers were required than had been the case in previous years, whilst the club 
contended that there was no need to increase the numbers of officers at home games. 
According to Smith LJ, the chief constable was ‗labouring under a misapprehension 
as to the level of [Special Police Services] requested‘ and therefore had ‗made a 
mistake as to their position, a mistake which the club had done nothing to lead them 
into. I do not see why the club should have to make good the [Greater Manchester 
Police‘s] mistake. I do not see why the club should pay for services which it did not 
ask for and which the police provided of their own volition.‘175 Similar objections to 
the application of a unilateral mistake as the basis of a claim for non-contractual 
services can be found in Rowe v Vale of White Horse
176
  and Benedetti v Sawiris.
177
 
Space precludes going into the debate about whether ‗free acceptance‘ should be 
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another unjust ground,
178
 but this larger debate simply reinforces the reality that this 
situation is clearly different from the example of a mistaken payment. Admittedly, our 
conclusion that we should distinguish between different types of enrichment was 
described by Birks as being ‗plainly nonsense.‘179 However, as noted by Dietrich, the 
lack of any case law to support the unified approach provided by unjust enrichment 
makes our conclusion unavoidable.
180
 The Opinion of the Privy Council in Blue 
Haven v Tully is another very clear example of this.
181
 Despite finding that a mistaken 
improver of land had ‗enriched‘ the defendant, no reference was made to the ‗unjust 
factor‘ of mistake. Instead, Lord Scott stated that the principles which govern this 
claim were the same as those which govern reliance-based claims in ‗proprietary 
estoppel.‘ This very much supports the overlapping analysis of this Chapter. Lord 
Scott‘s judgment in Blue Haven, is one of the clearest examples of the overlapping 
approach being explicitly used by the courts. The reliance element is the same in both 
reliance-based land claims and in claims for non-contractual services. From a realist 
perspective, this indicates that we are looking at a very different concept from that 
seen in cases of mistaken payments, and therefore requires a different analysis. The 
benefit of our overlapping approach is that we have the mechanism to explain the 
requirements of this claim. 
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Recognising this issue, Burrows has adopted ‗failure of consideration‘ as the 
reasoning which explains claims for non-contractual services.
182
 Nonetheless, 
Burrows fails to explain why mistake is precluded in most cases.
183
 If we look past the 
mistake issue, the identification of ‗failure of consideration‘ is, to a degree, similar 
approach to the one adopted here. Nonetheless there is one important difference; as 
we saw in Chapter 5, ‗failure of consideration‘ hides the importance of recognising 
that the purpose for the services is shared by the defendant as well as the claimant. To 
avoid confusion, the agreement element needs to be brought to the forefront. 
 
The Enrichment Issue 
 
For most unjust enrichment lawyers, in principle, there is no distinction between 
money transfers and non-contractual services.
184
 It has recently been argued by 
Edelman that where the defendant has received a benefit in the form of non-
contractual services, the unjust enrichment analysis is the appropriate analysis for the 
liability of the defendant.
185
 One significant problem with the unjust enrichment 
analysis is that, as McBride notes, enrichment is not an essential ingredient in a claim 
for the conferral of non-contractual services.
186
 For example, there are many claims 
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for non-contractual services where there is no identifiable benefit.
187
 One such 
example is Pullbrook v Lawes,
188
 where the claimant had entered into an oral 
agreement for the lease of a house, on the condition that specified improvements were 
made. The claimant contributed to the improvements, which were made with the 
consent of the defendant. Although it was stated by Blackburn J that the claimant‘s 
improvements were of no benefit to the house, his claim for the value of the services 
was successful. If this claim was concerned with unjust enrichment, the award would 
have reflected the actual benefit to the recipient, rather than the reasonable value of 
the services provided. A similar problem arises in the case of Planché v Colbourn, 
189
 
where the defendant had contracted with the claimant to write a book aimed at 
youngsters. Before the claimant submitted his work, the defendant decided to abandon 
the publication. The claimant succeeded in his claim for quantum meruit, without 
being required to submit the work which he had already completed. With some 
artificiality one could argue that the benefit received by the defendant was that the 
claimant‘s treatise would be available in the event that the publication was 
continued.
190
 However, this did not appear to be relevant in the court‘s decision in 
Planché, as the main justification for the award in the judgment was that the claimant 
had done that which he had been asked to do.
191
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Additionally, it is highly fictional to regard mere acceptance as evidence of a 
benefit.
192
 For example, my next door neighbour, who is a budding musician, asks me 
whether I enjoy his compositions. If I say yes, this encouragement does not 
necessarily mean that I value his efforts as a benefit, as I might just be saying this so 
as not to offend him. It would make little sense if he could then turn around and ask 
me to pay him for the value of his services. Indeed there is a consensus amongst 
academics that the issue of enrichment for non-contractual services is more 
complicated than when the enrichment is in the form of a money transfer.
193
 Primarily 
these complications arise because the defendant may not value the enrichment, and an 
order to make restitution might limit his freedom of choice. Likewise if I see someone 
who is mistakenly cleaning my windows, I might not say anything simply because I 
think that it will teach the cleaner not to make silly mistakes.
194
 The requirement of 
acceptance or acquiescence is, therefore, a distinct issue from the question of whether 
the defendant values the enrichment. One may be enriched by the services provided 
by the claimant and at the same time have good reasons for not wanting to pay for 
these services.
195
 Take, for example, this scenario (which is a slightly modified 
example of the one given by Birks in An Introduction to the Law of Restitution): A 
tells B that he would like to have his house painted but he cannot afford to do so, 
because he has more pressing financial concerns.
196
 B mishears A, and thinks that A 
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will be able to pay for the work. A may very well be enriched if B goes ahead and 
paints his house while he is away on holiday. Nonetheless, the obligation cannot 
simply be forced upon A simply due to the fact that B mistakenly believed that A 
would pay for this, and A is now enriched.
197
 The case law refutes any such 
proposition.
198
 Importantly, it also conceals the reliance element which is present in 
these claims. For example, the claimant may provide the defendant with something 
valuable, but if it was going to be provided anyway no claim will lie.
199
 
 
A more convincing explanation for these claims is provided by Beatson, who argues 
that the claim for non-contractual services, at least where it does not produce a 
tangible benefit for the defendant, is based on the principle of injurious reliance.
200
 
This is not an attempt to argue that the concept of unjust enrichment is irrelevant in 
claims for non-contractual services, as the unjust enrichment analysis may be helpful 
in cases where the benefit is readily returnable, such as in the Greenwood v Bennett 
situation.
201
 Even so, the application of this rule only appears to be relevant as a 
partial defence to pre-existing claims. In the majority of claims for non-contractual 
services, the unjust enrichment analysis only serves to obscure the true nature of the 
claim.  
 
Expanding our concept of Contract 
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An alternative approach that has been proposed is that claims for services should 
simply be incorporated into a wider conception of contract. Hedley, for example, 
argues that these claims are contractual in nature, and that they are not concerned with 
reversing unjust enrichment.
202
 It is certainly true that contractual terms can come into 
force even when the parties have not expressly agreed to them. As stated by Waller LJ 
in Furmans Electrical Contractors v Elecref Ltd, a court will be unwilling to find that 
there is no contract simply because there is no agreed price.
203
 Even when the courts 
do not apply the term ‗contract‘, a prior contract is also often a good indicator of how 
the court will deal with the claim. An example is ERDC Group Ltd v Brunel 
University,
204
 where the value of the services was the same under the initial contract 
and also in the period after the agreement had expired. In ERDC, even though the 
contract had expired, the court concluded that the terms under that agreement still 
determined the conditions under which the work was being provided.  
 
Hedley has argued that it would not be going too far to use the language of contract to 
explain claims for non-contractual services. Hedley utilises a wide version of contract 
to achieve this aim. In fact, his version is so wide that he has on one occasion 
indicated that he sees little distinction between contract and other areas of the law 
such as tort.
205
 For Hedley, contract is based on ‗a factual premise – that commercial 
parties confer benefits in the expectation of receiving payment‘.206 That may be the 
case, but the issue in most contracts is that the expectations of A and B are sometimes 
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very different. The courts invariably side with the recipient of the services, even if the 
provider has a reasonable expectation to be paid.
207
 McKendrick is surely correct that 
stretching contract to cover cases where there is no agreement to pay for the actual 
services provided only serves to undermine the concept of contract.
208
 There is also a 
difference in the measures applied, as under contract we would see expectation 
damages, but as McKendrick points out, claims for non-contractual services reflect 
what would generally be regarded as ‗reliance‘ based damages.209 The final, very 
important, difference is that the claim only arises after performance. A simple 
agreement does not provide any possible claim in the non-contractual services cases. 
It is only when performance has begun that the claim has any chance of success. 
 
Another approach has been taken by Jaffey,
210
 who suggests that this claim is a 
‗device for effecting exchanges where agreement is impossible or impracticable.‘211 
However, this overlooks the fact that the claim for non-contractual services can occur 
even when negotiation is possible and practical. Moreover, it would seem to 
undermine the entire premise of the concept of contract by enforcing exchanges where 
no agreement has been reached. The ‗contract‘ explanation must be abandoned for the 
reason that it would require the expansion of contract, when this is not at all 
necessary. Certainly there are striking similarities between claims for non-contractual 
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services and contract, but at the same time there are important distinctions. Applying 
the overlapping concepts analysis once again will provide the best explanation for the 
co-existence of the two types of claim. 
 
The Reliance Approach 
 
The approach which is adopted in this chapter is reliance-based, but as has been 
repeatedly stated reliance itself will not explain the case law. For the purposes of this 
section, the additional element is agreement; but we do not mean that the parties have 
necessarily agreed to the payment for the services. Instead, we are arguing that the 
claimant relies on the agreement which has been communicated between him and the 
defendant. Unlike the analysis with the bargain type reliance-based land claims, it is 
not necessary to show that this is beneficial to the claimant. As we have pointed out, 
this runs against the current unjust enrichment approach which would place 
enrichment at the centre of the claim.  
 
This is justified on three counts. The first is that we have already seen that there are 
many cases where the defendant receives no tangible benefits whatsoever from the 
performance of the services. Secondly, we do not need to contend with a competing 
title in land, as the claimant is asking to be paid for their services, not for an interest in 
land. The reallocation of wealth is something which the courts are more ready to do 
when they are not faced with competing claims to land. This is because there is no 
property issue in play in these cases except for the defendant‘s title to his pre-existing 
wealth. Thirdly, unlike in bargain cases, there is absolutely no need for the claimant to 
provide complete performance in return for payment. This is why agreement is 
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relevant; if the defendant agrees to receive the services, it is the reliance of the 
claimant on the wider agreement which best describes the claim. This regularly 
happens in cases of pre-contractual liability, which covers benefits provided where 
both parties expect a contract to materialise, but where the contract is never 
formalised. If the services are provided for any other reason there will be no reliance 
and thus no claim. 
 
Agreement 
 
The reliance approach asks whether there was an agreement to provide the non-
contractual services. A recent example is the case which we mentioned earlier of 
Yeoman’s Row v Cobbe.212 The agreement there was for the claimant to obtain 
planning permission for the demolition of an existing block of flats and then to 
develop houses. However, no formal contract was ever agreed and the defendant 
withdrew from the negotiations. It should be remembered that the defendant failed to 
establish his claim in ‗proprietary estoppel.‘ The claim instead succeeded on the basis 
of the value of the services that the claimant had provided which secured the planning 
permission for the land. Lord Scott referred to three different justifications for this 
claim; ‗unjust enrichment,‘ ‗quantum meruit‘ and ‗failure of consideration.‘ As for the 
unjust enrichment explanation, his Lordship did not refer to any particular unjust 
factor, but it appears that he was referring to ‗failure of consideration.‘ As for the 
second, quantum meruit is simply a reference to the award based on the value of the 
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services, so it does not explain why the claim succeeded in the first place.
213
 The 
essence of the claim seems, therefore, to lie in the meaning of ‗consideration which 
has wholly failed.‘  
 
Despite the use of the phrase ‗failure of consideration‘, this has not introduced a new 
basis for the claims involving non-contractual services. Writing in 1997, Spence had 
already identified four English decisions where similar facts had arisen and the claims 
were successful.
214
 Importantly, he also viewed all these cases as being examples of 
reliance-based claims.
215
 For example, the facts of Yeoman’s Row v Cobbe are very 
similar to William Lacey v Davis,
216
 where the claimant had been approached by the 
defendant for the prospective development of land, with the defendant also leading 
the claimant to believe that a full contract would eventually be completed. Spence has 
analysed the decision in William Lacey v Davis in terms of reliance, and it is also 
possible to apply the same analysis to Yeoman’s Row v Cobbe. The claimants in 
neither case would have undertaken the time and effort to do the work that they did, 
unless they had been led to believe that a contract would be concluded. Similarly, the 
defendant would not have been liable if he had not agreed to receive the services. This 
was recognised in Yeoman’s Row v Cobbe, where Lord Scott stated that ‗[w]here an 
agreement is reached under which an individual provides money and services in 
return for a legal but unenforceable promise which the promisor, after the money has 
been paid and the services provided, refuses to carry out, the individual would be 
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entitled, in my opinion, to a restitutionary remedy.‘217 Although we do not agree that 
this is ‗restitutionary‘, this is an accurate statement of a reliance-based claim where 
the induced party acts on the basis of a wider agreement. In essence, the claim 
requires an agreement, and the services are provided to facilitate this agreement. It 
should also be noted that if the terms of the agreement exclude any award for non-
contractual services then it will also prevent any claim. For example, if gratuitous 
services are provided under an agreement, the claimant clearly cannot rely on the 
agreement to assist in any claim for the value of these services. At present, this 
agreement element is hidden beneath the language of unjust enrichment. Using our 
analysis, it is much easier to identify this overlap with contract. 
 
Communication 
 
As in all reliance claims, the claim for the value of services provided will not succeed 
unless the defendant has communicated that the claimant should provide the services. 
In BP Exploration Co.(Libya)  Ltd v Hunt (No. 2)
218
 Goff J noted that claims for non-
requested services are ‗rare in restitution‘.219 The simple explanation for this is that if 
there is no agreement for the provision of the services, there can be no claim in the 
first place. In the absence of communication, there can be no inducement. In Blue 
Haven v Tully,
220
 the defendant witnessed the development of a coffee plantation on 
his estate, and informed one of the employees of the claimant that the development 
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was illegal. He was then told that this information had been passed to the claimant. He 
proceeded to visit the estate around three times a year for around five years, without 
making any further objections to the development. This was sufficient to preclude the 
claimant from establishing any agreement to carry out the work. Another recent 
example is the aforementioned Chief Constable of Greater Manchester v Wigan 
Athletic AFC Ltd.
221
 Here, the claimant reluctantly accepted an increase in security for 
a football match, and then refused to pay the costs of the additional services which 
had been provided.  There was a clear agreement to accept the basic level of security, 
but no agreement at all that the increased level of security should be provided. The 
defendant was only under an obligation to pay for the services to which it had agreed.  
 
Services 
 
Although most commentators adopt an unjust enrichment analysis, they also 
recognise that the value of the services is determined by the agreement itself. The 
agreement governs both the services to be provided and also the availability of any 
award. The obvious requirement is that the claimant must perform the services which 
were envisaged under the agreement. Since we are referring to agreement, it should be 
remembered that agreement is an objective fact. Accordingly, we do not consider the 
uncommunicated thoughts or expectations of either party. It is the agreement which 
determines the nature of the services to be provided. It may be that the claimant is 
given a specific task to do, as in Pullbrook v Lawes,
222
 or it may, in some cases, 
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require the claimant to begin work on a larger project, as in Planché v Colbourn.
223
 It 
will also cover situations where there is an agreement that the claimant will achieve a 
specific goal which is also contingent on an event that is outside the control of the 
parties. For example, if A asks B to assist in the takeover of a company, the courts 
will ask whether B caused the eventual takeover. If A achieves it without B‘s 
assistance there will be no claim against A.
224
  
 
Causation 
 
The issue of causation is something which the unjust enrichment analysis cannot 
explain. If the claimant has not actually relied on the defendant‘s representation it 
seems that there will be no liability; this is demonstrated by E.N.E. Kos v Petroleo 
Brasileiro S.A.
225
 In E.N.E. Kos, Smith J ruled out any possible claim for requested 
services as ‗[t]he positions adopted by both parties demanded that the status quo be 
maintained during the exchanges. I consider it unrealistic to draw the inference that in 
the exchanges or their response to them the Owners were complying with any request 
of the Charterers.‘226 Although part of this judgment was later reversed by the Court 
of Appeal, this part of Smith J‘s judgment was not criticised. In fact, Longmore LJ 
appeared to take the same line of reasoning in the Court of Appeal on this particular 
issue.
227
 The claimants performed these acts for a purpose which failed and it was 
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clearly of benefit to the defendant. The absence of a causal link between what was 
said by the defendant, and the claimant‘s act, removes any possibility of reliance. This 
is, therefore, the better explanation of this case. That the case appears to run against 
the unjust enrichment analysis is supported by McMeel‘s statement that, in Enos, ‗the 
court accordingly failed to grapple with important, difficult and financially significant 
issues concerning the nature and identification of the benefit (if any) received…‘228 
Our approach is that this argument rests on the premise that the law should conform to 
the abstract theory of unjust enrichment, when instead it should be the theory which 
conforms to the law.
229
 To put it in simpler terms, we cannot criticise a court for not 
applying a test which has never worked or properly explained that area of law. The 
claim makes perfect sense on a reliance analysis, and the over-generalities introduced 
by unjust enrichment have failed to introduce sufficient certainty in our understanding 
of non-contractual services. 
 
Payment for Non-Contractual services 
 
Undoubtedly, if the defendant has encouraged the claimant to confer a valuable 
benefit, then the value of the benefit received will have some relevance in the award 
made by the court. However, it is not the only issue that will be taken into account. In 
fact, in most claims for non-contractual services the detriment suffered by the 
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claimant is just as important as the tangible benefits received by the defendant. This 
issue was recognised by Mr Nicholas Strauss, Q.C. in Countrywide Communications 
Limited v ICL Pathway Ltd;
230
 ‗[m]uch of the difficulty is caused by attempting to 
categorise [the claim for non-contractual services] as an unjust enrichment of the 
defendant, for which an action in restitution is available, what is really a loss unfairly 
sustained by the plaintiff.‘231 The unjust enrichment analysis, which we mentioned 
earlier, is unhelpful for judges as the benefit received is not the only relevant factor in 
determining the appropriate level of the award.
232
 This is because, if the claim does 
not fit into contract, the unjust enrichment approach tries to fit it into a very distinct 
category. This ignores the reality that this claim clearly does overlap and the 
agreement element is important in determining the operation of this claim. 
 
This is also demonstrated by the decision in ERDC Group Ltd v Brunel University.
233
 
The claimants had constructed buildings on behalf of the defendant, with some of the 
work being done under a valid contract and some of the work being completed after 
this agreement had expired. There was apparently a disagreement about the 
appropriate valuation of the construction work, and subsequently the initial agreement 
expired. At this point, the parties could not agree on a price for the continuation of the 
project. Importantly, however, the parties both agreed that the claimant should 
continue to provide the services. Afterwards, it was contended by the claimant that the 
costs of the work had increased by the time that the letter of intent had expired. The 
claimant offered to carry on the work on the basis of quantum meruit, which would be 
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based on a costs plus profit basis. It was decided by Lloyd QC that the appropriate 
valuation of the work was that under the initial contract, not the quantum meruit basis 
that was being claimed by the defendant. At the same time, costs for unexpected 
delays were also taken into account when assessing the appropriate level of award. 
This reflected the loss suffered by the claimant rather than any specific gain received 
by the defendant. Another interesting issue in the decision was that some of the work 
was found to be substandard. The court, therefore, made a reduction to the award that 
was due to the defendant, which indicates that the court was weighing both the 
benefits received by the defendant and the losses suffered by the claimant.
234
 This can 
be explained on the basis that there was an agreement to perform the services, but not 
to an unsatisfactory standard. Therefore, the nature and terms of the agreement 
provide the best guidelines for the response of the court. In most cases, the best way 
of achieving this is the market value of the services, which is neither exclusively loss-
based nor gain-based.
235
  
 
Justifying this Approach 
 
By adopting reliance, the inquiry takes into account the actions of the defendant and 
the effect that this has on the status of the claimant (he must place reasonable reliance 
on this encouragement.) Moreover, reliance-based claims deter defendants from 
refusing to pay for services which they have requested (which justifies making people 
liable to pay for benefits or losses, even when they hold no subjective value for the 
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defendant) and removes the financial incentive for non-contractual exchanges (the 
claimant does not have the opportunity to make a disproportionate gain from the 
reliance as he is restricted to the objective value of the work, while at the same time 
he also takes the risk that he will not be able to establish a reliance-based claim in the 
first place.)
236
 Clearly there will be an overlap of factual circumstances; as Waddams 
has pointed out reliance-based claims can include elements of consent (contract), loss 
(tort) and gain (unjust enrichment.)
237
 The approach offered here also allows us to 
protect the conceptual boundaries of the concept of contract, as well as the claims for 
monetary transfers which we established in the previous chapter, whilst removing any 
necessity to stretch these concepts beyond their factual boundaries. This is only 
possible by recognising the overlap between reliance and contract. 
 
5.Reliance and Carelessness  
 
 
At this point, we can further develop the idea of how reliance overlaps with other 
legal concepts. The overlap which we are concerned with here relates to situations 
where reliance is present in the form of inducement and the claimant‘s reliance-loss, 
coupled with carelessness. This is more commonly referred to as claims for pure 
economic loss. In Chapter 4, we adopted a narrow concept of negligence, which 
requires physical loss caused by a positive act of careless conduct. Just as intangible 
money is a weak version of property, so too do we have a weak version of tort; loss 
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and carelessness are present, but the important element of physical loss is absent. The 
territory which we left out of our concept of tort does not need to be left unaccounted 
for. The argument which is presented is that in most cases of ‗pure economic loss‘, 
reliance is an essential ingredient in the claim. It should, however, be noted that this is 
not an attempt to explain all cases of pure economic loss. Nonetheless, the 
requirement of reliance corresponds with the general reluctance to impose liability for 
omissions, as the communicated inducement makes the potential liability of the 
claimant a self-imposed one, at least to some extent. The established authority, which 
to this day is still good law, is the decision in Hedley Byrne v Heller
238
  (the Hedley 
Byrne principle.) In Hedley Byrne, the House of Lords recognised that a claim in 
negligence could succeed for inaccurate statements which are relied on by the 
claimant and result in financial losses.  
 
The comparison with proprietary estoppel may sound odd, but the origins of the 
Hedley Byrne claim in fact can be traced to the earlier House of Lords decision in 
Nocton v Lord Ashburton.
239
 Lord Shaw explicitly stated that, whilst he was avoiding 
the term ‗estoppel‘, the basis of liability for negligent statements was based on a 
similar principle.
240
 Although this is a wider form of estoppel, the essential 
requirement of reliance is the same as we have seen in the above section. There are 
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many other examples where the analogy with reliance-based estoppel was made in 
cases involving negligence for pure economic loss, as in Low v Bouverie
241
 and Seton, 
Laing & Co v Lafone.
242
 Thus the indications were that there were certainly some 
similarities with existing reliance-based claims. Using the overlapping approach 
developed in this thesis, it is possible to explain the similarities with reliance-based 
estoppel, whilst at the same time recognising that, due to the nature of the overlaps, 
they do not require a like-for-like approach. The overlap lies in reliance, coupled with 
carelessness and the control mechanism of reasonable reliance (this is in addition to 
the causal element required for reliance generally.) As will be discussed further on, 
the role of reliance correlates to the different concerns that arise with regards to 
physical harms and purely economic harms. 
 
 
Rejecting Assumption of Responsibility 
 
Assumption of responsibility is also problematic for a number of reasons. A 
competing analysis of the cases of pure economic loss is adopted by Stevens, who 
argues that the claim for pure economic loss arises simply on the defendant‘s 
assumption of responsibility.
243
 Assumption of responsibility was used by Lord Goff 
to justify the decisions in White v Jones, Spring v Guardian and Henderson v Merrett. 
Indeed, this is why Stevens argues that all cases can be explained on the basis of 
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assumption of responsibility.
244
 Both Whittaker and Murphy have criticised the 
assumption of responsibility approach for being too wide, as it seems to run entirely 
against the requirement of consideration in contract.
245
 If this was the basis of the 
claim in these cases, one would be liable simply for making a gratuitous promise, but 
we know generally this will not be sufficient to justify imposing liability. On its own, 
assumption of responsibility sets the conceptual boundaries too wide to be of any 
useful application. We already know this because we have identified a clear pattern 
which contradicts any such principle. 
 
 
Reliance Does Not Explain All Cases of Pure Economic Loss 
 
In particular, Barker, whilst recognising that the reliance-model could explain most of 
the cases of pure economic loss, concluded that ‗the law of negligence has already 
advanced beyond the ground which models of liability based upon specific reliance 
are capable of encompassing.‘246 For example, there is the line of authority which 
began with Anns v Merton LBC.
247
 It was never possible to apply a reliance analysis 
to this line of authority. However, this line of authority has now ended with Smith v 
Erich Bush,
248
  which has more recently been followed by the Court of Appeal.
249
 
Therefore, we can safely leave this to one side.  
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The other line of authority, which came after Barker‘s article, can be traced to a trio of 
House of Lords decisions which were decided in the mid 1990s. These cases are 
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates,
250
 White v Jones
251
 and Spring v Guardian 
Assurance.
252
 All three cases involve elements of reliance, but not in the same way as 
most other cases of reliance. Henderson involved claims against sub-agents, where 
the courts held that a duty was owed to the claimants even in the absence any direct 
contractual relationship. In White v Jones, the defendant failed to carry out 
instructions to amend a testator‘s will, which resulted in the intended beneficiaries 
missing out on the inheritance that the testator wanted to leave for them.
253
 The 
beneficiaries were successful in their claim, despite the absence of reliance. As 
Waddams points out, it is certainly possible to identify an element of reliance in White 
v Jones, as the testator clearly relied on the solicitor to amend the will.
254
 The same 
can be said for Henderson, as the agents relied on the sub-agents to perform their jobs 
carefully on behalf of the claimants. It is not, however a clear example of a reliance-
based claim as the lack of communication between defendant and claimant prevents 
there being any direct reliance in either situation. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson did in 
both Henderson
255
 and White v Jones,
256
 an analogy can be drawn with fiduciary 
duties of trustees, whereby the beneficiary need not have any communication with the 
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trustee, but nonetheless the trustee owes duties to that beneficiary. This is not simply 
an example of a ‗trust‘, as there is no trust asset in these cases. It is thus an overlap 
between reliance and the trust mechanism, and it need not form part of our core 
concept of reliance. This analysis also explains Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock 
Marine Co Ltd,
257
 where the owner of cargo which was lost at sea tried to sue a 
classification society for negligently surveying the ship. The claim failed, and an 
obvious reason for this was that the defendant had made no indication that it would 
look after the interests of the cargo owners. 
 
A modified form of this three-party reliance claim is also present in Spring v 
Guardian, as the other employer who requested the reference was clearly relying on 
the contents of the supplied reference. Spring, however, is slightly different from 
Henderson and White insofar as the defendant was not asked to look after the 
claimant‘s interests, but rather to provide an accurate reference. Thus an additional 
fact was required, which was that this was an act done by an employer in regards to an 
employee. For Lord Cooke, this provides the best explanation of the decision in 
Spring, and brings into play the status of the defendant as an employee, which we 
have already identified as being relevant in negligence claims generally.
258
 Thus, in 
each case the reliance was between a third party and the defendant. The lack of any 
reliance also goes some way to explaining why there was no liability in Customs & 
Excise v Barclays Bank,
259
 where a bank ignored a freezing injunction imposed by a 
court and released funds which were owed to the customs commissioners. The court 
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was in no way relying on the bank, it made an order under its own volition. The 
reliance analysis, on its own, cannot provide a complete explanation of the cases 
without stretching our idea of reliance to the point of usefulness. This is because it 
would be over-inclusive and would remove the need for communication which is 
essential in the majority of the cases.
260
 An explanation which fits the non-reliance 
cases is that (i) the defendant has communicated to a third party that they will look 
after the interests of the claimant or that the defendant is an employer who is 
providing information about an employee (ii) the third party has relied on this and (iii) 
this causes loss to the claimant. Reliance is still central, but if the communication is 
made to another third party, then an additional element must come into play. We can 
leave to one side these cases, and move on to explore our primary overlap between 
negligence and reliance. 
Why Reliance is to be Preferred 
 
This approach means jettisoning unhelpful legal devices such as ‗special relationship‘, 
‗assumption of responsibility‘ and ‗proximity,‘ all of which have proven to be elusive 
terms. As Stapleton has concluded ‗[w]hat is needed is the unmasking of whatever 
specific factors in each individual case weighed with judges in their determination of 
duty. It is not acceptable merely for a judge baldly to assert that the plaintiff was 
proximate; or that a duty was justified because the parties were in a ‗special 
relationship‘, or because the plaintiff had 'reasonably relied' on the defendant, or 
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merely because it was 'fair, just and reasonable'. Without more, these are just 
labels.‘261 The point was even made by Lord Bridge himself in Caparo who, after 
setting out his three-stage test for duty of care in negligence, concluded that the 
‗ingredients are not susceptible of any such precise definition as would be necessary 
to give them utility as practical tests, but amount in effect to little more than 
convenient labels.‘262 
 
The reliance element should not be underplayed simply because it does not provide a 
comprehensive account of claims for pure economic loss. Even Barker concedes that 
the vast majority of the case law is explained on this basis. When cases arise that do 
not fit into a reliance analysis, the answer is not to conclude that reliance is no longer 
useful and it certainly does not mean that the answer is to find an even wider principle 
to explain pure economic loss claims. Unfortunately, this is precisely what Barker 
does. The better analysis, surely, is to keep reliance so long as it predicts most of the 
case law, and identify the facts which underlie the cases which we cannot explain 
under reliance.  
 
 
The Overlapping Element: Carelessness 
 
As indicated, the significant overlap with claims for negligence is the requirement for 
‗carelessness,‘ however, it will be explained that at this point it is necessary to show 
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that not only has the defendant been careless, but also that the claimant himself was 
careful in relying on the defendant. A good example is Caparo v Dickman,
263
 where 
the claimant had relied on advice provided in an audit report. The claimant‘s own 
behaviour was careless when considering the alternative routes available to the 
investor for establishing this information.
264
 In contrast, in Morgan Crucible v Hill 
Samuel Bank,
265
 the case was distinguished as the claimants relied on information 
during the course of negotiations, and ‗much of the information on which the accounts 
and profit forecast was based was presumably available to the defendants alone.‘266 
This indicates that the claimants were justified in relying on what was said. This is 
commonly referred to as the requirement of ‗reasonable reliance‘.267 
 
This approach also helps to explain the role of disclaimers. In Hedley Byrne v Heller, 
it was concluded that the claimant had relied on the advice of the defendant, but 
liability was excluded by a disclaimer of liability.
268
 Subsequently, in Smith v Eric 
Bush, the House of Lords refused to enforce a disclaimer which was made by a 
surveyor in a report which was communicated to a prospective home buyer.
269
 This 
was justified on the basis of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, and in particular 
section 13 which subjects disclaimers to a test of reasonableness. The disclaimer in 
Smith was regarded as unreasonable given the professional expertise of the defendant 
and the status of the purchaser. Thus, where a professional fails to perform his job 
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properly in valuing a house, and this is relied upon by a non-professional, the balance 
of carelessness goes in favour of the claimant.  By balance of carelessness, we mean 
that this is one of the situations where the courts need a control mechanism for the 
issue of fairness.  If the claimant‘s reliance is careless, then the claim is unlikely to 
succeed.  This just simply reflects the pattern that we identified at the start, which 
shows that economic interests are not provided with full protection by the courts, 
when compared to physical loss.   
 
Communication 
 
As with our earlier discussion of reliance in the context of land disputes, here the 
claim requires the communication to the claimant some information which is 
subsequently relied upon. In short, the communication must be directed towards the 
claimant. This was the case in Smith v Eric Bush,
270
 where the surveyor passed the 
information to the bank, who then forwarded it to the claimant. In contrast, in West 
Bromwich Albion FC v El-Safty,
271
 the medical opinion of a surgeon was 
communicated to a football player and not to the player‘s employer. A closer analysis 
of Williams v Natural Life Health
272
 also demonstrates this point. The information 
provided by the defendant was given to his company, and not directed towards the 
claimant. Again, we see that the reliance mechanism is applied across a variety of 
situations, and is easily identifiable. This demonstrates its usefulness as a realist 
concept. 
                                                 
 
 
270
 Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 (HL). 
271
 West Bromwich Albion FC v El-Safty [2006] EWCA Civ 1299, (2007) PIQR P7. 
272
 [1998] 1 WLR 830 (HL). 
  
289 
 
 
 
Loss 
 
In contrast to reliance-based land claims, the factual element of the defendant‘s title is 
removed from the equation. Therefore, the claim can succeed merely on the basis of a 
financial detriment. This may mean that the claimant has lost money which he already 
owns, or money which he would have received.
273
 An example of the first instance is 
a failed investment. There are also cases of ‗lost chances‘, where the careless act has 
deprived the claimant of a valuable investment.
274
 Detriment is sufficient as the 
factual elements of the claim are different from reliance-based land claims. 
 
Causation 
 
Finally, it is important to show that the communication and the loss suffered are 
causally connected. This requirement again demonstrates why the alternative 
‗assumption of responsibility‘ analysis is unhelpful. Even when the communication 
has been made and the claimant has suffered a loss, the claim will fail if the loss 
would have been suffered anyway. For example, in Calvert v William Hill Credit 
Ltd
275
 the claimant, a compulsive gambler, had made an arrangement with a 
bookmaker that the claimant would not be permitted to make bets over the telephone. 
The bookmaker failed to operate this exclusion, but it was not liable for the claimant‘s 
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gambling losses as he would have gone elsewhere to make the same bets. Causation 
will, however, be shown where the defendant‘s information or advice reaffirms a 
position which the claimant was considering, as in Levicom International Holdings 
BV v Linklaters.
276
 This is entirely compatible with the reliance mechanism, as we 
saw the same pattern on the bargain type of reliance-based land claims.  
 
Summary 
 
As we have seen in the context of reliance-based land claims, it is not possible to 
define a free-standing reliance action. It is always necessary to include additional 
factual elements to bring a claim, particularly in reliance-based loss claims. Being 
able to identify the overlap with our core concept of tort provides the additional 
elements for this claim. The first unique element that we saw in this context was a 
requirement that the defendant has been careless, and that the claimant‘s reliance is 
itself not as careless. This reflects the general reluctance to impose liability for pure 
economic losses. Additionally, whereas detriment is not sufficient in reliance-based 
land claims, it will be in cases where the claimant does not have to contend with the 
claimant‘s competing title. What this allows us to do is then to locate the factual 
ingredients in a reliance-based claim. Most importantly, it is argued that by using an 
approach which looks at overlaps, the law becomes much clearer and predictable. 
This solution has been achieved by recognising that we cannot and need not explain 
all cases of pure economic loss. The current language of ‗duty of care‘, proximity, 
assumption of responsibility, special relationships and reasonable reliance offer 
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nothing except confusion and unpredictability. They are only needed when we draw 
the boundaries of our concepts too wide; by breaking down the analysis, and 
recognising that concepts can overlap, a description of this area of law finally 
becomes an achievable goal. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 
The approach presented in this chapter is not an argument for an overextended 
principle of reliance that ignores the contextual circumstances in which the situations 
above will lead to liability. As we have seen, the context of the reliance is of 
particular relevance in assessing the requirements of any claim and also the response 
of the courts. In the first part, we identified the core elements of reliance by looking at 
proprietary estoppel. In doing this, we rejected the terminology of 
‗unconscionability‘, and also provided an alternative analysis for claims which are not 
based on reliance. We established that any claim involving land must account for the 
property element, which is the title of the landowner. This can be overcome in two 
ways, both of which reveal further overlaps. The first is another overlap with 
property, with the claimant showing control of the land. The second was an overlap 
with contract where the bargain element is present. Reliance is also relevant outside 
the context of land claims. The first was where reliance was provided under an 
agreement, allowing the claimant to claim the market value of any services. This is an 
overlap between reliance and contract. Secondly, we established that the core 
elements of the Hedley Byrne v Heller claim also fit into the reliance model. It is not 
  
292 
 
 
an exhaustive account of claims for pure economic loss, but it does describe the 
majority of the case law.  
 
The overall benefit of our overlapping analysis is that, at present, these scenarios have 
posed problems for more well-established concepts in private law, such as contract, 
negligence and monetary transfers. There is a tendency to try to stretch the boundaries 
of those concepts to accommodate these cases, which in turn reduces their descriptive 
utility. This error in legal reasoning can be avoided by maintaining narrower concepts, 
and recognising the overlap of reliance to explain these situations. As it should always 
be remembered, we are concerned with prophecies of what the courts will in fact do, 
and any analysis which provides a more descriptive account of the law should be 
adopted.
277
 The identification of these claims as examples of negligence or unjust 
enrichment constitutes paper rules, not real rules.
278
 We have to invent duties of care 
in negligence and to invent enrichments to achieve this. Where the elements of 
reliance are present they will have a significant impact on the way in which the courts 
deal with the case. This provides a necessary and invaluable tool in classifying private 
law. 
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 CHAPTER 7: THE TRUST 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Arnold, who was one of the leading academics in the Legal Realist movement, once 
stated that ‗[a] conceptual approach [to the law of trusts] is a betrayal of its origin and 
purpose‘1 and, moreover, that ‗[the trust] is not the name of an organized philosophy; 
it is simply a bad piece of indexing.‘2 In this penultimate chapter we find yet another 
legal concept where there are very few recurrent factual elements and it is difficult to 
predict the judicial outcomes. A similar point was made by Megarry VC in Tito v 
Waddell, ‗[o]ne cannot seize upon the word "trust" and say that this shows that there 
must therefore be a true trust; the first question is the sense in which that protean word 
has been used.‘3 Arnold‘s criticism, in essence, is that any attempt to incorporate all 
cases where the court identifies a ‗trust‘ is an impossible task.4 Nolan appears to 
recognise this stating that ‗[a] unifying, defining characteristic is sought where none 
exists, nor ever can exist, given the flexibility of trusts in allocating and apportioning 
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benefit from trust assets.‘5 Therefore, the realist‘s method of looking past the 
language and breaking the law into smaller concepts is to be preferred.  
 
The starting point is to deal with attempts to provide comprehensive accounts for the 
trust mechanism, which have also tried to explain the basis of ‗resulting‘ and 
‗constructive trusts.‘ It is concluded that it is not possible to establish a useful and 
predictable concept of the ‗trust‘, which incorporates all of these claims. Next, a basic 
definition of the trust will be provided, with the ‗express trust‘ forming the framework 
for this concept. We do not adopt a single definition of trust, but instead recognise a 
number of variations of the overlap between contract and property. At the end we 
consider the common intention constructive trust, and it is argued that there is very 
little overlap with any of our core concepts. The patterns are, therefore, unique to 
those cases. 
 
Attempts to Unify the Law of ‘Trusts’ 
 
The trust is a concept which was developed in the courts of chancery, and it is still 
quite common to hear argument that ‗equity operates on the conscience of the owner 
of the legal interest.‘6 In Australia, this has been defined more concretely as a concern 
to protect weaker or vulnerable parties from exploitation.
7
 As an explanation of the 
trust mechanism this may explain some types of trust, but not all. For example, it is 
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questionable how ‗conscience‘ can explain a constructive trust that arises between 
two parties where they both have equal bargaining power.
8
 Moreover, it seems to be 
stretching the idea of conscience to say that a volunteer beneficiary, who has been 
granted an interest by the settlor/trustee, can claim that it would be unconscionable for 
the latter to refuse to look after his or her interests.
9
 It may be the case that the 
claimant in that particular situation is in a weak position. However, that would mean 
that trusts should arise more regularly in consumer, employment and family 
relationships. The ‗weak party‘ element may be a useful guide, but it fails to provide a 
descriptive account of the general operation of the trust. 
 
Another alternative is that by conscience, the courts are referring to either a subjective 
or objective standard of behaviour. It is no explanation to state that the courts are 
applying a subjective standard of conscience, i.e. what the trustee feels he or she 
should be bound to do, as otherwise there would often be little point asking the court 
to recognise the trust in the first place. As Birks noted, it would seem that by 
conscience, the courts are referring to an objective standard, at least as it is perceived 
by the judiciary.
10
 When used in this way, the term conscience appears simply to refer 
to the intuitive right or wrong of the situation.
11
 As set out in Chapter 3, predictability 
is the objective of realism and, in turn, for classifying the law. By stretching the 
concept of ‗conscience‘ to justify every trust, we have achieved only a façade of 
predictability. The argument is also made by Tang, who concludes that 
unconscionability does little to assist our understanding of the traditional express 
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trust.
12
 If we are to achieve the aim of achieving a descriptive account of the law, 
phrases such as conscience, equality and justice need to be left to one side for the time 
being. They may provide normative justifications for the court‘s actions, but they fail 
to describe what is going on. A more realistic analysis is needed to reveal the factors 
that influence the courts. 
 
A Proprietary Right 
 
Beneficial interests are usually described as proprietary rights,
13
 and the presence of 
some identifiable asset certainly makes the two situations similar.
14
 We dealt with the 
problems of defining ‗trusts‘ as property in Chapter 4;15 a very important distinction is 
that whereas property requires a claimant to have control over an asset, these 
characteristics rarely apply to the beneficiary. More importantly, very different levels 
of protection are provided, with property interests usually binding even good faith 
purchasers, whereas trust interests will usually be defeated by a good faith purchaser. 
From a realist perspective, the distinction is reflected in the way in which the courts 
treat these situations. A similar approach does not mean the same approach. 
 
The Trust as a ‘Duty-Burdened Right’ 
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Another possibility is presented by McFarlane, who argues that a trust is a ‗duty-
burdened right‘,16 where the trustee ‗holds a particular right and is under a duty to [the 
beneficiary] in relation to that right.‘17 The consequence of this analysis would mean 
that many interests that are not regarded as trusts should be reclassified as such. As 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained in Westdeutsche v Islington London BC,
18
 ‗[t]here 
are many cases where B enjoys rights which, in equity, are enforceable against the 
legal owner, A, without A being a trustee, e.g. an equitable right to redeem a 
mortgage, equitable easements, restrictive covenants, the right to rectification, an 
insurer's right by subrogation to receive damages subsequently recovered by the 
assured…‘19 Not only is the definition too wide, it lacks any concrete meaning.  
 
Furthermore, it is only a useful definition for lawyers who are well versed in the law 
of trusts, as one must have a prior knowledge of the context of these legal duties and 
rights for this to make any sense. Using McFarlane‘s analysis, one could use this 
formula to argue that a trust is present in most property scenarios. For example, a 
landowner holds a general right to make substantial changes to the land, but that duty 
is subject to planning permission, which needs to be authorised by the local council.
20
 
The arrangement does not mean that the council is also a beneficiary. To any lawyer 
this conclusion is absurd, but only because we know immediately that this situation is 
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far removed from any ‗trust‘ situation.21 McFarlane is guilty of the criticism which 
Llewellyn made of applying ‗terms too broad to be precise in application to the details 
of single disputes.‘22 Therefore, McFarlane‘s analysis must be rejected as it would 
incorporate far too many situations which even now would not be regarded as ‗trust‘ 
arrangements.  
 
Separation of Legal and Equitable Title 
 
A trust may simply be a description of any situation where there is a separation of 
legal and equitable title. Worthington has, in the past, referred to this definition,
23
 and 
so too has Birks.
24
 It is also the explanation which was seemingly adopted by Lord 
Millett.
25
 According to Lord Millett, ‗a trust exists whenever the legal title is in one 
party and the equitable title in another.‘26 The simplicity of this analysis is appealing 
but must be rejected as a comprehensive account of the ‗trust.‘ Firstly, if there is a 
separation of legal and equitable title, this would seem to indicate that there must be a 
beneficiary who enjoys the equitable title. This would preclude discretionary trusts
27
 
and Re Denley’s28 type trusts from being regarded as ‗true trusts.‘ After Jerome v 
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Kelly,
29
 we would also have to exclude constructive trusts that arise under a 
specifically enforceable contract for the sale of land, as neither the seller nor the buyer 
has a ‗beneficial interest.‘  
 
Secondly, the reasoning is, once more, circular. As Swadling has noted, ‗having an 
equitable right is the consequence of there being a trust, not the reason why one 
arises.‘30 The separation of title approach leads to the circular logic that we can only 
identify the trust by the presence of an equitable title, and the only apparatus we have 
to identify the trust is the presence of an equitable title. An alternative analysis which 
might provide a more concrete meaning for beneficial interest is presented by 
Schenkel.
31
 Accordingly, by referring to the separation of legal and equitable title, we 
are simply referring to any situation where the benefit of an asset is held for another 
party.
32
 This analysis was considered and rejected the recent decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Clarence House v National Wesminster Bank.
33
 In this case, the court 
recognised a new type of interest whereby the owner of an estate can make a ‗virtual 
assignment‘ of the property. This means that the profits of the property and the 
burdens of looking after the property are assigned under a contractual agreement to an 
assignee, but the legal title remains with the owner.
34
 The Court of Appeal concluded 
that the assignee was not a beneficiary, but was actually an agent of the owner. The 
decision demonstrates that we cannot define the trust merely by asking who is to 
benefit under the trust, as benefit in that context is a special legal term that does not 
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simply mean financial benefits. We are not rejecting the relevance of the benefit issue, 
as it is important for our own definition. We are instead pointing out that it cannot be 
the unifying element for all types of ‗trusts.‘ 
 
It is not possible to define ‘trusts’ 
 
The main argument presented here is that the trust concept need not accommodate all 
of those instances which are described as ‗trust.‘ What, instead, we can do is 
recognise that most trusts are overlaps between property and contract. Each of these 
overlaps involves different combinations of property and contract; we define these as 
agreement, control and bargain trusts. This correlates, for the most part, with ‗express 
trusts‘, ‗resulting trusts‘ and ‗Quistclose trusts‘. Each of these is a special type of 
overlap between contract and property. In adopting this overlapping approach we 
reject Birks‘ classification of the trust as responses to consents, wrongs and unjust 
enrichment.
35
 It is no solution to criticise the law of trusts for being too wide and 
lacking any concrete meaning, and then suggest that an even wider concept of 
‗consents‘, ‗wrongs‘ and ‗unjust enrichment‘ can explain the law.  
 
2. Overlap 1; The Agreement Trust 
 
The preferred approach under a realist methodology is to adopt a narrower form of the 
trust. It is unsurprising that attempts have been made to find a level of generality 
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which can encompass all of the situations where the ‗trust‘ remedy is at play. 
However, all we do is create confusion when we look for patterns of judicial 
responses alone. As has been said before in this thesis, Holmes taught us that to 
identify the law, we have to look at the facts as well as the consequences.
36
  It is never 
sufficient to purely focus on responses.  
 
The agreement trust can be a valuable and useful conceptual tool, but this does not 
correlate precisely with the express trust. For us the overlap is quite clear between 
contract and property; elements of both are in play when we look at an agreement 
trust. The reality of the overlap is that factual elements of both are present. We make 
no apologies for focusing on the paradigm trust scenario of A giving an asset to B to 
look after C. It is, after all, the most common trust situation. Nonetheless, we must 
properly explain why we see agreement as the most important element in this trust. To 
do so, we must explain self-declarations of trusts. As McFarlane notes, the contract 
comparison is very difficult to make where someone makes a self-declaration of 
trust.
37
 However, we argue that it is not possible or sensible to treat self-declarations 
of trust in the same way as agreements where the assets are controlled for another 
person. Our argument is that, by lacking the agreement element, this is a ‗weak‘ trust 
in the same way that a deed is a ‗weak‘ contract due to the lack of consideration and 
the reluctance of the courts to enforce promises without clear proof and written 
evidence. We take the same view as Langbein that self-declarations are non-trusts.
38
 
 
                                                 
 
 
36
 OW Holmes, The Common Law, (Little, Brown and Company 1881) at 289. 
37
 B McFarlane, ‗The Centrality of Constructive and Resulting Trusts‘ in C Mitchell (ed), Constructive 
and Resulting Trusts (Hart 2010) at 184. 
38
 J Langbein, ‗The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts‘ (1995) 105 YLJ 625 at 672. 
  
302 
 
 
Why we are not Including Declarations of ‘Trust’  
 
In his article on the relationship between trust and contract, Langbein relegated 
declarations of trust to his appendix.
39
 It is argued here that he had very good reasons 
for doing so. As noted above, the few cases of self-declaration usually have much 
more obvious reasons for enforcement. The current orthodoxy is that a settlor can set 
up a trust by a simple declaration, so long as it is certain that he intends to do so. 
Parkinson has argued that, particularly in cases of declaration; ‗[d]ifferences of 
context go some way to explaining the differences of result and provide a certain 
order and coherence.‘40 We should not be led to believe that the express declaration of 
trust is by any means a common or well established rule. According to Alexander, it 
was not until 1811 that the courts began to recognise self-declarations of trusts in the 
absence of consideration as being effective.
41
 Even then, the prevailing view that one 
can make a simple oral declaration of trust is a mere paper rule and not a real one. 
There is surprisingly little authority to support oral declarations of trust, and even 
those cases where it is applied are easily explained on a different basis. 
 
Cases Where the Settlor is Deceased 
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In Langbein‘s appraisal of self-declarations of trust he came to the conclusion that 
these were better regarded as ‗non-trusts.‘42 Most of the ‗non-trust‘ involved gifts 
which were made during the lifetime of the settlor, and disputed after his death.
43
 On 
this point, there is no need to stretch the concept of a trust to cover cases where the 
courts were simply trying to avoid the consequences of the Wills Act.
44
 Most of the 
‗oddities‘ in the law of trusts involve cases about gifts made by deceased settlors, as 
we see in the cases of secret trusts and the rule in Strong v Bird.
45
 Refusing to 
recognise the relevance of the status of the settlor leads to absolute confusion and 
uncertainty. For example, in T Choithram v Pagarani, Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated 
that the courts ‗will not strive officiously to defeat a gift‘.46 But in Shah v Shah, Arden 
LJ recognised that there was a benevolent construction in some cases against 
enforcing a gift.
47
 Without taking an external perspective of these cases, and looking 
at facts rather than the words being used by the judges, this makes little sense. By 
focusing on the facts we can see that the two cases were very different as, in the first 
case, the declaration was made by a now deceased settlor, and, in the second case, the 
settlor was still alive. 
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Cases Involving Written Documents, Bargain or Reliance 
 
If we leave to one side gifts made by deceased settlors, it leaves very few cases of 
self-declared trusts where there has not either been reliance by another, or the trust 
has been set out in a clear written document.
48
 This is important for our purposes. We 
have been using the overlapping approach to identify legally significant facts. 
Attempts to make a self-declaration of trust appear to be a promise, and in Chapter 4 
we concluded that promises alone have very little normative force in English law. We 
always need to find additional facts to support the promise; in contract that is shown 
by a bargain, in cases of a deed it is a specified and considered written declaration of 
intent, and in the previous Chapter we saw that promises can have effect when they 
are relied upon by others. Outside of the context of gifts by deceased settlors, most of 
the cases involve the enforcement of a bargain, written trusts, or reliance. Take, for 
example, the well known rule that one cannot enforce a trust for assets which the 
settlor does not yet have.
49
  Yet even when applying this supposed general rule, the 
courts acknowledge that they would enforce the trust if it was part of a bargain.
50
 The 
rule is not absolute, and is merely another mechanism for preventing general 
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declarations of trust.
51
 Therefore, we can see in these situations that the inclination of 
the courts is against enforcing a declaration of trust. This is best explained by a 
statement of Arden LJ in Pennington v Waine;
52
 ‗[t]he objectives of the rule obviously 
include ensuring that donors do not by acting voluntarily act unwisely in a way that 
they may subsequently regret. This is a paternalistic objective, which can outweigh 
the respect to be given to the donor's original intention as gifts are often held by the 
courts to be incompletely constituted despite the clearest intention of the donor to 
make the gift.‘53 She also added that this principle would protect creditors of the 
settlor.
54
 Indeed, in Midland Bank v Wyatt,
55
 the court refused to enforce a ‗sham‘ 
trust, which had been set up by the owner to keep his assets out of the hands of 
creditors by declaring trusts for family members.
56
  
 
The Clarity Achieved by Excluding Declarations 
 
The exclusion of the self-declared trust is not just an effort to make a purer concept of 
the trust. The failure to distinguish between trusts created by transfer and those 
created by declaration has led to an even greater confusion when it comes to trusts 
over land. The Law of Property Act 1925 s 53(1)(a) prevents oral declarations of trust 
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over land. The obvious benefit is to protect third party purchasers, as well as 
providing another mechanism to prevent a self-declaration of trust. When applied to 
transfers of land, however, the courts have regularly ignored this provision. Swadling 
has noted that there are several attempts to explain why the provision is ignored when 
land is transferred and an oral declaration of trust is made beforehand.
57
 For 
Swadling, and for our purposes, where there is a transfer from settlor to trustee, it is a 
clear trust scenario. The Statute, however, seems designed to cover declarations of 
trust. The whole law of trusts would be much clearer, therefore, if we recognise that a 
declaration is a weaker form of trust. Using our overlapping analysis, we can see that 
it lacks the element of agreement which is integral to the trust. It is no more a trust, 
than a trust of a tangible thing is property. Just as a trust of a tangible thing lacks the 
element of control, cases of self declaration lack the agreement element.  
 
The Agreement Trust: An Overlap between Contract and Property 
 
We can more fully explain our core concept of trust, and demonstrate how this 
mechanism involves an overlap with contract and property. In fact, this overlap is so 
clear that we can deal with it even more briefly than we dealt with the above 
discussion of declarations of trust. The simple arrangement in a trust is that the settlor 
(the existing title-holder) transfers an asset to another person, under an agreement that 
the asset will be controlled on behalf of someone else. This creates the separation of 
control and title which is characteristic of the trust mechanism. It is also the reason for 
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the personal obligations of the trustee, as it is the agreement which provides the 
legally significant event which indicates that the various rules on investment and 
acting in good faith will be applied.  
 
Explaining the Factual Requirements of the Agreement Trust 
 
We can deal with this briefly, as the facts have been touched upon already at various 
points in the thesis. As with our concept of money transfers, we look for the transfer 
of an asset, which is an observable fact. The asset itself can be identified by looking 
for both tangible and intangible assets. It, therefore, includes shares, money, land and 
goods.
58
 As noted, the trustee must accept the position of responsibility.
59
 We need 
not look for reliance here (as there may not be any causal link between the trustee‘s 
acceptance and the settlor‘s decision to appoint), but it does fit within an agreement 
model. There is a communication between the parties (even when the instruction is 
made under a will), and as Langbein pointed out it is very much within the same 
framework as agreement in contract.
60
 Unlike Langbein, we need not conclude that 
this is in fact a contract, as our overlapping analysis allows us to recognise a partial 
overlap of facts.  
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The requirement of acceptance seems to underpin Lord Browne-Wilkinson‘s 
judgment in Westdeutsche v Islington London BC.
61
 His Lordship concluded that 
resulting trustees would not be personally liable for deeds done before they 
discovered the circumstances that have given rise to the trust.
62
 His Lordship went on 
to make an even stronger statement that an individual could not be regarded as a 
trustee until he or she became aware of the fact that the owner did not intend to 
transfer the full benefit of the asset.
63
 Admittedly, this has not been universally 
accepted. The controversy really rests on how one defines the trust. Millett LJ, who 
we saw earlier would adopt a wider definition of trust than the one seen here,
64
 clearly 
agreed with Lord Browne-Wilkinson that generally the personal duties of a trustee 
will not be imposed in cases of non-express trusts.
65
  
 
The Protection Afforded to Trust Assets 
 
The fact that the beneficiary has title without control indicates why beneficial interests 
are not as strong as full property interests. The beneficiary has an interest in the asset, 
and can call for the trustee to transfer the asset and bring the trust to an end.
66
 The 
beneficiary can also trace the assets if the trustee breaches the arrangement and 
attempts to abscond with the assets. This operates in a similar way to specific 
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restitution. It is also possible to set aside a transaction for mistake, in much the very 
same way as we saw in Chapter 5.
67
 Another important element of the trust, is that 
once the trust has come into existence, we also see that the trustee will be subject to 
personal obligations.  
 
Why this Combination of Facts is Legally Significant 
 
The personal obligations of the agreement trustee distinguish this concept from other 
‗trust‘ like situations. It is a point made by Hayton, who argues that in looking at all 
types of ‗trust‘, we can overlook these very important rules.68 The rules are not simply 
concerned with small family trusts, they have been relevant in developing the rules on 
management duties in general.
69
 We do not have the space here to give a full account 
of fiduciary duties, but the control element provides a significant factor in 
determining the full range of remedies which are provided by the courts. As far as the 
trust is concerned, the personal obligations of trusteeship (including avoiding conflicts 
of interest,
70
 duties and powers of investment
71
 and personal liability for failing to 
protect the trust assets
72
) are present in the agreement trust, but not in the absence of 
agreement.
73
 Once we exclude the latter from our concept of trust, the personal duties 
of the trustee will only be present in express situations.  
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Summary of the Agreement Trust 
 
The conclusion must be that there is very little to be achieved by classifying all trusts 
without considering the nature of the overlap; the circumstances in which a trust can 
and the personal obligations of the trustee are very much dependent on this overlap 
with contract. This shows the problem with Goode‘s statement that all legal systems 
distinguish ‗property rights from mere personal rights to the delivery or transfer of an 
asset. I own property; I am owed performance of a transfer obligation.‘74 In the 
context of the trust these elements can exist hand in hand, and this is because this 
arrangement represents a combination of title, control and agreement. It also solves 
the issue presented by Worthington who concluded that the divide between property 
and obligation was disappearing.
75
 If we focus on contract rather than obligation, it 
can be seen that there never was, and never could be any divide between the two areas 
of law. Contract and property can stand on their own as concepts, but they often 
interact and overlap as we have demonstrated at various points in the thesis. The only 
possible way to understand the trust, and to keep our understanding of property, 
contract, and additionally the law governing monetary transfers, is to apply the 
overlapping analysis. Discrete categories collapse and soon break down, but the 
classification presented here explains and accommodates these overlapping areas of 
law. 
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3. Overlap 2;Control Trusts 
 
Control trusts are commonly referred to as ‗resulting trusts.‘ According to Megarry J, 
there are two types of ‗resulting trust‘, the first is where a settlor attempts to establish 
an ‗express‘ (agreement) trust which fails, and secondly where there is a transfer 
which is not made under trust. Using our overlapping concept analysis, we can see 
that both ‗resulting trusts‘ appear to lack the necessary agreement element that we 
saw in our previous overlap. However, again, the answer to the classification of the 
resulting trust, it will be argued, can be found in our overlapping analysis. The 
argument is that this ‗trust‘ merely constitutes a different combination of facts from 
our core concepts of contract and property. The important element is that of control, 
which remains with the transferor. First we look at two different approaches to 
resulting trusts which have both garnered support. Then we will explain how the 
overlapping approach assists in providing the better explanation of the ‗resulting 
trust‘, and its relationship with the agreement trust. 
 
Swadling’s Analysis 
 
First, we will deal with the argument that resulting trusts do enforce the intention of 
the owner, through a presumption of fact. One of the earliest proponents of this was 
approach was Costigan,
76
 who argued that in ‗resulting trust‘ cases the courts presume 
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that the transferor has an unexpressed desire to keep his interest in the money.
77
 A 
modern supporter of this view is Swadling, who adopts this analysis in discussing the 
role of resulting trusts, looking for a presumed intention to create a trust, and 
concludes that resulting trusts that cannot be classified as such defy ‗legal analysis.‘78 
Penner has taken the view that if Swadling is correct, a ‗resulting trust‘ is merely an 
express trust without clear evidence of a declaration.
79
  
 
An example of how these presumptions operate is the decision by the Court of Appeal 
in Seldon v Davidson.
80
 Here, there was a gratuitous transfer between two strangers. 
The court found that, in the absence of any evidence that a gift was intended, the 
money was to be held under resulting trust for the transferor. For Swadling, the 
decision can be reinterpreted as a presumption that, since one does not make gifts to 
strangers, the transfer gives rise to a presumption that there had been an express 
declaration of trust.
81
  
 
The approach adopted in this chapter is one that is not compatible with Swadling‘s 
analysis. It would be contradictory if the law recognised the silent actions of the 
settlor as providing intention, when we have seen that it is so difficult to establish 
declarations in express trusts. The immediate riposte to that point is that the scenario 
is different here; in self- declarations of trust, the rules generally prevent the settlor 
from losing title to the asset, and ‗resulting‘ trusts achieve the same goal, but in a 
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different way. But that is in fact a very good reason for rejecting Swadling‘s analysis. 
It fails to tell us that this pattern exists, and merely confounds the confusion we saw 
earlier on when considering the various ways in which the courts adopt ‗benevolent 
constructions‘ of the settlor‘s intentions. Piska has recently criticised the reasoning 
behind this presumption of express trust.
82
 As Piska points out in many cases, it is not 
just a case of having to deal with the lack of evidence of what the parties intended. 
There are many resulting trust cases where ‗the presumed resulting trust arises [even 
though] there exists sufficient evidence to prove that there was no declaration of 
trust.‘83 The presumed resulting trust seems to require a fictional element which we 
should be keen to avoid under a realist approach. 
 
Chambers’ Unjust Enrichment Analysis 
 
Another approach is presented by Chambers who argues that a resulting trust arises in 
the absence of any intention to benefit the recipient.
84
 Even this analysis is 
problematic, as we are still looking for an intention which cannot be seen. As Penner 
explains, in many cases there is no evidence to show an intention not to benefit, but 
nonetheless a resulting ‗trust‘ can still arise.85 Chambers attempts to avoid this issue 
by arguing that there is a presumption against gifts.
86
 This is surely incorrect; people 
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do not need to justify their gifts, as the Court of Appeal made clear in Ogilvie v 
Littleboy.
87
  
 
Even if we look past this fictional account of intention, Chambers also fails to explain 
why the ‗trust‘ arises here when it does not arise for other types of ‗unjust 
enrichments‘, including failed conditions. He focuses on an intention which relates to 
whether or not the parties intended the recipient to have the full benefits of ownership. 
It is similar to our control explanation; but our explanation does not require belief in a 
principle of unjust enrichment nor does it require us to invent intention. Intention 
merely obscures our view. There are many cases where resulting trusts do arise even 
though there was a clear intent to benefit, as for example Re Abbott Fund Trusts 
where money was collected for two elderly women, and the remaining amount was 
held under ‗resulting trust‘ for the benefactors.88 
 
The Overlapping Explanation 
 
Unfortunately, the search for principle has served to confuse this area of law. This is 
because academics and judges are only looking at intention when the real issue, it is 
contended, is the claimant‘s control of the assets. It is, therefore, argued that resulting 
trusts are another example of the overlap between property and contract. In these 
cases, the factual elements are; title, transfer and under an agreement that the money 
or assets are to be used for a purpose. Although agreement is also required here, for 
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the purposes of distinction we adopt the phrase control to describe this combination of 
contract and property. By making a transfer for a purpose, the control element 
remains with the transferor. This can be explained on the basis of what we learnt in 
Chapter 4. All titles derive from control, and in particular the first- in time approach. 
In a control trust, the claimant is the first in time, and when they transfer an asset to be 
used for a particular purpose, they retain partial control of the asset. By maintaining 
control when the transfer is made, the transferor shows that he still has title.  
 
All of this makes sense once we realise that control and title are legally significant 
events. When they both lie in the hands of the claimant, the court will side with the 
claimant and not a recipient in the absence of any clear evidence of the actual nature 
of the transaction. The necessity of such a mechanism has already been witnessed in 
our discussion of self-declarations of trust. The courts are keen to ensure that those 
making such gifts have properly contemplated the consequences of this decision. 
Although it may simply be a case of coming at the same issue, but from different 
perspectives, the view presented here is that the courts are protecting title and control 
in these cases, and it is about preventing the transfer of these two with which we are 
concerned. It also explains cases such as Vandervell v IRC,
89
 where clearly the 
claimant intended to make a full transfer to the recipient, with all the benefits that it 
entailed in that case. By including an option to repurchase the shares, he was not 
altering that very clear intention at all. He simply retained control over the assets, and 
additionally his title was the first in time. 
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The same facts can explain some forms of ‗constructive trust‘ as well. One such 
example is the case of an agent who mixes a principal‘s money with his own, or 
siphons money away from his principal.
90
 The principal will have given the money for 
a purpose, hence retaining control over the fund. The ‗trust‘ is imposed even without 
any evidence that the principal has stated that the money is to be held under ‗trust‘. 
We do not need to show any such intention; the consequence of prior title and 
continuing control gives rise to a continuing interest in the asset. This also obviously 
explains the correlation between ‗resulting trusts‘ and gifts without any need to look 
for fictional intentions. An unfettered gift cannot be a resulting trust, unless the 
transferor has said that the money is to be used for a purpose. In this, we share 
Chambers‘ conclusion that we have to look at what control has been placed on the 
received assets.
91
 Where we differ is that this analysis should be expanded to other 
payments including ‗mistaken‘ transfers.92 As we saw in the previous Chapter, the 
added factor of carelessness weakens any claim for restitution, limiting the transferor 
to a simple debt claim. At this point, we can change sides and agree with Swadling 
that the element of control changes hands in a mistaken payment. It simply precludes 
any possibility of a ‗resulting trust‘. This is why we used the very different term of 
specific restitution in Chapter 5, as a ‗trust‘ like remedy for mistaken payments 
requires an act of appropriation by the defendant. It cannot be a control trust. 
 
4. Overlap 3; the Bargain Trust 
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A similar type of trust, which again involves an overlap with property and contract, is 
the Quistclose trust.
93
 This arises where money is transferred under a specific 
purpose; it recreates the control element, but also requires a clear agreement and 
bargain between the parties. The nature of this trust has been long debated, but our 
overlapping analysis provides a simple solution. Swadling, for example, has 
interpreted this trust as an express trust,
94
 but he recognises that this interpretation is 
problematic since in many cases the purpose of the trust can be an abstract one. This 
is because the loan need not be made for the benefit of any individual. As Chambers 
notes, the prevailing view
95
 is the one presented by Lord Millett in Twinsectra v 
Yardley.
96
 When the money is paid over, the specific purpose restricts the use of the 
money meaning that the beneficial interest is never received by the borrower. This is 
part of a wider principle of ‗absence of intention‘, meaning that full title was not 
intended to be in the hands of the recipient. In this context, this is slightly problematic 
as it presents the justification as a claimant-orientated reason for specific restitution. 
This hides the relevance of the initial agreement between the parties in the same way 
as ‗failure of consideration‘ does. Yet the terms of the agreement are clearly relevant. 
Evidence of this is to be found in Lord Millett‘s explanation that the Quistclose trust 
has a fiduciary character, which indicates that the other party must agree to the 
arrangement.
97
 It is a bilateral arrangement, not one which is created merely by the 
specificity of the transferor‘s purpose. 
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It is not just the agreement element which alters the nature of the control trust. The 
fact that the arrangement is also made as part of a bargain between transferor and 
recipient adds a further element to the contract and property overlap.
98
 The bargain 
element gives the recipient of the fund a much stronger interest in it than where it is 
received gratuitously. This can be important; as Birks explains, there are no examples 
where the transferor has been able to ask for the return of the money before the 
purpose fails depends on the terms of the contract.
99
 This restriction was also 
recognised by Lord Millett who noted that ‗whether the lender can countermand the 
borrower's mandate while it is still capable of being carried out, must depend on the 
circumstances of the particular case.‘100 If this was an agreement trust or normal 
control trust, the transferor would presumably be able to request the repayment of the 
money even before the purpose can be carried out.
101
 Another factor, which indicates 
that this is distinct from overlaps which involve agreement but not bargain, is that the 
trust is not for the benefit of anyone in particular. If the purpose is to transfer the 
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money to a third party, such as the shareholders in Quistclose, they do not obtain a 
beneficial interest in the money.
102
  
 
Although we do not have sufficient space to discuss the issue, the role of agreement 
and bargain also explains a number of ‗constructive trusts‘ which arise even where the 
beneficiary is not the person with the strongest title (the first-in time.) The commonest 
is the trust which arises under a specifically performable contract. This is a long 
recognised overlap between contract and property, fully supporting the arguments 
made in this section. This shows the importance of identifying the bargain element; it 
alters the dynamics of the contract and property overlap.
103
 So, although the main 
elements of the trust are established, the additional facts of the agreement and bargain 
elements alter the way in which the courts treat the case. It is contended that this is 
entirely predictable after we consider the nature of these overlaps.  
 
Summary on these Overlaps 
 
Hopefully, the benefits of the overlapping analysis are fully apparent when 
considering the trust mechanism. We do not focus on legal principles or theory; we 
focus on facts. Facts are the all important element, and they are revealed by realist 
concepts. We have now reached a stage where we have identified most of the legally 
significant elements in private law. The overlaps of property and contract would be 
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difficult to deal with unless we understand that each concept represents a collection of 
facts. We have seen throughout that different combinations of facts lead to different 
outcomes; the agreement trust, control trust and Quistclose trust should not be 
regarded as the same because they all involve overlaps with contract and property. It 
should be remembered that we are looking at the factual matrix; it is the facts that 
determine the overlap and not the general concepts themselves. To use an analogy, 
facts are like cooking ingredients, and similar ingredients can be mixed in different 
ways to make different types of food. Thus all of these trusts represent different 
formulations of the contract and property overlap.  
 
5. Constructive Trusts 
 
Finally, we will consider one particular type of ‗constructive trust‘. There is 
insufficient space to give a full account of all ‗constructive trusts‘, but the argument 
presented here is that it would be unwise to assume that there is any single principle 
which can explain all of these cases. Those cases which can fall into the contract and 
property overlap can be regarded as different variations of the trust, but many others 
have very little to do with these core concepts. To illustrate this point, we will 
conclude by looking at the ‗common intention constructive trust.‘ Our conclusion will 
be that there are simply some claims which do not really touch on any of our core 
concepts. Claims involving co-habitees involve many facts which are particular to 
those cases, and it should be remembered that this is why we did not consider them in 
our reliance-based land claims. In short, although our core concepts cover most of 
private law, they do not provide an exhaustive account of all legally significant facts. 
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Unjust Enrichment Analysis  
 
The relationship between ‗constructive trust‘ and unjust enrichment is one that has 
long been recognised in the United States.
104
 The unjust enrichment analysis regards 
this ‗trust‘ as a response rather than a substantive source of rights. According to Krull, 
for example; ‗[the c]onstructive trust is a metaphorical, shorthand description of a set 
of remedial possibilities.‘105 The unjust enrichment approach favoured by academics 
such as Birks,
106
 Chambers
107
 and Smith
108
 contends that the ‗constructive trust‘ is, in 
some cases, used as a mechanism for preventing unjust enrichment. Birks argued that 
trusts could be imposed to prevent unjust enrichment, as in cases of mistake or failed 
conditions.
109
 We dealt with the main thrust of these arguments in Chapter 5.
110
 
Although Etherton has attempted to explain claims involving co-habiting couples on 
the basis of unjust enrichment, few unjust enrichment scholars would agree with this 
analysis.
111
 A very simple reason for this is that if this was the basis of the claim, the 
‗resulting trust‘ analysis would be more appropriate as unjust enrichment fails to 
explain why a claimant can have a stake in the family home which is greater than any 
benefits received by their partner. The more significant problem is that in cases such 
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as Eves v Eves,
112
 the landowner receives no benefits at all under the arrangement. 
Another analysis is required. 
 
Common Intention 
 
The ‗common intention constructive trust‘ (CICT), is concerned with the rights of co-
habiting couples.
113
 Unlike any of the above situations, the principle does not require 
any transfer of assets, neither does it require any declaration or bargain. Applying a 
factual analysis, we can see that the core concept consists of co-habitation and a long-
term commitment to land, with one of three additional factual elements required; 
either an express declaration to share the land, direct financial contributions, or (as it 
was argued in the previous Chapter) the provision of valuable services.
114
 Apart from 
the fact that the claim involves an ‗asset‘ in the form of the house, there is very little 
overlap with the trust mechanism. We have gone so far from our overlap with contract 
and property that we are left with an altogether different beast which does not appear 
to be a trust at all. At present, the orthodoxy is that the CICT is created when two 
parties are co-habiting. There are two routes to achieving this claim.
115
 Firstly, there is 
the express variety, where an ‗intention‘ to share the property is demonstrated through 
either a shared title to the land or by an oral declaration. In the absence of this, it is 
necessary for there to be a direct financial contribution to the purchase of the 
property. 
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If there is any area of law which demonstrates the problems with a formalist and 
doctrinal approach it is the CICT. The very nomenclature of this claim suggests an 
intention that simply does not exist. The Law Commission has already concluded as 
such; ‗[i]t is widely accepted that the present law is unduly complex, arbitrary and 
uncertain in application. It is ill-suited to determining the property rights of those who, 
because of the informal nature of their relationship, may not have considered their 
respective entitlements.‘116 Fox has also noted that the rules have been developed to 
protect the sanctity of the family home. Essentially, this is an issue of social policy, 
and thus raises political issues such as whether the courts should protect unmarried 
couples in the same way as married couples.
117
 The trust concept, and ‗intention‘, do 
little to assist in describing these cases. In particular, in the dissenting judgment of 
Lord Neuberger in Stack v Dowden,
118
 he criticised the majority for ‗imputing‘ 
intention and not restricting their analysis to ‗inferring‘ intention when it came to 
quantifying the interests of the parties. The accusation of ‗imputing‘ intention seems 
unconvincing in the light of the Law Commission‘s view.119 The courts have, 
arguably, been ‗imputing‘ intentions in this area from the very beginning. A more 
realistic analysis is desperately needed. Further, McFarlane‘s suggestion that we adopt 
‗proprietary estoppel‘ to explain these cases would either require a narrower approach 
for claims of co-habitation, or would require us to stretch ‗proprietary estoppel‘ to the 
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point where we would undermine the developing body of predictable decisions which 
are slowly being built up by the courts.
120
 
 
Expressions of Sharing 
 
The starting point for the CICT is set out by Lord Bridge in Lloyds Bank v. Rosset.
121
 
There were, accordingly, two ways of establishing this interest; express or inferred 
‗intention.‘ This ‗express‘ declaration is very different from that required for normal 
trusts, as once it is proved that the statement is made it is sufficient and it is not 
necessary for the words to be repeated as we saw in Paul v Constance.
122
 For 
example, in Eves v Eves
123
 the husband had made the statement that the house was to 
be shared, but the subjective intention was to avoid registering the property in the 
name of his partner. Similarly, in Grant v Edwards,
124
 the trustee had refused to have 
both names on the title deeds using the excuse that it could jeopardise the other 
parties‘ divorce proceedings. This was approved of as a perfect example of an express 
common intention by the House of Lords in Lloyds Bank v. Rosset.
125
 Clearly this was 
not the owner‘s actual intent, and we are dealing with declarations in an entirely 
different way than they are dealt with outside of this particular context.
126
 It is another 
example of a ‗benevolent construction‘. The real ‗fact‘ appears to be the occurrence of 
a statement by the landowner that the property is to be shared. 
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Financial Contribution 
 
The alternative path to a CICT is inferred intention, which is purportedly established 
through the conduct of the parties. Once again there is no observable criterion that 
reflects intention; the parties have rarely even contemplated whether the property will 
be shared. Financial contributions to the purchase of the property will usually be 
enough to infer the mutual intention to share the property.
127
 This is very similar to 
the approach of the courts in relation to control (resulting) trusts, and indeed in the 
past the two approaches were thought to be interchangeable.
128
 The distinction lies in 
the fact that under a CICT, the interest is not specified by the amount which has been 
contributed, but under a control trust the amount is determined by the levels of 
contribution. This merely demonstrates, even further, that the patterns we saw in 
relation to the contract and property overlaps do not apply in the context of co-
habiting couples.  
 
Providing a Valuable Contribution to the Family Unit 
 
Finally, after the last chapter, we can add the third route to the CICT, which has not 
been explicitly recognised at the moment, but which explains the cases we saw in the 
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previous chapter. This is where the claimant has not made a financial contribution, but 
has made a valuable contribution to the family unit by giving up time and effort in 
either helping in a business or looking after the landowner.
129
 Thus, we see a concept 
which has its own factual elements, but also overlaps with the requirement of co-
habitation which is required for the orthodox CICT. Support for the proposition that 
the provision of valuable services should also be sufficient is indicated by the 
judgment of the Privy Council in Abbott v Abbott,
130
 where Baroness Hale delivered 
the judgment of the Board. The confusion arises from the fact that Baroness Hale first 
referred to Lord Walker‘s obiter comments in Stack v Dowden131 that the court should 
acknowledge that indirect contributions can establish the requisite intention. Sir 
Terence Etherton has commented on this decision and concluded that Abbott v Abbott 
confirms this part of Lord Walker‘s judgment.132 Baroness Hale also made reference 
to an excerpt from her own judgment in Stack v Dowden, which was only concerned 
with the quantification of the interest; ‗[t]he law has indeed moved on in response to 
changing social and economic conditions. The search is to ascertain the parties‘ 
shared intentions, actual, inferred or imputed, with respect to the property in the light 
of their whole course of conduct in relation to it.‘133 Thus it seems that the ‗holistic 
approach‘ advocated for quantifying the interests of the parties may also be relevant 
in establishing a beneficial interest.
134
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Given the tentative proposals to extend the law in this area, coupled with our analysis 
of Wayling v Jones,
135
 Ottey v Grundy
136
 and Campbell v Griffin,
137
 the sensible 
analysis is that the courts have already taken this step, but that it will primarily be 
available where the claimant has provided something valuable either to a business or 
in looking after the landowner. As noted by Dixon the possibility for legislative 
intervention appears remote.
138
 Whatever the merits of any new changes in this area, 
our project is about describing the law. For the law as it stands, this analysis holds the 
most descriptive account. Things may certainly change after the Supreme Court hears 
Kernott v Jones
139
 as it is likely that the Supreme Court will take the opportunity to 
clarify this area of law.
140
 It is, therefore, predicted that the grounds for the CICT will 
be extended to include valuable non-financial contributions to the family unit. The 
decision of the Supreme Court may be a good test to see how successful this thesis 
has been in predicting the development of this altogether distinct, yet very important, 
concept. One should, however, always remember the point made at the end of chapter 
2; the law is unpredictable, but we can simply do our best to predict it by looking at 
what has been decided in the past. 
 
6. Conclusion 
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The trust raises many issues when it comes to classifying the private law. For our 
analysis most ‗trusts‘ are simply different combinations of the overlap between 
property and contract. Nonetheless, the different combinations lead to different 
results, and it is the facts of the cases which determine the nature of these overlaps. 
Attempts to explain the basis of all ‗trusts‘ have proven unsuccessful and misguided. 
Breaking down the law of trusts is the only way to achieve any descriptive account of 
the law. We did this by setting out three main types of overlaps; the agreement trust, 
the control trust and the bargain trust. These correlate somewhat broadly to the 
existing types of trust; agreement trusts correlate with most ‗express trusts‘, control 
trusts correlate with ‗resulting trusts‘, and the Quistclose trust correlates with the 
bargain trust. By doing so, the overlaps between property and contract emerge. The 
agreement trust is exemplified by a transfer of an asset to a trustee who agrees to 
control it for someone else. A control trust uses the same ingredients, but places 
control in the hands of the transferor. The nature of the control trust only changes 
when the further element of bargain comes into play, and brings us closer to contract 
in our overlapping scheme. The search for a basis for constructive trusts takes us far 
from our core concept of trust. It is questionable whether anything other than 
confusion is created by the use of the word ‗trust‘ in this context. Only by doing this 
can we begin to classify the trust in a useful and descriptive way, and in turn begin to 
analyse the cases of ‗constructive trusts‘. If we fail to do this, we will simply continue 
to hide the true function and application of the trust in the search for a coherent 
principle that simply cannot be found. 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
 
At the start of the thesis it was stated that there were two primary aims which we were 
seeking to accomplish. First, our aim was to show that legal analysis must be rooted 
in reality, and that this can only be achieved through description and not prescription. 
Secondly, the attempt has been made to construct a conceptual approach which allows 
us to be as accurately descriptive as possible. We should not fool ourselves in 
thinking that any description of the complex and relatively unstructured system of 
private law claims will provide us with a neat and small number of discrete 
categories. Any attempt to construct a system of classification which presents a small 
number of discrete categories will lose the flavour, nuances and important facts which 
characterise English private law. 
 
The overlapping of legal concepts is seen by many to undermine any system of 
classification. Classification is regarded as a process of systemisation: claims have to 
fit into one category, or another. Categories are exclusive, and they do not sit well 
with overlaps. In Chapter 1 we argued that there is little justification for such an 
inflexible approach. There are concerns about restricting the development of private 
law, and indeed its inherent dynamism. Categorisation is simply another method of 
repeating these problems. However, classification need not mean categorisation. A 
conceptual approach recognises that concepts are merely collections of legally 
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significant facts. Those facts are not exclusive to any particular concept, and different 
formulations of these facts lead to different outcomes. 
 
In Chapter 2, we moved on to look at the importance of methodology in classifying 
private law. In particular, our concern was with the integration of descriptive, 
prescriptive and interpretative accounts of the law. It was concluded that classification 
must be a process of description, which can then allow an open debate about the 
prescriptive elements of the legal system. It was argued that we should avoid attempts 
to reduce private law into single ‗causative events‘. Claims can arise because of a 
number of different facts, and simply because two claims involve the fact of consent 
can mean that they overlap, but it does not mean that they can or should be grouped 
together. The express trust is one particular example of a concept which does not 
neatly fit into contract or property, and we would lose the essence of this concept if 
we overlook this. The thesis, as it should be apparent, was inspired by the debate 
which was triggered by Birks‘ attempt to classify private law. Although it should also 
be apparent that the thesis is diametrically opposed to the methods applied by Birks, 
this is in no way meant to undermine his contribution to our understanding of private 
law. Without Birks‘ work it is doubtful that this project would have been felt 
necessary. Chapter 2 set out why this thesis has adopted a very different methodology 
to that of Birks. It was argued that it is not possible to construct a system of 
classification which is intended to provide coherence and consistency. Unless we are 
actually going to change the substance of the law, providing broad generalities does 
more harm than good. We conceal the complexities, and make law even less 
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accessible to those who are not versed in the world of ‗lawyering‘.1 The answer to 
doctrines such as unconscionability is not to reject them in favour of technical legal 
principles,
2
 but to take a closer look at the facts of each decision. One of the biggest 
impediments to this is the idea that law is ‗internal‘ and that only a limited range of 
facts are relevant in the identification of legal principles. Thus, unjust enrichment 
lawyers tell us that we can only look for enrichment, at the expense of the claimant 
and consequent upon one of the specific unjust factors. The types of interests at play 
(whether that is property, money, services or trust interests) fall outside of this narrow 
definition of what is or is not law and, therefore, become treated as though they are 
irrelevant facts. The relevance of these facts is demonstrated by a close analysis of the 
case law. That is why the overlapping approach is to be preferred, as it allows us to 
tailor our general concepts when other significant facts arise. 
 
This led to our adoption of a realist approach in Chapter 3. Realism, in the tradition of 
Llewellyn, can be reconciled with a conceptual approach so long as we adopt the 
appropriate methodology. It is, therefore, necessary to adopt concepts that identify 
socially observable facts, which provide guidelines for the decisions of the courts. 
This was only possible by rejecting the fact-sceptic form of realism and adopting the 
rule-sceptic form of this approach to legal reasoning. The concern highlighted towards 
the end of the chapter was that we cannot just focus on critiquing the classification of 
others, especially if we think that classification is at all a worthwhile exercise. Since, 
in our view, classification can be useful if used in the right way, it was then argued 
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that an attempt to construct an overlapping approach would avoid the errors of Birks 
and develop a means for predicting the facts and patterns of English private law. 
 
To establish an overlap, it is necessary to have the framework within which these 
overlaps occur. Taking the lead from Llewellyn and our Roman forefathers, it was 
concluded that this framework could be established through three core concepts. This 
was achieved through the redefinition and refinement of the concepts of property, 
contract and tort. This leaves several gaps in our private law. Those gaps can then be 
filled with our overlapping concepts. Therefore, it is possible to adopt additional 
concepts to explain those areas of the law that are not caught by the core concepts of 
property, contract and tort.  
 
In Chapters 5-7, those concepts were monetary transfers, estoppel and express trusts. 
They share similarities with our core concepts; however, they play two important 
roles. For our core concepts to be descriptive concepts, they must be kept as narrow as 
possible. The remaining parts of our private law must still be accounted for: which is 
why it is important to develop overlapping concepts. The first main overlap was with 
money, which formed a weaker form of property due to the fact that most transfers 
involve intangible interests, and money is also, itself, legally significant. However, the 
Chapter also showed that it was not possible to construct any general rules which 
could apply to different types of money claims. This complexity is concealed by most 
approaches, and it was argued that the overlapping analysis makes the topic 
manageable whilst also providing the key element of predictability. Similarly, we 
provided a framework for reliance-based claims which recognised the need to tailor 
this claim depending on the nature of the overlap. So different types of reliance-based 
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claim can be seen when it overlaps with property, contract and tort. Finally, we saw 
the trust mechanism, which stands between property and contract. The main examples 
of trusts are different formulations of this overlap. The last issue we looked at was co-
habitation claims, which have up until now been classified as ‗constructive trusts‘. It 
was argued that these claims do not fit within the property and contract overlap. The 
benefit of this analysis is in recognising that we cannot treat these claims in the same 
way that we treat other private law claims. The overlapping analysis provides insights 
into these various branches of law, but it also begins to identify the patterns of private 
law. On that basis, an overlapping approach assists in classifying private law. 
 
This is why a conceptual approach has been adopted in this thesis. There are no 
simple guides or rules for private law. Private law is inherently complex, and there are 
numerous facts which determine the outcome of cases. It is impossible to bring 
together and capture every single fact which may or may not be relevant in any given 
case. This is only a problem for classification if we are under the misapprehension 
that classifying the law will provide the solution to even the most complex of cases. 
So instead our goals must be tempered with some realism. All that we can do is look 
for the core rules in our legal system, and try to identify patterns of behaviour. What 
we see in this conceptual approach is that legal concepts are expository devices that 
contain a number of important facts that are important in determining private law 
liabilities. Different combinations of these facts will likely lead to distinct liabilities, 
and, therefore, we must adopt separate conceptual approaches for these claims. We 
must move away from reductivist accounts of private law, as they only serve to hide 
and obfuscate the various elements that constitute our private law system. 
 
  
334 
 
 
To conclude, it should never be assumed that any classification of private law can be 
expected to answer the difficult questions posed by some of the more complex cases 
which are dealt with by the courts. The thesis of the overlapping of legal concepts 
approach is that classification merely assists in identifying facts and patterns. Those 
patterns are the best starting point in identifying what decisions the courts will make. 
A system of classification does no more than that. To quote Pound once more; ‗I 
doubt whether a classification is possible that will do anything more than classify.‘3 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
3
 R Pound, ‗Classification of Law‘ (1924) 37 Harvard L Rev 933 at 938. 
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